Iran’s Election and Unrest: What’s behind the silence of the Azerbaijanis in Iran?

Nadir GHAZANFARI - Eurasia Critic, August, 2009


Just hours after voting ended following last month's presidential election in Iran on June 12, the reformist candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi claimed an early victory with a majority of the votes. But a day after the election where two prominent reformist candidates, Mousavi and Mahdi Karroubi, and the conservative candidate Mohsen Rezaie, had run against the president, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, Iran's Interior Ministry announced that Ahmadinejad would retain the presidency--coming out ahead with more than 62 percent of the votes over his rival Mousavi, who had trailed far behind at 32 percent. After the election results were announced, reformist rivals Mousavi and Karrubi immediately protested, claiming the elections were rigged by Ahmadinijad. Mousavi contended that the election was marred by widespread fraud and insisted that he was robbed of a rightful victory. Rezaie followed suit.

People dissatisfied with the result of the elections demonstrated in Tehran and in some other cities, chanting "Where is my vote?" Hundreds of thousands of people flooded the streets of Tehran to support Mousavi and Karrubi's claims that the election had been flawed. In a statement, the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, praised the high turnout (reported to be 85%) and described the elections as a "real celebration" and called on people to stay calm.
Despite a number of both veiled and open threats against the protestors issued by Tehran, swarms of disappointed voters, reported to number more than 2 million people, pressed on with the demonstrations on June 15. But the firing on the crowds changed the tone of the protests. Iranian authorities confirmed that at least 8 people were killed. While Tehran was clearly home to the most volatile display of unrest and anti-government protests in the history of the Islamic Revolution, protestors rallied in support of a wider demonstration of dissent in other cities. The violent clampdown by the government and clashes between security forces and civilians during 10 days of protests ended with more than 20 people killed, hundreds injured and many arrested.
Protests also took place in some larger cities in Iran including Mashhad, Esfahan and Shiraz. But the predominantly Azerbaijani region of northwestern Iran, including its capital, Tabriz, remained quiet during the turbulent days of protests that rocked Tehran. There were a number of factors determining which way the Azerbaijani vote would go; one being the fact that Mousavi is an Azerbaijani and secondly, Ahmadinijad's bloody handling of the demonstrations by ethnic Azerbaijani citizens back in 2006. Against a backdrop of active engagement and even leadership on the part of Iran's Azerbaijanis in the social and political movements that have shaped Iran over the last century; the Azerbaijanis silence at today's strategic juncture is no coincidence.
The role of the Azerbaijanis in the revolutions and political movements in 20th century Iran

In Borders and Brethren, Brenda Shaffer argues that in the history of modern Iran, Azerbaijanis always struggled for democracy hoping that this would bring autonomy to Azerbaijan. Starting from Iran's 1906 Constitutional Revolution to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, as well as the period in between, Azerbaijanis have always taken on important roles during the critical turning points that determined the country's political fate. Its proximity to the Ottoman Empire and to the Caucasus has historically made the Azerbaijani region of Iran open to progressive ideas and trends.

In the early 20th century the Constitutional Revolution took place in Iran in August 1906. The system of constitutional monarchy was created by the decree of Mozzafar-al-Din Shah as a result of the Revolution. After his death, his eldest son Mohammad Ali, an opponent of constitutional government, became the Shah. He carried a coup d'état and dissolved the National Assembly in 1908. Some deputies were killed and others were seized in Tehran. But Tehran is not the whole of Iran; and a civil war broke out as revolutionaries stood up in defense of the revolution in Tabriz. Sattar Khan and Bagher Khan, two main figures of the revolutionary movement, led the people of Tabriz to endure two sieges in defense of the Iranian Constitution of 1906, resisting against the royalist forces. The movement spread to other parts of Iran. Finally, the civil war was over when the rebel armies reached Tehran, and the second National Assembly was declared in 1909.6 Iran's ethnic populations, and especially the Azerbaijanis, played an active role in the reestablishment of the Constitutional Assembly.

In 1919, an agreement was reached between Iran and the United Kingdom known as the Anglo-Iranian Agreement. According to the agreement, decision-making authority over Iran's military, financial, and customs affairs were transferred to Britain. The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan under the leadership of Shaykh Muhammad Khiabani was the first to demonstrate against the agreement and accused Tehran of selling out to foreign colonialists. The party demanded the establishment of a republic in Iran and went even further, calling the province of Azerbaijan as Azadistan (the land of freedom). The demonstrations spread to other parts of Iran, especially Tehran. Khiabani led Tabriz and the surrounding areas to another revolt against Britain's colonial maneuvers. Iranian forces were sent to Tabriz, the revolt was suppressed and Khiabani killed. The agreement was abrogated in 1920.6

After 1926, when the Pahlavi dynasty took over power in Iran, an era of dictatorship started under Reza Shah Pahlavi's reign. He launched various projects that he called reforms and aspired to build a nation through a rapid push for modernization, all the while eliminating all ethnic rights which had been the first of their kind in the history of Iran--a country which has never had an officially dominant ethnic group. The demand for ethnic cultural and economical rights was voiced from the Azerbaijani region. During World War II, Iran was occupied by the Allies and Reza Shah was removed from power, after which time the winds of democracy blew in Iran. The first voice of democracy rose from Tabriz.

Jafar Pishevari announced the foundation of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (the same name as Khiabani's organization). "The party expressed that Azerbaijan will remain as part of Iran but demanded three major reforms for Azerbaijan: the use of Azerbaijani Turkish in state schools and government offices; the retention of tax revenues for the development of the region; and the establishment of the provincial assemblies promised in the constitutional laws".6 The party announced the autonomy of Azerbaijan on December 12, 1945 with Pishevari as the founder and chairman of the Azerbaijan People's Government. Tehran was strife with concern about the rising demands for ethnic rights, fearing that other ethnic minorities would soon vocalize similar demands. The Iranian government sent forces to Azerbaijan in order to crush the Azerbaijan autonomous government. The forces attacked Tabriz and the autonomous government was crushed only a year later, in December 1946. Thousands of people were killed and executed after Tabriz was occupied. Once again, demands for democracy in Iran were cut down in Tabriz.

The 1979 revolution that lifted Ayatollah Khomeini to power was carried out by a wide coalition of groups with different ideological orientations. What united them was the desire to dismantle the throne of monarchy in Iran. Many of the provinces with predominately non-Persian ethnic groups did not favor the new rules that the incoming regime was planning to institutionalize, especially the referendum for the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran.

Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, born to an Azeri family in Tabriz, was the leading representative of the clergy during the final years of the reign of Reza Shah. He opposed the establishment of an Islamic republic which did not fully represent the will of the Iranian people and which aimed to exclusively grant all power to the supreme leader. An outspoken critic of Khomeini, Ayatollah Shariatmadari opposed the new constitution, which was based heavily on Khomeini's view of "governance of the jurist" or Velāyat-e faqīh. Following the referendum on the constitution, Azerbaijanis demonstrated against the results on the basis that the media had treated them unfairly and that the referendum was rigged. The Muslim People's Republican Party (MPRP) was founded in 1979 by supporters of Ayatollah Shariatmadari in his native Azerbaijan and took control of Tabriz for a month. The government maintained that the protestors were foreign instigators, not Iranians, a move reminiscent of statements issued earlier by the Shah after the Tabriz demonstrations in 1978 against the Pahlavi regime. During this time, Azerbaijani protestors and the Revolutionary Guard clashed in violent confrontations and when finally the security forces wrested control of Tabriz, eleven MPRP leaders were executed. Killings which aimed to eliminate political opponents continued for days in Tabriz. Further executions of MPRP members took place some months later in May. Soon afterward Khomeini ordered the MPRP disbanded. Once again, the Azerbaijanis endeavors in the name of furthering democracy in Iran were thwarted by bloody means. No show of support came from Tehran or other Iranian cities. The events of late 1979 and early 1980 were a turning point for many Azerbaijanis in their relation with the Islamic Republic.

The Azerbaijanis national movement

After the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, Azerbaijanis hoped that they could finally claim, at a minimum, the rights which are laid out in the Constitution. But state policies were moving the country in a completely different direction.

During this period, Azerbaijani national identity entered a phase of increasing awareness and consolidation in Iran. This trend accelerated dramatically following the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Additionally, the occupation of Karabakh proved to add more steam to the ethnic stirrings among Azerbaijanis in Iran.8, Iran has long been weary of a strong handed Azerbaijan which could mobilize ethnic-based identity politics in Iran and provoke demands for ethnic rights among its own Azerbaijani population in Iran. Despite ideological differences with Armenia, Iran supported the Armenians against Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict-even though Iran and Azerbaijan both have a Shiite Muslim majority. This caused dissatisfaction with Iran's policies toward Azerbaijan among Iranian Azerbaijanis at home. Students at Tabriz University organized a protest inside the university. The demonstrations were the first of their kind in terms of the political content and tone highlighting demands for the recognition of Azerbaijani language and identity.

In 1995, the Iran Broadcasting Authority released a survey in which widespread prejudice was revealed among Persians toward Azerbaijanis. Students at Tabriz University organized a protest to condemn the racist questionnaire.11 The demonstration ended when the East Azerbaijan Province governor accepted to meet the protesters. The demonstrators indicated that the survey was conducted "to divert our national struggle from its main stream to a reduced issue of Fars-Turk conflict". The protests came to an end but the event deeply affected the terms of the Azerbaijanis relationship with the government, as well as their approach to promoting Azerbaijani identity from that point forward. Feeling sidelined from mainstream Iran, ethnic Azeris became more eager to embrace their own cultural heritage and history.

The period of collective awakening among the Azerbaijanis marked by more vocal demands for their ethnic rights reached its peak with the Iranian parliamentary elections in 1996. In Tabriz, Mahmudali Chehregani, the parliamentary candidate who had the support of the Azerbaijani student activists, ran on a platform that called for the use of Azerbaijani Turkish in schools and in the state apparatus, and greater economic development measures for the Azerbaijani provinces.5 Although Chehregani received overwhelming support from the voters in Tabriz, the central government could not tolerate it. The security forces detained Chehregani, the Tabriz-based demonstrations in his support were silenced, and hundreds of students and activists were arrested. He was released after he agreed to withdraw his candidacy from the elections.

The 1996 elections were a disappointment for the Azerbaijanis who had held high hopes that it would be a watershed moment in strengthening pluralistic democracy in Iran. It also changed their strategy in terms of voicing demands for an expansion of ethnic rights. In the face of Tehran's resistance to signs of the opening up of political spaces for the Azerbaijanis, they arrived at the conclusion that there was no longer any hope of achieving greater freedoms from inside the existing political system and decided that the struggle should continue independently. The result was what is today called the "South Azerbaijan National Movement" (SANM).

Demands for greater recognition of ethnic rights in Iran are rising among Iran's diverse non-Persian ethnic groups. Along with Azerbaijani Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Beluchis, and Turkmans are also struggling for an expansion of democratic measures to ensure the rights of all ethnic minorities in the country. The efforts of Azerbaijanis in achieving progress through political struggle have generally been halted by the government. The irony has been the prevalence of persistent restrictions and limitations even in the period of the reformist government under former president Khatami-a time which had held out great hopes in favor of liberalization and plurality in Iranian politics.

The cartoon crisis

On May 12, 2006, "Iran", a state-run newspaper published a cartoon insulting Azerbaijanis. It depicted an Azeri-speaking cockroach and suggested people deny it food until it learned to speak Persian. Azerbaijani university students held demonstrations protesting the cartoon and demanded a formal government apology. In the first days of the demonstrations, no official response from the government condemning the cartoon materialized. The demonstrations spread to other cities in the predominantly Azerbaijani region of Iran. On May 22, Tabriz was home to the greatest anti-state demonstration since the founding of the Islamic Revolution. The protestors went out to the streets and called on Tehran to respect ethnic rights, and demanded that Azerbaijani Turkish be an official state language in Iran. The Azerbaijanis peaceful demonstrations were met with force. The security forces fired on people, reportedly killing at least 15 and arrested hundreds of protestors. Similar demonstrations shook most of the Azerbaijani cities. Naghadeh (Sulduz), Urmia, and Meshghinsherhr (Khiyav) hosted bloody demonstrations with at least 10 people killed.

In response to the vast demonstrations, the government quickly removed the editor-in-chief of the newspaper and the caricaturist, but no official apology was released. The Iranian media did not adequately report the events that occurred during the demonstrations despite their unprecedented size and duration and the events went largely unnoticed in foreign media outlets as well. Azerbaijanis found themselves completely alone in the struggle for their rights in Iran. The opposition in Iran, the so called reformist camp, also did not support the rightful protests of the Azerbaijanis. The demonstrations were not only a backlash against the cartoon, but represented a wider uprising against the tens of years of discrimination and oppression in Iran toward the Azerbaijanis.

Why are Azerbaijanis quiet today?

The silence among the Azerbaijanis in light of the widely contested results of the June 12 presidential election in Iran has three major reasons. The first and most important is the historical background of the Azerbaijani struggle for democracy in Iran. Although Azerbaijanis have played a central role in the battle for ethnic rights, sacrificing themselves at times to achieve the common goal they share with other ethnic groups in Iran, the movements and revolutions were deflected or even brought down brutally by centralist sentiments in Tehran. Since the Azerbaijanis demands have not been guaranteed despite previous political attempts, there is a sense of disillusionment among the Azerbaijanis today who do not want to participate in what they view as passing trends that are not likely to identify with or support their cause for greater rights and freedoms.

The second reason is how the May 2006 uprisings of the Azerbaijanis were clamped down by Tehran. The opposition centralists did not support the demonstrations. In fact, the most damaging reaction came from human rights organizations in Iran who ignored the news of human rights violations reported in the Azeri region. Such actions disappointed the Azerbaijani community, and brought them to a position where some now think of themselves as no longer a part of Iran.

Finally, many Azerbaijanis interpret the recent post-election uprisings on the streets of Tehran as a struggle for power and control, not for the ideals of democracy. Although Azerbaijanis do not approve of Ahmadinijad's policies and attitudes toward ethnic groups in Iran, they are not confident that the reformists will choose a different, and more tolerant, set of policies. Azerbaijanis recall the Khatami presidency which failed to bring any genuine change in the regime's approach toward an expansion of ethnic rights. This is also true for other ethnic groups in Iran, since they also are tired of being caught up in Iran's domestic power struggles at the expense of progress on cultural and language rights granted to ethnic minorities not far beyond Iran's borders.

Any new proposal tabled by the opposition movement on the issue of ethnic minority rights needs to be convincing and support measures such as formally recognizing the decades of discrimination that ethnic communities in Iran have had to endure; acknowledging Azeri and other language and cultural rights; and introducing institutional mechanisms to allow ethnic groups to participate in a more representative and pluralistic political system in Iran. Such steps would encourage non-Persian ethnicities to actively participate in molding Iran's political, economic and social future, and help regain lost confidence in Tehran.

i http://ghalamnews.ir/ Mousavi's official website.
ii http://tabnak.ir/ Last access 10/07/09.
iii http://www.kayhannews.ir/ Keyhan newspaper official website.
vi http://www.irna.ir/ The official news agency of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Last access 10/07/09.
v Brenda Shaffer, Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity, The MIT press (2002).
vi Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, Princeton University press (1982). Ahmad Kasravi, History of Iranian Constitutional Revolution, Amir Kabir press (1978).
vii Alireza Asgharzadeh, Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism, and Democratic Struggles, Palgrave Macmillan (2007).
viii Brenda Shaffer.
ix Hamed Yeghanepur, "Azerbaijan national movement", South Azerbaijan Social and Cultural Researches (GUNASKAM).
http://www.gunaskam.com/az1/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=62
x Alireza Asgharzadeh, "In Search of a Global Soul: Azerbaijan and the Challenge of Multiple Identities", South Azerbaijan Social and Cultural Researches (GUNASKAM).http://www.gunaskam.com/eng/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=67
xi Araz Student Journal, Azerbaijan student movement, Tabriz University (2005).
xii Arif Keskin, "Azerbaijani-Turk nationalism in Iran and the cartoon crisis", South Azerbaijan Social and Cultural Researches (GUNASKAM).http://www.gunaskam.com/tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=110
xiii Association for the Defense of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran,http://www.adapp.info/

Read more ...

Profile: Dr. Alireza Asgharzadeh

Advocacy-farzin: Earlier in my blog posts, I mentioned that I regretted not giving adequate coverage on civil rights and racism in Iran. Being that my own personal experiences are quite limited to the Persian community outside of Iran, I decided to go to an expert, if not the foremost expert on racism in Iran against Azerbaijanis, Dr. Alireza Asgharzadeh.

Dr. Asgharzadeh holds a holds a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto and currently a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at York University, Toronto, Canada. His areas of concentration and research include Globalization, Iranian Studies, Middle Eastern Cultures and Societies, Social Theory, the Sociology of Education, and Social Inequality, among others. His work has been published in various journals, including: Middle East Review of International Affairs, Journal of Studies in International Education, Canadian and International Education, Language and Education, Journal of Educational Thought, Journal of Post-Colonial Education, Journal of African Studies, Anthropology and Education Quarterly. His most recent book is Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Aryanist Racism, Islamic Fundamentalism, and Democratic Struggles (This happens to be the book that I mentioned earlier that I was reading. I highly suggest it). He is also co-author of Schooling and Difference in Africa: Democratic Challenges in a Contemporary Context, and co-editor of Diasporic Ruptures: Globality, Migrancy, and Expressions of Identity (in two volumes). I’ve had the pleasure to talk to Dr. Asgharzadeh a few times and must note that he is truly an inspiring person and one of the most brilliant people that I have had ever met. Since he currently teaches in Toronto, I couldn’t get a chance to do a video interview, however I was able to communicate with him through e-mail. Since it’s quite long, I’ve broken it down. Here’s part 1 of our interview:

Me: First, if you would please introduce yourself, your profession, work and your background.

Dr Asgharzadeh: Generally, I consider myself a universal subject who has multiple identities and occupies multiple social and geographical locations: a world citizen, a Canadian, an Azerbaijani, an Iranian, a Turk, an Azeri-Canadian… As a young student I participated in Iran’s 1978-79 revolution. This revolution did not only transform the socio-political order in the country (for better or worse), it also fundamentally changed the way members of my generation thought about a variety of social, political, and cultural issues. I was simply fascinated by how ordinary people could bring down the most powerful institutions like the monarchy and the state in a society. Hence my interest in politics, social sciences, philosophy, etc. I have been passionately pursuing these interests ever since, and more academically since my arrival in Canada, from the late 1980s. I have studied political science, philosophy and sociology throughout my mature life, and now am teaching different aspects of these subjects at York University and the University of Toronto.

Me: Dr. Asgharzadeh, please describe the nature of racism in Iran, its history and who it affects. Is racism in Iran an institution, or is it simply a societal flaw? Does racism serve as a tool of control?

Dr. Asgharzadeh: Well, in a nutshell, it all goes back to this Orientalist scholar named Sir William Jones and the observation that he made in 1786 regarding the affinity among various European languages, the Sanskrit and what he called in passing “the Old Persian.” In this brief speech to the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Jones brought a fresh insight to the questions concerning the ancestral language of peoples of Europe and their original homeland, sparking a debate that eventually culminated in the creation of Comparative Linguistics and the Aryanist/Indo-Europeanist enterprise. This of course opened the floodgates for numerous European scholars, historians and philologists to try and establish a connection between White Europeans and the ancient East. Using mainly linguistic signs and traits, some of these scholars identified central Asia, some India, and some Iran as the original homeland of the white Nordic race, which later on came to be constructed as the infamous ‘Aryan race.’ A side from intellectual curiosity, the main objective for many Orientalists was to move ‘the white race’ as far away from Semitic races and Biblical traditions as possible. In Europe this enterprise reached its logical conclusion in fascism and Hitler’s Nazism. After Nazism, the Europeans became disillusioned with the entire enterprise of the so-called ‘Aryan race.’ Irrespective of this, the fascination with this illusory race continued in a different fashion in places like Iran and to some extent India, where certain groups saw an enormous opportunity in attaching themselves to this so-called ‘Aryan race’ and in identifying themselves as “Aryans.”

I should emphasize that William Jones and many of his contemporaries did not intend to purposely promote racism, anti-Semitism or fascism through their scholarship. They simply believed that they were engaged in scholarly research on Orient and the Orientals. The German scholar Max Muller had a major role in digging out the term “Arya” from ancient Sanskrit texts and redefining it, quite intentionally and erroneously, as a racial concept, as the name of a racial group. But he too came to his senses and quite vigorously repudiated this earlier conviction of his in 1888. Here is what he said in a book titled Biographies of words and the home of the Aryas:

“To me an ethnologist who speaks of Aryan race, Aryan blood, Aryan eyes and hair, is as great a sinner as a linguist who speaks of a dolichocephalic dictionary or a brachycephalic grammar.” (1888, p. 120)

However, the Iranian elite, scholars and government were not ready to give up on this notion of “Aryan race” so easily, even after the fall of Nazism and Fascism in Europe. They built up on Max Muller and others’ earlier definitions and refashioned a definition of Arya as a purely racial group, building a whole new literature on “Aryan race” and how the true Iranians were carriers of this “superior race’s” not only language and culture but also genes and blood. This racist ideology, of course, had serious ramifications for Iran’s non-Persian and non-Indo-European communities, namely the Turks and the Semites (Arabs and Jews) along with others.

As you can imagine, this Iranian version of racialization was quite oxymoronic in the sense that in terms of skin color and physiology, the supposedly non-Aryan Turks and Semites had more resemblance to Hitler’s white-skinned, blue-eyed and blond-haired Aryans than the original Persians whom Hitler would probably classify under “the brown race” category. This simple discrepancy, however, did not stop our Persian Aryanists from advancing the strongest claims to “the superior Aryan race.” Logically, they didn’t (because they couldn’t) emphasize too heavily on “blood” and “skin color” the way Hitler did; they, however, placed a greater emphasis on “Persian language” and history–as if other people had no history and no language! In the Iranian reconstruction of Aryanist racism, then, the emphasis on “language” replaced the Nazist and Hitlerite emphasis on “blood” and “genes.”

In 1934, the Reza Shah government officially changed the name of the country from Mamalik-e Mahrouseh (protected countries) to Iran and defined it as “the land of Aryans.” Simultaneously the Persian ethnic group was singled out as the most authentic representative of these Aryans where the language of this group was seen as an Aryan- and hence superior- language, which was in turn translated into the banning of non-Persian languages from schools and government apparatuses. It is important to note that the term “Persia” was an Orientalist construct and has never been used by diverse ethnic groups to refer either to themselves or their country, neither historically nor currently.

In today’s Iran, just as throughout history, only the Persian ethnic group calls itself Persian. Irrespective of this, the Orientalist scholarship abroad still insists on calling all residents of Iran Persian, which is a clear case of epistemic violence against non-Persian communities. Anyway, this notion of fixed Aryan/Persian identity has been imposed on Iran with no consideration for diversity, social dynamism and historical evolution. This process still continues and the non-Persian communities are left with no choice except to adopt this “superior Aryan” identity by leaving behind their supposedly “savage and barbaric” heritage. This racism is reinforced through the education system, the media, as well as official and non-official literature produced in Persian language. In contemporary Iran then, Aryanism and Aryanization constitute the core of Iranian racism. We should also note that since 1979, Khomeinism and Shi’ist fundamentalism have been added to the existing Aryanist racism.

Me: Aside from the government, what kind of racism exists within Iranian society? You could use academic or anecdotal evidence.

Dr. Asgharzadeh: Basically, all sorts of racism(s) exist/s in this society, from systemic to individualistic, cultural, linguistic, internalized, scientific and academic. For instance, lately there has been a lot of fuss about this presumably marvellous Iranian biologist who has apparently done DNA testing in a British university on the Azeri Turks, the Anatolian Turks and the Persians and has “successfully proven” that the Azerbaijani-Turks are not genetically related to the Anatolian Turks but are (genetically) almost the same as the Aryan Persians! They have been talking about this for the past couple of years and we are all anxiously waiting to see when the results of these “path-breaking experiments” are going to be published and in what esteemed scientific journal! I for one, am very interested in seeing the kind of research methodology, the size of research population, and the kind of terminologies and their definitions (e.g., race, racism, etc) that are used by this brilliant scientist. As you can imagine, the dominant group in Iran constructs all these hyperbolic racist discourses to deny one basic human right to over 20 million Turks in Iran: Education in their own natural language.

Me: Many say that if Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is a reported Azeri, how can racism still exist in Iran? And the same could be said about Mir-Hussein Mousavi, the “unofficial leader” of current opposition movement in Iran, who happens to be an Azeri. How can you explain this?

Dr. Asgharzadeh: The supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s father was an Azeri from the city of Khameneh, but his mother is Persian and he himself was born in the Persian city of Mashhad. A few weeks ago, on the occasion of The Mother’s Day in Iran, a group of children and adolescents were visiting him. And in this visit he talked about his own childhood, his upbringing, and his parents, identifying his mother as a Persian and a “Hafez-Shenas” (someone well-versed in Hafez, the great Persian poet). So his mother tongue is Farsi but he has picked up some Azeri words from his Azerbaijani father which he occasionally blabbers–for the sheer purpose of demagoguery– when he visits Azerbaijani cities or when Azerbaijanis visit him. Interestingly enough, the leader of current opposition movement, Mir-Hussein Mousavi, too, is an Azeri-Turk, born in the Azerbaijani town of Khameneh and migrated with his family to the capital city of Tehran at the age of 12. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that, in the context of Iranian politics, ethnic lineage plays any role in disturbing Iran’s dominant national identity as modeled on the identity of the Persian ethnic group.

People like Mousavi and Khamenei are assimilated Azerbaijanis to whom the local Azeri vernacular refers as “Manqurt”: i.e., someone who has forsaken his/her own roots and embraced the identity of the dominant to the exclusion of his/her former identity. Put differently, a “Manqurt” is someone who assumes someone else’s identity and at the same time fights against the “former” community from which he or she has originally come. As such, it would be a mistake to presume that Mousavi’s ascendency to power will bring about any improvement in the condition of his Azerbaijani community, just as the role of Khamenei as the supreme leader has not done so. If anything, the dominant Persian group uses the examples of individuals like Khamenei and Mousavi to deny the existence of racial/ethnic discrimination in the country, employing these assimilated figures as decoys to masquerade its domination of non-Persian communities.

Conversely, the elite and assimilated members of non-Persian communities whole-heartedly support the dominant group and its racist/exclusionary policies vis-à-vis the marginalized communities. These “Manqurts” include elite members of parliament, heads of local and provincial apparatuses of government, mayors, governorates, university presidents, local educational authorities, heads of police stations and military units, and so on and so forth. In terms of representing the rights of local communities, the “Manqurts” not only fully support the repression of human/ethnic/linguistic rights of their community members, they even go farther than the central government’s oppressive policies in an attempt to show their loyalty to the state which in turn guarantees their positions of power and privilege. This process could be viewed in recent Iranian election, where the choice between the Persian candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the Azeri candidate Mir-Hussein Mousavi, to Iran’s Azeri population was clearly a choice between Scylla and Charybdis.

Me: Does Racism exist among Iranians outside of Iran?

Dr. Asgharzadeh: Yes, it does and its degree depends on their socialization, their age, etc. Usually, it is not that prevalent among younger generations particularly if they grow up in multi-racial environments. However, it is more rampant among the older generation who has come with its cultural and linguistic baggage from the old country. Among members of this group- many of them highly educated- you’ll see a lot of references to Aryan race, Aryan blood, superior civilization, superior language, and that sort of things. Anti-Semitism, anti-Arabism and anti-Turkism are also very prevalent among them.

Particularly, in recent years we have witnessed the emergence in Iranian Diaspora of a group of hooligans and, if you will, intellectual thugs, who run around and blatantly attack whoever talks of Iran’s Azerbaijani or Turkic population, a population which numbers over 20 million. Whoever defends the rights of this particular community, even the scholars who do objective research on the situation of this community in Iran, and even those members of the community who self-identify as Azerbaijani-Turks are attacked by these racist thugs who, using various pseudonyms, label these individuals as “pan-Turkist” and so forth. In my book, Iran and the Challenge of Diversity, I have given some samples of racist literature produced in Iranian Diaspora.

Me: Let us turn to your book then. When was it written and what is it about? Can you explain its core arguments?

Dr. Asgharzadeh: My book Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Aryanist Racism, Islamic Fundamentalism, and Democratic Struggles, was published by Palgrave Macmillan in the summer of 2007. Basically, the book explores a number of important questions such as: How is the racist order produced, maintained, and perpetuated in contemporary Iran? How do the acts of othering, misrepresentation, and racism take place through works of literature, history, religion, and other textual/discursive means? What role does language play throughout the processes of ‘otherization,’ foreignization, cultural annihilation, and assimilation in contemporary Iran? What are the ramifications of Aryanist racism for Iran’s non-Persian ethnic groups? How do the victims of this racism engage in acts of resistance against the ongoing racial/ethnic oppression? What role can the intellectuals, scholars, social activists, and the education system play in helping to eliminate racism in Iranian society?

The book, then, seeks to establish the existence of racism and its detrimental ramifications for social, political, economic, and educational developments in Iran. It examines the role of Europe, and the West in general, in the origination and development of modern racism in Iran. It also explores possible mechanisms, ways, and sites through which racism can be eliminated in Iran, for instance through empowering the marginalized languages; providing space for the expression of indigenous histories; reforming the education system, etc. In so doing, the book deconstructs the dominant Euro-centric ideas of nation, nationalism, nation-statism and Aryanism in an Iranian context. It implicates the dominant members of Farsi-speaking community in their capacity as writers, poets, and intellectuals in producing, reproducing, and maintaining unequal ethnic, cultural, and linguistic relations in the country. At the same time, it provides a space for marginalized communities in Iran to articulate their condition through their own voices, in their own languages, and by way of their own literatures, as opposed to being exclusively represented through the dominant Persian language and literature. It redefines and rearticulates the question of citizenship based on equal cultural, linguistic, and human rights of each citizen, each collectivity, and each community. This rearticulation challenges the dominant notion of citizenship, which has granted the ownership of the country to certain group(s) based on their ‘Aryan-ness.’

Me: What was some of the backlash you have received as a result of your work and your book? Have you yourself experienced any direct racism?

Dr. Asgharzadeh: Well, to expose Aryanist racism in Iran, to talk about ethnic, linguistic and cultural rights for the non-Persian communities, these are taboo topics among Iranians, regardless of whether they are inside Iran or in Iranian Diaspora outside, and regardless of whether they are a part of the current Islamic regime or a part of its opposition. This is an act of daring, a speaking of truth to power. And when you do that, the power reacts. This reaction takes many forms, from the blocking of your publications in Iran-related and Middle East-related academic journals to attacking you in conferences and seminars to threats of getting you expelled from your job and so on and so forth.

Recently a progressive Canada-based Persian newspaper named Shahrvand interviewed me on the events leading to the tenth election and its aftermath in Iran. In response to one of the questions, I compared the current political regime in Iran to the Apartheid system in South Africa and said that, in order to defeat the current fascistic regime in Iran, we Iranians could learn a lot from the struggle of South Africans as well as from the Civil Rights Movement in America. Soon after the interview was published, I received a threatening email from an “academic,” asking me, among other things, “How dare you compare the Aryan race of Iran to Black Africans?” The email concluded that if I had a single drop of Aryan blood in me, I wouldn’t disgrace “the Aryan nation of Iran” by suggesting that they should learn from “Black Africans.”

I suspect this email was coming from a group who has published a 300-plus page monologue to refute and reject my “false book.” Published on a well-known racist website, this monologue starts by an epigraph in Persian, depicting me as a “Mongol demon” with a Dracula face and long nails, “blood constantly dripping from his fingernails”… I think you can imagine how the rest of this brilliant critique unfolds. Suffice it to say that the only connection between my work and this “review” is my name that the anonymous authors remember to throw in every now and then. Other scholars such as Dr Reza Baraheni, Dr Brenda Shaffer, Dr Zia Sadrul-Ashrafi and courageous Azerbaijani human rights activists such as Ms. Fakhteh zamani have been regular victims of this group.

This group even managed to pressure the editors of “Ethnologue,” an international website pertaining to world’s languages, to reduce the size of Iran’s Azeri population from about 23.5 million to 11 million, and this, despite the warning that many scholars and human rights activists from the Azerbaijani community had given to the Ethnologue editors regarding this group. In an open letter to Ethnologue, these scholars complained about the aggressiveness of some ultra-nationalist Iranians abroad and expressed their hope “that the editors and researchers of Ethnologue will not cave in to various ultranationalist bullying, and will not allow Ethnologue’s scholarly reputation to be tarnished by ideologically motivated hyperboles.” Despite this, their prediction came through in Ethnologue’s latest issue: a whopping 12 million reduction in the number of Azeri-Turks in Iran!

Me: What in your opinion is the solution? Do you have any policy recommendations for government structure?

Dr. Asgharzadeh: I think we have to expose this racism and bring awareness to the world community about it, like the things that you guys are doing and ADAPP is doing. This is a first major step. In the course of recent elections, the government authorities emphatically made it clear that in the Islamic Republic of Iran “issues pertaining to ethnic minorities are considered a matter of national security” to the extent that even the regime’s own majles/parliament could not have any say on these issues. What this means is that in Iran, ethnic minority related issues are dealt with by the regime’s security agents. They are not even considered as normal social and political issues–let alone as human rights issues. Thus, we cannot expect much from the Islamic regime in this regard.

Me: What would Iran look like without racism?

Dr. Asgharzadeh: We have to remember that, what “blood” was for German Nazism, “language” is for Iranian racism. So I will leave you with this thought: when I see that millions of children belonging to Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Baluchi, Turkmen, Arab, Lur, Bakhtyari, Gilani and other communities have schools in their own languages, that will be a good sign towards the creation of an Iran without racism.

Me: Thank you very much Dr. Asgharzadeh. Your words have been insightful and inspiring.

Read more ...

Coop Radio's interview with Fakhteh Zamani

15th of June 2009, Reginald Angus Argue (pen name of Angus McLeod) had as guests Fakhteh Zamani & Pastor James David Manning. This was originally broadcast on CO-OP Radio (102.7 FM CFRO http://www.coopradio.org/ on the Internet) out of Vancouver British Columbia Canada on the radio show Monday Brown Bagger, which is heard from Noon to 1 pm PST.

Fakhteh Zamani is the President Association for Defence of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran (ADAPP) out of Vancouver, Canada. The discussion was around Iran and how the Azerbaijan people have been treated within this nation, and other points surrounding Iran.

http://www.archive.org/details/MondayBrownBagger-June-15-2009

Read more ...

Minorities Disillusioned by Iran's Democracy Movement

advocacy

July 7, 2009, Vancouver, Canada: Iran's large Azerbaijani minority feels disappointed and ignored by the pro-democracy movement, which has been widely praised internationally for opposing the Iranian government's attempt to rig the June 12 election.

The sense of disillusionment among Iranian Azerbaijanis, who make up almost a quarter of the country's population, has emerged from coverage of the post-election crisis by the Association for the Defense of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran (ADAPP), an advocacy group that works from Canada. ADAPP is a new partner of the Advocacy Project (AP).

Farzin, an AP Peace Fellow volunteering with ADAPP, said Azerbaijanis and other minorities have been savagely treated by Iranian authorities during the crisis - first for supporting the opposition and second for demanding the right to enjoy their own culture and language.

But this has not been acknowledged by the followers of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the main opposition candidate, because they are mostly Persians and share the government's concern that minority rights would threaten Persian hegemony in Iran, he said.

This bias extends to the Persian media, and the alternative media, which has been celebrated internationally for escaping the heavy hand of Iranian censors. ADAPP's press releases have been ignored by the Voice of America's Persian service, which is normally receptive to criticism of the Iranian government, as well as the BBC and Radio Farda. Major online media outlets, like the Huffington Post, have also been silent about the plight of Iran's minorities.

"There has been absolutely no reporting on Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Baluchis, Semitic Peoples, Afghanis, Turcomens, Qashqai and Ahwazi Arabs," reports Farzin, who was himself born in the Azerbaijani town of Urmia.

Farzin's blog has offered a dramatic, and highly personal, alternative perspective on the election crisis. They began on an optimistic note before June 12, as the two main candidates competed for the large Azerbaijani vote. Mr Mousavi, who is himself an Azerbaijani Turk, toured the Azerbaijani towns of Tabriz and Urmia and addressed enthusiastic crowds (shown above) in Azerbaijani. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also visited Tabriz and claimed to speak Azerbaijani.

But even as the President was speaking, police were rounding up dozens of known Azerbaijani activists. The government response to protests (shown below) after the election was also swift and brutal. Two pro-democracy protesters died in Urmia and 300 were arrested, including two activists, Behnam Sheykhi and Mahmud Ojaghli, who worked for Mr Mousavi's campaign. Three protesters were beaten to death in Tabriz.

This was just the latest in a long campaign to suppress minority rights, but it prompted no statement of regret from Mr Mousavi, his followers, or the Persian media. As a result, areas with a high percentage of minorities - including Kurdistan, Baluchistan and Khuzestan - have seen no major protests since the election.

"People in these regions - especially in Azerbaijan - believe that no matter who comes to power, their rights will not be supported. So they are not taking an active role," said Fakhteh Zamani, Founder and President of ADAPP.

Yashar Hakkakpour, a spokesperson for the ADAPP, said that Mr Mousavi isn't trusted by Azerbaijanis because he failed to support minority rights during his term as Prime Minister. Mr Mousavi also remained silent in 2006, when thousands of Azerbaijanis took to the streets to protest a political cartoon that pictured Azerbaijanis as cockroaches. Scores were detained, beaten and even killed. Hundreds were arrested.

In his blog, Farzin observes that Iran will not enjoy true democracy or peace until the "racism" in Iranian society is eradicated and Persians embrace linguistic and cultural rights for Azerbaijanis and other minorities.

"In this current movement, minorities must finally be guaranteed these rights," he wrote. "Otherwise, why would they risk their lives for the status quo? What's in it for them?"

Read Farzin's blog
Learn more about ADAPP
Watch a video interview with ADAPP Founder Fakhteh Zamani

Read more ...

AZERBAIJANIS LIVING IN ANKARA REGARDING RECENT INCIDENTS IN IRAN

July 1. 2009

Historically, Azerbaijan has clearly stated its attitude and position with respect to processes leading to freedom and democracy in Iran. Azerbaijan has not only contributed significantly to these processes, but has also provided leadership. Recently, activities in pursuit of democracy and human rights have followed the announcement of presidential election results in several large cities, particularly Tehran. They are by no means unusual or previously unknown. Such reactions are considered to be the last recourse against anti-democratic pressures that have been felt since the revolution of 1979.

Likewise, national, civil, democratic and liberal movements within Azerbaijan have entered a new phase and taken on added dimensions since 1995. Such movements are reflected in the course of elections, in gatherings at the Babek Citadel, in commemorative ceremonies, symposiums and conferences, or in events such as the “cartoon crisis” which encouraged millions of people to come into the streets for the pursuit of freedom and human rights. But centralist opposition circles have exhibited attitudes of exclusivity and aloofness, and did not support the rightful protest for basic human rights and demands during the Azerbaijan cartoon crisis of March 2006.

Until now, Azerbaijan has remained silent during the ongoing democratic protests in Tehran and this silence must be reconsidered.

We the undersigned, despite the exclusive and abandoning manner of centralist opposition circles, cannot remain silent while excessive force and violence is used against democratic, civilian and liberal protests taking place in Tehran. In this context, we express our deep sorrow over the events of recent days. We thoroughly condemn these suppressions of humanity and democracy as witnessed in unknown perpetrator murders, detainments, torture, firings, exiles and so on.

Accordingly, we demand:

1. The application of regulations in international law and the articles of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights which have been signed and committed to by the government of Iran.

2. The legal application of constitutionally protected rights and freedoms, and an end to the blockage of modern democratization and liberal processes by outmoded approaches and justifications.

3. The immediate granting of freedoms and rights related to collective cultural identities, thus ending all racist, chauvinistic and fascistic approaches against Azerbaijanis as the relative majority of Iran’s population, and other ethnic minorities; the immediate release and setting free of those Azerbaijani Turks who have been detained, imprisoned, exiled and tortured unfairly because they want to advance their own culture; and the freedom for candidates of presidential, parliamentary or city council elections who by using their constitutional rights, approach positively the needs and demands of Azerbaijani Turks. These candidates have made an effort to compete in equal terms but do so in vain because unfair decisions have been made beforehand.


Afsar Abbasi (MS student of biotecnology)
Artum Dinch (Hossein Ahmadian) (sociologist)
Babak Daneshvar (doctorate student of industrial engineering and academic personel)
Behrooz Alizadeh (doctorate student of biotecnology)
Davood Tooran (sociologist)
Ebrahim Haghighi (MS in agrecultural engineering)
Eldar Aghabalai Vahid (doctorate student of LAW)
Fariba Abdi Golzar (MS in psychology)
Farzad Samadli (MS in political sciences and journalist)
Fathali Ghadami (student of dentistary)
Gholamreza Poorbagher (MS in political sciences)
Hossein Haghparast Gharamaleki (doctor of economy)
Houriyeh Gholipoor (translater and journalist)
Javid Tabrizli (musician)
Majid Javadi (electrical engineer)
Mir Yousef Moosavi (MS in industrial engineer)
Mohammadreza Heyat (MS in Turkology and doctorate student)
Nader Ghazanfari (doktorate student in physics)
Naser Khaze Shahgoli (MS student of Turkology)
Oghuz Turksoy (MS student industrial engineer)
Parvaneh Ebrahimi (psycologist)
Reza Lakzadeh (MS in pharmacology)
Siamak Babanejad (student of Cinema and TV)
Sina Hossein Alizadeh (dentist)
Vahid Malekzadeh (student of medicine)

Read more ...

ADAPP Denounces the Iranian Government’s Crackdown on Civilians

27 June 2009

The Association for Defence of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran (ADAPP) supports the people of Iran who are now struggling against oppression. The current election crisis reflects the democratic urgings of the Iranian people. ADAPP condemns the violence used after the election to crush this popular democratic surge. The videos of Basij militiamen firing upon innocent civilians have deeply disturbed its members. ADAPP denounces the violence and it calls for the complete halt to the violent repression used by the Islamic Republic.

In May 2006, dozens were killed and scores were arrested after Azerbaijanis took to the streets to protest a cartoon published in a state-run newspaper that compared Azerbaijanis to cockroaches. Although the crackdown was brutal, much like the recent measures against the Iranian election protests, it received little to no attention from the international community. ADAPP understands the full potential of media coverage and asks that the international community continue its efforts to advance those who are demanding democracy and free speech in Iran.

Social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook have proven to be effective tools in reporting the atrocities committed by the Iranian government. ADAPP, however, urges caution in publishing reports from social networking media because it is believed that officials have infiltrated these sites and are making false reports.

For 3 years, ADAPP has maintained a close relationship with Azerbaijani rights groups in Iran and continues to maintain contacts with Iranian Azerbaijanis throughout Tabriz, Urmia, Ardabil and various other predominantly Azerbaijani cities. Since the beginning of the Iranian election protests on June 13, 2009, it has been in daily contact with Iranian Azerbaijanis.

After the election results were publicized, protests erupted in the cities of Tabriz and Urmia. During the demonstrations, eyewitnesses reported that 2 people were murdered in Urmia, Iran on June 12 and June 15. Eyewitnesses also reported that 3 were beaten to death in Tabriz during the June 15 protests.

Since June 15, however, Azerbaijanis have not organized into formal protests. Despite the various videos and reports that have emerged claiming recent riots in Tabriz, ADAPP’s contacts have asserted that the predominantly-Azerbaijani cities in Iran have remained relatively quiet.

ADAPP offers its most heart-felt condolences to the families of the victims of the government’s brutal crackdown. ADAPP supports Iran’s shift toward democracy and asks that the government of Iran support the wishes of the Iranian people.

Read more ...

Iran: Azeris caution about supporting native son Mousavi in Tehran political fight

Iran’s ethnic Azeri community numbers roughly 15-20 million, or almost a quarter of the country’s overall population. Most Azeris harbor deep feelings of resentment toward Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration in Tehran, and they are believed to have voted strongly for the aggrieved presidential challenger, Mir Hussein Mousavi, who is himself an Azeri from Tabriz. Even so, most Azeris remain unwilling to take an active part in the continuing battle for control of Iran’s social and economic agenda.

Mousavi’s lackluster record on promoting civil rights for minority groups in Iran is the main reason why many Azeris are currently sitting on the sidelines. Iranian Azeris see little to gain from getting involved. Regardless of the outcome of the power struggle in Tehran and Qom, few Azeris expect that their quality of life will improve significantly.

Yashar Hakkakpour, spokesperson for the Association for the Defense of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran - ADAPP, an unofficial organization based in Tabriz, explains that Azeri activists see no advantage to be gained from pushing for Mousavi, or opposing Ahmadinejad.

"The Tehran-based organizations that back Mousavi do not report on the activists arrested in Azeri cities. Persian-language media ignores minorities. Why would Azeris support their cause?" asked Hakkakpour in a telephone interview from Van, Turkey. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"It does not mean that Azeris support the current regime," he added. "They just do not see a big difference."

That situation, argues another activist, explains why the reaction to events by Azeris in Azerbaijan proper has been relatively muted. For example, there have been no pro-Mousavi protests staged outside the Iranian Embassy in Baku.

One Tabriz-based Azeri cultural rights activist concurred with Hakkakpour. "We [ethnic Azeris] have decided not to interfere in the confrontation between the regime and Mousavi," said the activist, who spoke on condition of anonymity. The activist pointed out that some prominent Mousavi backers today endorsed the use of coercive measures to contain Azeri protests in Tabriz and other cities in 2006. The protests erupted after an Iranian youth magazine published a cartoon in which an Azeri was depicted as a cockroach.

While most Azeris may not feel inclined to publicly display support for Mousavi, some did take to the streets following the June 12 rigged presidential election. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Media outlets in Azerbaijan reported that five people were killed and dozens injured in mass protests on June 13 and June 15 in Tabriz and Orumieh, the capitals of Iran’s East Azerbaijan and West Azerbaijan provinces, respectively. [For additional information click here].

In general, many areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities -- not just East and West Azerbaijan, but also Kurdistan, Baluchistan and Khuzestan -- have been quiet amid the post-election tumult in Tehran. Minority groups, including Azeris, Arabs, Kurds and Baluchis, have long resented systematic discrimination carried out by authorities in Tehran, in particular restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights. But they don’t see the present crisis as an opportunity to seek redress for their grievances.

Hardliners in Tehran are doing all in their power to make sure ethnic minorities don’t become more active. The ethnic minority issue is a potential powder keg for Iran, and if it were to blow up at this time, it could completely alter the nature of the country’s power struggle. Just as hardliners have flooded Tehran with security forces, they have placed the regional capitals of ethnic minority enclaves under lockdown conditions. Hardliners also reportedly told the Mousavi camp that security forces would take drastic action if it appeared that the opposition was trying to stir up trouble among ethnic minority groups.

During the presidential election campaign, both Mousavi and Ahmadinejad promised to expand civil rights for Azeris. Ahmadinejad, who claimed to speak Turkish, promised to allow Azeri-language classes in universities and schools, the Tabriz source told EurasiaNet. Mousavi, meanwhile, promised to designate Azeri as Iran’s second official language and to grant greater financial autonomy to Azeri-populated regions.

But few Azeris treated these campaign pledges as anything more than empty rhetoric. "Every election, candidates come to Tabriz, Orumieh and other cities and make similar promises. However, once they win the elections, they immediately forget their promises," Hakkakpour said.

"Mousavi during his entire career has never shown concern about [Azeri language rights and pressure on ethnic Azeris] and there were no signs he is willing to bring changes," added Agri Garadagli, an Azeri activist now living in exile in Baku as the spokesperson for the South Azerbaijani National Awakening Movement.

Editor^s Note: Shahin Abbasov is a freelance correspondent based in Baku. He is also a board member of the Open Society Institute-Azerbaijan.

Posted June 23, 2009 © Eurasianet
http://www.eurasianet.org/

Read more ...

PRESS RELEASE: FORMER PRESIDENT OF IRAN INSULTS AZERBAIJANI MINORITY

VANCOUVER – Protests have erupted this week in three Iranian cities after former Iranian president Mohammed Khatami made degrading comments about the Azerbaijani minority in Iran.

On May 14th, a video emerged on the Internet which showed Khatami belittling ethnic Azerbaijanis at a gathering of Iran’s reformist politicians, referring to the ethnic group as a community of unintelligent and foolish people.

Among the identifiable attendees were prominent mullahs as well as representatives of presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi, all of whom were either laughing or contributing to the racist jokes.

Thus far, four college students – Hamed Hasan Zare, Babak Minaqi, Ali Imani and Peyman Imani – have been identified among those who were arrested by federal police during protests in Tabriz. Demonstrations also took place in Tehran and Urmia. Activist groups have said they will continue their demonstrations until Khatami formally apologizes for his remarks.

“ President Khatami advocated a dialogue between civilizations, yet he entertains his fellow reformists with racist jokes against Azerbaijanis,” says Fakhteh Zamani, president of the Association for the Defence of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners,” a Vancouver-based organization.Azerbaijani Iranians are ethnic Turks who make up between 25 and 30 per cent of the Iranian population. They are regularly discriminated against by the Persian majority. A cartoon published in the state-run newspaper Iran in 2006 compared Azerbaijanis to cockroaches and suggested various methods of exterminating them.

The public backlash against Khatami’s comments has so far not been as severe as the protests against the publication of the cartoon, but has the potential to become much more widespread unless Khatami issues a formal apology to Iranian Azerbaijanis.

Preliminary reports show that about dozens of prisoners were detained in Tehran, Tabriz and Urmia and it is believed that some may have been released. It is still unclear if the four protesters in Tabriz have released.

ADAPP will continue monitoring and reporting on any further developments that arise.

For more information contact:

Fakhteh Zamani - President, Association for the Defence of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners
+1-604-677-2524

info.adapp@gmail.com
http://www.adapp.info/

Read more ...

The Struggle for Equality in Iranian Azerbaijan

Habib Azarsina

As Western media has focused on Iran's nuclear program, Iran's authoritarian government has continued its policy of cracking down on any form of dissent. Civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion, continue to be severely restricted.

All Iranians suffer from such restrictions by the central government of the Islamic Republic. However, Iran's non-Persian ethnic groups are subject to even more restrictions and discrimination. Azerbaijani Iranians, which are the second largest ethnic group, are no exception. A new wave of arrests has hit the Iranian Azerbaijan activists. Scores of students, journalists, and women's rights activists have been arrested under false accusations and trumped up charges. Plain-clothes officers often seize activists without warning and hold them incommunicado in detention centers for several days before permitting them to contact family members. The human rights monitoring organizations such as Amnesty International have issued several appeals for the release of the Azerbaijani Human Rights activists. In interviews with Voice of America (VOA), and other mass media organizations, Fakhteh Zamani, director of the Association for the Defense of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran (ADAPP), has talked about the plight of Azerbaijani activists. According to Ms. Zamani, all Azerbaijani activists are demanding their constitutional rights for education in their mother tongue, the Azerbaijani-Turkish. ADAPP and ASMEK, two organizations defending rights of Azerbaijani political prisoners in Iran, have reported that in February and March of 2009, security forces belonging to the secret service (Ettelaat) of the Islamic republic have intensified their activities in cities of Ardebil, Tabriz, Maragheh, and Zanjan in Iranian Azerbaijan.

Restrictions on Activities of Women’s Rights Defenders in Tabriz

Azerbaijani women face the same issues that all women in Iran face in their daily lives. They are denied equal rights in marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. However, in provinces outside of Tehran, the Iranian authorities place even more restrictions on activities of defenders of women's rights. One of the feminist activists in the Azerbaijan area who has been arrested and imprisoned on several occasions is Shahnaz Gholami. Ms. Gholami is a prominent blogger and a member of the Women Journalists Organization (RZA). Before her release in March she was on a hunger strike protesting mistreatment of political prisoners in Iran. Ms. Gholami had been sentenced to six months imprisonment by Branch 1 of the Islamic Revolutionary Court in the city of Tabriz. She had been charged with propaganda against the Islamic State by publishing anti-government articles. In the court session Ms. Gholami had defended herself and rejected the charges. Previously she was imprisoned for five years for her political activities from 1989 to 1994. Also, in August 2007, Ms. Gholami was detained for about one month for her participation in the ceremonies marking the anniversary of the massive protests of May 2006 when hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis protested publication of a cartoon in a government newspaper depicting Azerbaijanis as cockroaches.

Another prominent Azerbaijani Women's Rights Activist, Faranak Farid, was summoned to Tabriz intelligence office in November 2008. Ms. Farid wasn’t allowed to participate in the women’s rights conference in Turkey. She was invited to speak at a three day conference on women rights issues in Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, which was scheduled to start on November 28, 2008.

Plight of religious minorities among the Azerbaijanis

Azerbaijanis are mostly Shi’a Muslims. However, in Iranian Azerbaijan there are people whose mother tongue is Azerbaijani-Turkish, but they have a different religion or belong to a different sect of Islam. Baha’is, and followers of the Bab, fall into this category and discriminations against them have been well documented and discussed in Western media. However, there are other smaller religious minorities in Western Azerbaijan province who have been discriminated against for decades and currently face persecution. Two such religious minorities are Kurasunni and Ahli-Haqq, or Alevites (called Goran by Shi’a Azerbaijanis). The Kurasunni are Azerbaijanis who are Sunni and speak Azerbaijani with a slightly different accent. They live in and around Urmia, Salmas and other cities in Western Azerbaijan province. They have been subject to discrimination by Azerbaijanis on the basis of religion (being Sunni rather than Shi’a) and by non-Azerbaijanis on the basis of their mother tongue. The most recent major confrontation of the Kurasunni with security forces happened in January of 2009 in the village of Qizil Kheneye (meaning “Red Mansion” in Azerbaijani). The conflict started over water rights and the construction of new water canals which would reduce the flow of irrigation water to the village. According to news reports from the area, about 400 residents of the village clashed with security forces. The fighting lasted for hours and the major highway between Urmia and Salmas was closed. The unusual traffic jam caused by the fighting brought the issues of the villagers to center of attention. Many villagers were wounded, many more were arrested. The issues have not yet been resolved.

Another religious minority among Azerbaijanis are the Goran, who are also known as Ahli-Haqq or Alevites. They live in villages near Miyandoab, Urmia, and other cities in Western Azerbaijan province. The men of Ahli-Haqq are known for keeping long moustaches and are distinguished by these moustaches. Shaving their moustache is considered an insult to their religious beliefs. They attach great importance to Imam Ali and hence are called Alevites. They are accused by Shiites of worshiping Imam Ali and elevating him to the status of God. Alevites have lived for centuries in their own communities, however, after the Islamic Revolution their confrontations with the government have increased. Immediately following the Revolution, the Revolutionary Guards cut the moustaches off of several Alevite men and started new tensions between them and the majority Shiites. Later, tensions eased and for years there were no confrontations. However, four years ago, when a new conscript from the Alevites was drafted for compulsory military service, authorities attempted to cut his moustache off and when the new draftee refused to cooperate, a new confrontation started. The village of Uch Tepe (meaning “Three Hills” in Azerbaijani) near Miandoab, became a battleground between government forces and Alevite residents. The battle continued for two days and twelve people, six from each side, were killed. Dozens of residents of Uch Tepe were arrested and prosecuted. Six of them were sentenced to death. Later an appeal court reduced the sentence for four of them to life imprisonment and sent them to a prison in city of Yazd. One of the reaming two, Mehdi Qasimzadeh (Ghasemzadeh) was executed in Urmia on February 28, 2009. He was 27. The authorities of the Islamic republic remained indifferent to various calls for clemency by international organizations. The sixth man from Uch Tepe Alevites, Yunis Aghayan, is on death row in Urmia prison.

Banning the use of Azerbaijani names

The policy of Persian supremacy adopted by the Pahlavi dynasty during the second and third quarters of the 20th century has been continued by the government of the Islamic Republic after a short break during the Islamic revolution in 1979. The government agencies even resorted to changing the names of geographical areas, mountains, rivers, and neighborhoods. For example the original Azerbaijani name of a mountain in Eastern Azerbaijan province has been changed from "Boz Qush" (Grey Bird) to the Persian name of "Boz Kosh" (Goat Killer). Another example is changing the original Azerbaijani name of the historic neighborhood of "Devechi" (Camel Herders) to Persian word of "Shotorban" with the same name. These changes appear on maps, signs, and official documentation; however, the locals keep using the original names when they refer to such places. A few years ago, government authorities attempted to change the Azerbaijani names for the islands of Lake Urmia and sent an order to schools of the region to start using the new Persian names. However, the order leaked to the public and was posted to opposition websites. This caused a backlash and massive protests and the local authorities announced that the names of the islands have not changed and the original names are still official.

Birth registration offices go through a list of approved names and, if the name given by the parents is not on the list, the official refused to issue a birth certificate with that name and would suggest a different name; in most cases a Persian name. Eventually the parents are left with no choice but to accept the proposed name or risk not having a birth certificate for their child. Names of shops and places of business are also being scrutinized. Giving popular Azerbaijani names to shops is good for business. It instantly draws attention and brings more customers. However, it also gets the attention of the local government officials who force the owner to change the name and adapt a name which will get the approval of the higher authorities. In fall of 2008, owners of three businesses in Tabriz were forced to change the names of their stores from Azerbaijani names to Persian names. Two years ago an outspoken Tabrizi member of parliament, Dr. Aalami, protested the government's actions on this issue. However, this policy still continues and the central and local authorities discourage local business owners from giving Azerbaijani names to their businesses. Recently there have been more cases of well publicized name changing in cities of Tabriz, Bonab, and Ardebil. Abbas Lisani, a prominent Azerbaijani activist is facing the same issue now. He has been given a deadline to change the Azerbaijani name of his store in Ardebil to a Persian name or face the closure of his store.

Azerbaijani music has thrived under pressure of Islamic Government

Despite restrictions by Islamic state authorities on music, Azerbaijani music has survived and thrived in Iran. Numerous groups of musicians, singers, and dancers have been created in Tabriz, Urmia, Ardebil, Zanjan, and other cities in the Azerbaijani region. They perform at weddings and other social events. Satellite TV programs from the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkey have had a big impact on the growth and popularity of Azerbaijani music. This obviously cannot be ignored by central authorities who order the local authorities in provinces with large Azerbaijani population to place restrictions on playing Azerbaijani music in public places. In March 2009 local authorities in Tabriz closed down the Azerbaijan Music School. This school has been managed by prominent musician Hasan Demirchi and does have an official license to teach Azerbaijani music. At the time that it was ordered to be shut down it had 12 music teachers and 180 students. The school, and Mr. Damirchi himself, have trained many talented singers and musicians who have had concerts throughout Iran and have won prizes, even from Iranian State organizations. Over the years the Azerbaijan Music School has become a symbol of national pride for Iranian Azerbaijanis. The school was operating for years but had been closed and reopened several times in the past. This time around the wave of restrictions hit them hard and they might not be able to reopen.

A tragic event which made Azerbaijani activists more determined

A tragedy in October of 2008 caused another spike in mistrust between local and central authorities and Azerbaijani activists. A former political prisoner and veteran activist in the area of cultural rights for ethnic groups, died in a mysterious car accident. Gholamreza Amani, who was a hero to many Azerbaijani activists, was returning from a funeral in the city of Ahar in Eastern Azerbaijan province when his car was struck by a truck. Mr. Amani was driving his personal car and two of his brothers were also in the car when the accident happened. His brothers died on the scene and he died hours later in a hospital in Tabriz. His death angered many Azerbaijani activists. Hundreds of people participated in his funeral and chanted slogans demanding justice and cultural rights for Azerbaijanis in Iran. According to eyewitnesses police and revolutionary gourds watched the event with tolerance and did not intervene. Gholamreza Amani spent 5 years in prison for advocating linguistic and cultural rights of Azerbaijanis. He was considered one of the leaders of Azerbaijani cultural rights activists.

Iran could have an Azerbaijani president this summer

Iran will have presidential elections in June. President Ahmadinejad is facing a tough reelection battle. One of his major opponents is Mir Hussein Mousavi, the former Prime Minister who was in office during the Iran-Iraq war. Mr. Mousavi, who is an Azerbaijani from Tabriz, is very popular among most Iranians and has a good shot at the presidency. What does Mr. Mousavi think about Azerbaijanis' cultural rights? If answering for him, one can say that, at a minimum, he does not tolerate any insults against Azerbaijanis and he gives speeches in Azerbaijani when he is in an Azerbaijan region. Another serious candidate is Ayatollah Karrubi who has openly advocated granting cultural rights for all ethnic groups and implementing articles 15 and 19 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic, which guarantees such rights. Elections at the national level in Iran have brought the issues of Human Rights in general, and cultural rights of the ethnic minorities in particular, to the center of attention of the electorate and the candidates. Ayatollah Karrubi has started the debate in his pre-election campaign and other candidates will have to declare their position on an issue which is very important for at least half of the voters.

The struggle for Equal Rights continues

It is true that Azerbaijanis are well integrated into Iranian society and are the second ruling ethnic group after the Persians. However, when it comes to cultural matters they suffer from the same issues that most other non-Persian ethnic groups do. And just like the Kurds, the Arabs, the Balouchi, and the Turkmans, they have been struggling for equal rights for decades and their struggle continues to this very day. One distinction in the struggle of the Azerbaijanis for their rights is their use of peaceful means. Azerbaijani activists avoid any violence and stage lawful demonstrations and campaigns allowed by the constitution of the Islamic Republic. Most Azerbaijani activists advocate cultural rights, and for them the use of Azerbaijani Turkish in schools and government offices has high priority.

Read more ...

FAKHTEH ZAMANI's VOICE

High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay invited individuals from various parts of the world to bore testimony to their experiences with racism in their countries. Fakhteh Zamani was one of the “Voices”

My name is Fakhteh Zamani, and I am the founder and current president of the Association for the Defense of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran. For three years, I have traveled throughout North America and Europe to speak at various forums in hopes of raising awareness towards Iran's minority groups in their struggle for linguistic and cultural rights.

Despite receiving countless threats to halt my work, I have tried my absolute best to represent those who have fallen victim to human rights abuses and the families and friend who support them.

They are imprisoned and often tortured for simply using their mother tongue in public and/or for requesting to study their own language. These are freedoms that we all take for granted and are symptoms of a broad based system of racism that exists throughout Iranian society.

Unfortunately, I have had to experience racism while growing up as an ethnic Azerbaijani Iranian. Consequently, I have remained sympathetic to those experiencing the same racism. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to be at Durban Conference and at VOICES to make known the nature of racism in Iran and the human rights abuses against those who try to expose or contest the racism. Before I begin, I must make it clear that I am not here to single out a specific race or group. I am here to discuss Iranian racism as a societal flaw. The racism of which I speak not only comes from the government, but from the whole of the Iranian population. It is a dehumanizing system of oppression that begins at an early age and affects the entirety of person’s life. Since more than half of the population of Iran is comprised of minority groups, this racism urgently needs to be addressed.

I’m going to start by anecdotally illustrating my experience growing up as a member of an ethnic minority group in Iran. Like most Azerbaijanis, I grew up speaking my native tongue in my home. My parents were very proud of our history, language and culture and as a result, so was I. They told me stories of the great contributions of Azerbaijanis to Iranian society, which truly made me feel like a descendant of a powerful and important people.

This all changed, however when I entered elementary school and I began experiencing racism first hand, not from my peers but more shockingly from my teachers. We were forced to learn to speak Farsi in school and the use of our native tongue was a serious offense. Our history textbooks completely distorted events in favor of the glory of the Persian race. None of us had access to textbooks written in our mother tongue. Persian culture was regarded as the common identity of all Iranians. The important role of Azerbaijani Turks in Iranian history was downplayed. In many cases, Azerbaijanis were demonized and referred to as “savages”, outsiders who disrupted the great civilizational history of the Persian Empire. Strict adherence to the material was monitored.

Representatives of the Ministry of Education entered our classrooms to make certain that our teachers were following the assigned Material. Otherwise, their jobs would be at Risk. Our teachers, who were often themselves Azerbaijani, followed this system. The ministry of Education guaranteed that children, who spoke any language other than Farsi, were severely punished, usually in the form of suspension or in-class beatings. Those who dared to ask to use the washroom in any language other than Farsi were forced to stay seated and suffer. Racism was not only confined to the classroom. I regularly heard and-or saw my people insulted on the radio, television, and in the state-run press.

This behavior continues to this day. Azerbaijanis are depicted in newspapers as intellectually-challenged, sub-human members of society and often referred to as “donkeys” and cockroaches” throughout Iranian media. Region that are dominant in ethnic minorities are deprived of economic investment. Shopkeepers in predominantly Azerbaijani neighborhoods are even prevented from using non-Persian names; and their shops are vandalized or closed down if they do not comply.

Racism against Iranian minorities, however, is not confined solely to Iran’s borders. I have experienced racist remarks and jokes outside of Iran, by Westernized Iranians as well. Even more disturbing is that racism does not disappear with the level of education one receives. The elite, professors, doctors, etc. still practice this behavior because it is something that is quite familiar to them. Iranian opposition groups are subject to this too.

Now there are many who would regard this issue as a small one which pales comparatively to issues such as broader human rights and Iran’s nuclear program. Racism on the minority populations of Iran, however, should be regarded as a very serious problem, one which demands as much serious attention as any other issue confronting the Islamic Regime. Ethnic minorities comprise over half of the population of Iran, so this problem affects a real majority of Iranian society.

Azerbaijanis, themselves comprise roughly one quarter of the Iranian population, which translates to around three times the population of Azerbaijanis in the state of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis on both borders share a common language and culture, but while “North Azerbaijanis”, have had independence since 1991 and have been able to flourish culturally and linguistically, “South Azerbaijanis” have been forced to be Persianized for the past 80 years. Azerbaijanis have no choice but to assimilate; if not, they are marginalized and prevented from societal advancement. Those who dare to speak out against the system of racism are arrested, tortured and sometimes killed.

This became abundantly clear after the publication of a political cartoon in May 2006 depicting miscommunication between a Persian boy and a cockroach, which represented the Azerbaijani people. In the aftermath, Azerbaijani residents in Tabriz, Urmia, Ardabil, Zanjan, Khoy and Naghadeh ***** (and many other cities)*****took to the streets in protest. The Iranian government’s crackdown was swift and severe. Reports claimed that anywhere from hundreds to thousands were arrested. Many were killed by the security forces. Prisoner of Conscience Abbas Lisani was among one of those who were captured and jailed. His sentence, coupled with the sentence he was given for his refusal to change his shop name to a Persian one, kept him jailed until 6 months ago. During his term, despite several hunger strikes in protest of the harsh treatment he suffered, hecontinued to be punished severely.

Scores have shared the same fate as Mr. Lisani. For example, 25-year old linguistic rights activist Ferhad Mohseni was detained after the anniversary of 2006 cartoon uprising and subsequently tortured and murdered 20 days after his detention. These cases are those which have been publicly reported. Since the Iranian court system is shrouded in secrecy, there may be countless others who are now sharing the terrible fates of the aforementioned.

So fellow anti racist activists; the system of institutional racism and ethnic discrimination should not be kept in the shadow of other seemingly more important issues confronting Iran. Racism is an oppression for people like me which means the prevention of linguistic and cultural expression within Iran and a lifetime of cruel jokes and stereotypes. For the braver souls who choose to publicly speak out against this racist practice in Iran, it can mean imprisonment, torture and even death. They are symptoms of a broad endemic problem which exists within Iranian society. If we are able to cure this plague of xenophobia, we will be able to hear various languages and to see cultures flourish and society progress. We will see the beautifully diverse cultures of Iran celebrate their heroes and study their histories in their native tongues. Most importantly, we will see the prevention of the torture and death of ethnic minorities fighting for what are their human rights.

Raising awareness of this issue is the first step. Together we can turn a small spark into a raging fire that burns down the walls of the institution of racism. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. once said, “in the end, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends.”
Therefore, we must make the entire world aware of the socially-limiting problem of racism that exists within Iranian society and hopefully one day see it erased.

Thank you very much for your time.

Read more ...

The Azerbaijan Question in Iran: A Crucial Issue For Iran's Future

by Dr. Nasib Nassibli

Iran is a multinational country, composed of Persians, Azerbaijanis(Azerbaijani Turks), Kurds, Turkmens, Arabs, Baluchies and others. The Turkic origin Azerbaijanis in Iran are being discriminated against by the Iranian regime. This problem is further exaggerated by the fact that, the Azerbaijanis are themselves a divided nation, separated by the borders of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan. These two circumstances have combined to pose an Azerba ijan dilemma.

The History of the Problem

In the early nineteenth century the Russian Empire occupied the khanates of North Azerbaijan, which were de jure a part of Qajar Iran, but de facto were independent. Despite the close relations between North and Sout h Azerbaijan until the 1930s, these two parts of Azerbaijan have historically developed in separate ways: the division occurred at a time when national self-consciousness amongst Azerbaijanis was not strong enough. It played an essential role in creating distinctions between South and North Azerbaijan.

The inclusion of North Azerbaijan into the Russian Empire-and consequently the cultural differences between Russians and Azerbaijanis-played a significant role in the appearance of self-awareness of Azerbaijanis. These differences have been expressed in language, religion, mentality, customs and historical roots. On the other hand, Northern Azerbaijan had been turned into a Russian colony in terms of tight control over its fiscal systems, exploitation of oil and other natural resources. Because of the fear of religious and ethnic affinity with the Ottoman Turks, Russia established special rule over North Azerbaijan, including repression of any sign of national movements. Despite this repression, the national movement in North Azerbaijan began earlier than in South Azerbaijan. The national movement in North Azerbaijan went through three evolutionary stages:

1. Demand for cultural autonomy (1905-1917).
2. Demand for national-territorial autonomy (1917-1918).
3. Struggle for national independence (since 1918).

Consequently, the creation of the independent Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in 1918, in Northern Azerbaijan formally symbolized the existence of Azerbaijanis as a separate nation.

During this period in South Azerbaijan several factors combined to ensure that a different course of events would transpire. The historical past, religious unity in terms of Shiism, cultural closeness, historical traditions of Persian l anguage and literature, and other related factors between Azerbaijanis and Persians slowed the development of the Azerbaijani national movement in Iran. At the same time, the permanent threat from Russia (Tsarist and Soviet) was an important factor that i nfluenced Azerbaijanis to put aside their national aspirations. For this reason, when Russian aggression against Iran at the end of the 19th and early 20th Centuries grew in its intensity, the main theorists of Pan-Iranism appeared to be of Persian as wel l as of Azerbaijani origin, such as Kasravi, Kazemzade, and Rezazade.

It is important to point here that for a long time during the Qajar and Pahlavi monarchies in Iran, and even in the present Islamic regime, there were and continue to be many ethnic Azerbaijanis, who carried substantial weight with the Iranian government. Those who joined the Iranian elite were tempted by the desire to have their social and economic needs met by the regime.

Azerbaijan in the Administrative and Demographic Structure of Iran

South Azerbaijan consists of Ardabil, East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Zenjan, Hamadan ostans (provinces), and the adjacent areas of Astara, Gazvin, and other ethnic territories. The size of these territories is est imated at approximately 170,000 sq. km. (the territory of North Azerbaijan is approximately 86,600 sq. km or roughly one third of the total area). Turks dominate by ethnic composition in the Azerbaijani provinces of Iran (more than 90% of the total popula tion).

It is difficult to determine the exact number of Azerbaijanis in Iran. Official statistics are not published detailing Iran's ethnic structure. According to our research, based on official statistics, indicate that the Azerbaijanis make up nearly 40% of the total population of Iran. This is 75% of all Azerbaijanis in the world.

Despite less territory and a smaller population, North Azerbaijan (Republic of Azerbaijan) is the political, ideological and cultural center of the Azerbaijani Turkish nation. However, the country's difficult geopolitical position has f orced Azerbaijan to look for allies in and out of the region. South Azerbaijan can be potentially the most faithful and strongest ally in the foreseeable future. The notion of a United Azerbaijan is very popular in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Cultural Discrimination Policy

Persian chauvinism in Iran has hurt significantly the economic and social well being of South Azerbaijan. Chauvinism as a policy has been practiced implicitly by the Iranian regime and has targeted at its core the na tional culture of Azerbaijanis in South Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani Turkish language had been removed from official use in all areas, including, schools, courts, government structures, and the army. Specific forms of Azerbaijani cultural expression are pr ohibited as well.

In the last parliamentary elections, Mr. Mahmud Chehregani, who ran on a platform of observing the 15th article of the constitution (that is on, using local languages for literature lessons in elementary schools), was elected in the fir st round of voting from Tabriz. His victory ended in a police interrogation, his torture and finally in arrest in Tehran.

National-Liberation Movement

The national-liberation movement of South Azerbaijan has a history going back 90 years. National-territorial autonomy demands were put before Iranian rulers during various movements-led by Sattarhan (1908-1909), Hiya bani (1920), Pishevari (1945-1946), Shariat-Madari (1979-1980). In their demands, they outlined various ways to resolve the pressing issues of nationality questions in Iran.

There are at least two factors that influence the current situation of the Azerbaijani national movement in Iran:

1. The rise of Azerbaijani Turkish national consciousness and diffusion of the national movement into a higher social strata.

2. The restoration of independent Azerbaijani statehood in the North.

Amongst Azerbaijanis in Iran there are three main viewpoints for dealing with the national problem of South Azerbaijan:

1. A group made up of religious, industrialists and bureaucrats, personalities who occupy a prominent position in the Iranian state, and their ideologists support the idea of a united Iran ("national Irano-centrists"). They strive to in crease the share of authority and capital within a single Iran. They support the notion of Turkisation of Iran. This group supports the idea of the unification of Iran with North Azerbaijan.

2. A group of intellectuals, industrialists and bureaucrats who fear the division of Iran and support the idea of granting South Azerbaijan (at the same time to other ethnic-national minorities) cultural or national-territorial autonomy , which is regarded by them as the optimal way of resolving the Azerbaijan problem. "Democracy to Iran, autonomy to Azerbaijan" is a very popular idea amongst this interest group.

3. The third group is represented by new political organizations and groups, which support the independence of South Azerbaijan and the idea of a United Azerbaijan. The appearance of these organizations signals the beginnings of a new s tage in developments related to the question of Azerbaijan in Iran. Those elements that are radical within these groups do not believe that the ethnic question in Iran can be resolved in an evolutionary manner. They believe that in order to achieve their national goals they should use all means possible, including military means if necessary.

The Iranian Government's Position

Any ethno-national issue in multi-ethnic Iran is one of the most important factors affecting the future of the country. Choosing the current form of government and its support is closely connected with the multinatio nal structure of Iran. The ideology of Pan-Iranism was hurt by the collapse of Shah's regime. Islam, as the centralizing ideology, became the main factor and brought the different nations together. The problem of non-Persian national minorities in Iran co incides with the problem of divided nations as well. The Iranian leadership deals with these problems by trying to involve representatives of ethnic groups and national minorities into government structures, but they do not make any concessions in the fie lds of language, culture or self-governance.

The sudden emergence of the independent Azerbaijan state in the North has caused many problems for the Iranian leadership. The mere existence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, above all, has had an important influence and impact on the nat ional movement in Iranian Azerbaijan.

The overall conclusion is that the future of Iranian statehood itself could be problematic. Part of the Iranian leadership, especially high-level politicians of Azerbaijani Turkish origin, support inclusion of the "ancient Iranian land, " i.e., the Republic of Azerbaijan into Iran. Most of the Iranian leadership, however, rejects such idea as unrealistic and undesirable. In their opinion, an increase in the Turkish elements in Iran and the politicization of the Azerbaijani population wil l cause additional concern for Persian nationalism.

Therefore, the current Iranian regime tries to bring the Republic of Azerbaijan into its political sphere of influence in an effort to eliminate the influence of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Azerbaijani population of Iran. In so do ing, Iran is demonstrating the following political interests:

1. To prevent the formation of a truly independent and prosperous of the Republic of Azerbaijan and minimize its influence in South Azerbaijan, in order to insure the territorial integrity and internal stability of Iran.

2. To prevent the increase of US and Turkish influence in Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

3. To prevent integration of the Turkic world.

4. To gain strongholds in order to influence the Muslims of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Russian Volga region.

5. To have free access to Azerbaijan's market and natural resources.

6. In accordance with the official "export of Islamic revolution" doctrine, to create an Islamic, pro-Iranian regime in Azerbaijan.

Recently, there has been intensified ideological activity in Iran on the Azerbaijan question. The active propaganda on the "absence" of ethnic unity in both North and South Azerbaijan, the increased ideological struggle against Turkism and the Turkic world by official propaganda, the ignorance of existence of independent Azerbaijan by the people are all characteristic features of the official policy of Tehran. In addition, repressive measures and the police regime toward the Azerbaijani activists in Iran have also been increasing.

Conclusion

The resolution of ethnic problems in Iran, including the Azerbaijan problem, is closely related with democratization in Iran. In the near future and in the next political crisis in Iran, these ethnic issues will be o n the agenda. It should be noted that this topic played a role in the last presidential elections as well. The extent and intensity of the Azerbaijan question, that is, cultural autonomy, national-territorial autonomy or the demands for full independence will depend on the influence and integrity of ethnic forces, the extent of support for national ideals and finally, foreign factors.

Read more ...

A Look at Hegemony, Racism, and Center-Periphery Relations in Contemporary Iran

Alireza Asgharzadeh

The rise of European fascism and the concomitant breakout of what came to be known as the Second World War changed the balance of forces all over the globe. The totalitarian and dictatorial regimes in Europe as well as in various parts of Asia, Africa and the Middle East had to remobilize their forces and focus their attention to the external threat posed by the war.

Response to outside threat relaxed the repressive conditions inside and provided favorable climate for oppressed nationalities and groups to assert their collective social, economic and political rights. The oppressed and marginalized peoples of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan were among various Iranian nationalities and groups that took notice of the opportunity provided by the war and sought to implement their legitimate social, cultural and national demands.

At the beginning of the war in 1939, Iran was ruled under Reza Shah Pahlavi, a military dictator brought to power by a British engineered coup d'etat in 1921 . Throughout his military career as a Cossack trooper, Reza Khan had never hidden his hatred for non-Persian Iranians. Now in full control over the destiny of the people, he had all the resources at his disposal to enforce his racist ideology.

Despite his well-known pro-Nazi tendencies, Reza Khan, under pressure from the Soviets and the British, declared Iran's neutrality. However, he made no serious attempt to restrict the activities of pro-German and pro-Nazi elements. In June 1941, German forces began their offensive against the USSR. Soon after, the Soviet and British diplomatic missions in Tehran demanded the expulsion of a large number of Germans, accusing the Iranian government of sheltering a German fifth column (see also Lenczowski, 1949:168).

On August 25, 1941, Soviets from the north and the British from the south invaded Iran. On September 16, 1941, the allied forces deposed Reza Shah and put his young son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in power. On the following morning, September 17, the British and Soviet forces entered Tehran. The United States of America's non-combat forces arrived in 1942 (see also Lenczowski, 1949:74).

While the ruling elite and highly privileged military personnel lamented the changes, masses of the people welcomed weakening of the centralized authority and began to enjoy the new political atmosphere. The presence of the Red Army in northern Iran paralyzed the Pahlavi regime's military machine, and thereby, greatly contributed to the celebration of new social, political, and cultural landscape. Soon, pamphlets and magazines began to circulate in Azeri language, accompanied by hitherto forbidden folkloric songs, dances, literary gatherings, wearing of indigenous clothing, and so forth.

On 12 December, 1945, the Azerbaijani provinces declared their autonomy and formed the Azerbaijan Democratic Government. Azerbaycan Demokrat Firqesi (the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan or ADP) played a pivotal role in redirecting the revolutionary demands and sentiments of Azerbaijani people. A month later, on February 12, a Kurdish Republic was formed in the neighboring Kurdistan, declaring the city of Mahabad as its capital.

Based on their mutual agreement, the allied forces were to leave Iran by March 2, 1946. The British left southern Iran by the deadline; the Russians stayed in the north. The Iranian regime took the matter to the newly founded United Nations. The UN pressured the Russians to leave, America and Britain playing a leading role. The conflict became internationalized, and as some have argued, it came to mark the beginning of the cold war (Fawcett 1992; Atabaki 1993). In May 1946 the Soviet forces left Iran.

On 12 December, 1946, the Imperial Iranian Army attacked Azerbaijan. The Soviet consulate in Tabriz persuaded Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) leaders not to resist. Considering the Soviets as their ideological brothers and sharing the Leninist illusion of “common struggle of the working classes against imperialism”, the majority of ADP leaders obeyed their big brothers in Moscow, ordering the Azerbaijani militia not to resist against Iran’s invading army. Facing no mentionable resistance, the Shah's army invaded Azerbaijan and savagely massacred its people (see also Douglas 1951; JAMI 1979).

After suppression of Azerbaijan, the neighboring Kurdish Republic was brutally attacked and conquered. The leaders of Kurdistan Democratic Party, Qazi Mohammed and his supporters, were hanged in Mahabad. Throughout both Republics, all the buildings belonging to National Governments, along with houses, crops, and newly constructed schools and universities were set on fire. Mass executions of participants, sympathizers, and those suspected of sympathizing with the national movements were performed in public, followed by the burning of books, magazines and pamphlets published in ethnic languages.

The invading army stayed in Azerbaijan for five years, continuing the persecution of ADP supporters. After five years the Shah declared national amnesty in Azerbaijan and the military rule was lifted. Irrespective of the so-called amnesty, the Persian racist propaganda, along with a fascistic campaign against the democratic movements, continued. The 12th of the December, the day of occupation, was commemorated as a national holiday and was celebrated in all government offices, schools and streets. The young Mohammad Reza Shah was praised as the mighty hero of "Azerbaijan Crisis" and "The Bringer of Azerbaijan onto the Bosom of Mother Iran".

In the year 1979, the Pahlavi dynasty was overthrown and, subsequently, the Islamic Republic was formed. With the fall of the Shah, his sponsored Persian racism was, for a short time, overshadowed by a 'supposedly anti-racist', universalistic Islamic ideology of the new rulers. In the revolutionary atmosphere of the time, various nationalistic demands and movements began to emerge particularly in Kurdistan, Khuzistan, Azerbaijan and Baluchistan.

The new regime brutally suppressed the legitimate demands of various nationalities for self-determination, placing even a greater emphasis on Persian racism as a determining factor in maintaining its power bases. Glorification of 'the Aryan race' symbolized through the hegemony of Persian language soon came to dominate the Islamic regime's propaganda machine. The government-sponsored literature introduced 'Shia Islam' as a phenomenon purely Iranian and a greater emphasis came to be placed on what was termed as the "Irano-Islamic civilization”. Identifying the Persian language as “the second language of Islam”, the new regime vigorously continued to enforce the ban imposed on non-Persian languages during the Pahlavi era.

Towards the end of 1991, after the disintegration of Soviet Union, the formation of an independent Azerbaijani nation was declared north of the Iranian borders. Realizing the importance of such an event to the southern Azerbaijanis, the Iranian regime pursued a hostile relationship with the Republic of Azerbaijan. Aryanization and Persianization of socializing agents such as the education system took a new turn, accelerating with the passage of time.

The Discursive Framework

Following the highly effective analytical framework provided by Dei (1999, 1998, 1996) and others in dealing with issues of power, domination, racism and injustice, in this paper I will take an anti-colonial approach to discuss the subject matter at hand. I believe that only an anti-colonial discursive framework is capable of effectively enabling one to critique and disrupt the racist and hegemonic relationships such as the one existing in current Iran. As Dei has argued, ’colonial’ in this context “is conceptualized, not simply as foreign’ or ‘alien’, but rather as ‘imposed’ and ‘dominating’” (1999:399).

The anti-colonial framework is a theorization of issues emerging from colonial relations, an interrogation of the configuration of power, embedded in ideas, cultures and histories of knowledge production. The anti-colonial approach recognizes the production of locally produced knowledge emanating from cultural history and social interactions/daily experiences. (Dei 1999:399)

An anti-colonial approach in studying the rise and fall of south Azerbaijani Democratic Republic is particularly important in that the colonial power relations leading to the downfall of the Republic are still as active today as they were half a century ago. The existing literature on the Republic has not been sensitive to race, class, gender and other biases emanating from social position and location of the researchers. More importantly, almost the whole of the existing literature on the Azerbaijani national movement has been created by the members of the dominant Indo-European-Persian race and their sympathizers (for an exception see Haqqi, 1993).

Independent research on the movement was and is banned by both the monarchic and the Islamic regimes, respectively. Aside from some sporadic government sponsored journalistic references (e.g., Pisyan 1949) and occasional references in retired army officers' memoirs (e.g., Zanjani 1974; Major Derakhshani 1994), there is no officially published work on the subject. The only well-researched Persian source is a book titled Gozashteh Cheragh Rah-e Ayandeh Ast (The Past Is the Light on the Path to Future) written by a political group at the time referred to as JAMI--The Society for Liberation of Iranian Nation. Presumably, such a political organization had existed during the Azerbaijani democratic movement. However, there is no viable information available regarding the group at the present.

The book was first published in exile in 1976, then republished in Iran with some modifications in 1978, the year of anti-monarchic revolution. Owing to the nature of their organization, the authors adopt an Iranian nationalistic viewpoint, greatly emphasizing the territorial integrity of Iran. The ADP leaders are blamed for the defeat of the movement in that they failed to Iranize the democratic movement by focusing on Azerbaijan alone.

Some leftist individuals and organizations have also provided their own account of the movement (e.g., Tudeh Party of Iran 1971; Nabdel 1973; Javid 1977; Khamei 1983; Avansian 1990). Adopting an orthodox class-based approach, the leftist literature, in general, views the aspirations of Azerbaijani people for self-determination through the class lens, seeking to subordinate various racial, national, social, cultural and linguistic issues to issues of class and relations of economics (see for example Nabdel 1973).

Not surprisingly, the independent western scholarship could not escape the censorship placed on the movement by the Pahlavi regime. It was only after the fall of Pahlavi regime that books and articles began to appear on Azerbaijan and Kurdistan democratic republics (for an exception on Kurdish Republic see Eagleton, 1963). Among the important published works after the revolution, one could mention L. Fawcett's Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijani Crisis of 1946 and T. Atabaki's Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-Century Iran (1993).

Identifying the national movement as "crisis", Fawcett tries to view the movement 'from an Iranian perspective' (p.3). Her uncritical acceptance of the hegemonic “Iranian perspective” leads Fawcett to adopt, perpetuate and reproduce the dominant racist literature on the movement, produced under the Pahlavi dictatorship. Writing within the boundaries of ‘the Cold War’ ideological framework, Fawcett is more concerned with “exposing” the interference of an evil USSR in Iran’s internal affairs rather than the enslavement of millions of non-Persian peoples.

Atabaki, on the other hand, promises an 'unconventional, non-partisan and balanced account' of the movement (PP. vii-viii). His account serves to support Persian nationalistic ideology, emphasizing the centralized authority and denying the right of various nationalities for self-determination. Quoting a dead Persian historian around the turn of the second millennium, Atabaki confesses that although he despises the Azerbaijani movement, “nevertheless, in writing this history I will avoid presenting any statement which might seem fanatical or vindictive, and thus the reader will not find fault with me” (P. 6).

By way of an anti-colonial discursive framework we learn that there is no such thing as self-confessed impartiality, non-partisanship, and indifference; that “discursive practices are never neutral or apolitical” (Dei, 1999:403); and that historical accounts and narratives “are shaped and socially conditioned by particular interests, histories, desires and politics” (Dei, 1999:403). Atabaki’s self-professed ‘impartial politics’ goes so far as removing the name of “Azerbaijan” from Northern Azeri Republic and replacing it with “Arran”, a designation manufactured by such racists as Ahmad Kasravi (1938), M. Afshar (1921) and others. He bravely ventures to deny the common history, language, culture, religion, tradition, norms and values between a people living on northern and southern banks of the Araz River. It seems that in his view, championship of the dominant Persian ideology is tantamount to impartiality and non-partisanship!

Born into an Azerbaijani family twenty years after the collapse of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, from the very beginning I came to realize the pain and agony of not being able to read and write in one’s own language. From my parents, grandparents, relatives, neighbors and others I heard about the executions, the burning of books, and the banning of my language, the language of my entire consciousness. I also heard and learned about the struggle of our people for self-determination, for justice, equality, freedom and liberation. From the very beginning I tried to be a part of that struggle, a part of that movement for broader social justice and restoration of human dignity.

Thus, throughout this paper, my approach is heavily informed and influenced by my geographical location, my nationality, and my personal experience—in short, by who I am and where I come from. Long before I was born, an Azeri poet, Bulut Qarachorlu, had vividly depicted my location and my background:

Look at my misfortune
My thoughts:
Forbidden
My feelings:
Forbidden
To remember my past:
Forbidden
To dream of my future:
Forbidden
To mention my parents’ names:
Forbidden
Do you know that when I was born
the very utterance of my first words
was Forbidden?
Without my own knowledge
The language of my mother into which I was born
was Forbidden
The Nineteenth century Azerbaijan is characterized by separation in 1828 of northern segment of Azerbaijan and its annexation into Russian Empire. According to a veteran Azeri scholar, Dr. J. Heyat, separation of the northern Azerbaijan not only did not severe the ties between the Azeris on the two sides of Araz, it, more importantly, gave birth to a unique genre of literature and poetry “whose subject is the theme of separation between brothers” (Heyat 1983). In his famous poem, Kamran Mehdi (1980) has captured the feelings of Azerbaijanis regarding the forced separation:

True, the Araz divides a nation

But the earth underneath is one!


The Formation of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic

World War I brought about a new geo-political landscape in the region. The Ottoman Empire was disintegrated into a number of states under the British and French rules, with Turkish Republic emerging as an independent entity. The Bolshevik revolution in Russia breathed new life into the struggle of oppressed groups and nationalities. On May 28, 1920, the northern Azerbaijan declared its autonomy under a democratic party led by Mohammed-Amin Resulzadeh. After a short while, the newly formed republic was invaded by the Red Army and was turned into one of the Socialist Soviet Republics (see also Altestadt, 1992).

Following the events in northern Azerbaijan, a liberation movement took place in southern Azerbaijan in 1919-1920. The movement was led by Sheykh Mohammed Khiyabani, a progressive Azeri nationalist. Khiyabani's 'Democratic Party of Azerbaijan' put out a newspaper called Tajaddud (Progress) and began spreading revolutionary and democratic ideas in Azerbaijan. Invoking the memory of 1906 Constitutional Revolution, Khiyabani came to symbolize Sattar Khan, the legendary leader of Azerbaijan’s Constitutional Movement. In a short period of time, the Khiyabani movement was able to gain the support of Azerbaijani people, disarm the central government's forces, and declare Azerbaijan an autonomous republic called Azadistan or The Land of Freedom (Taqiyeva 1958; Azari 1955).

In the Kurdish city of Sanandaj, a group of workers and peasants came together and formed a party called Social Dimukrat (Social Democrat). Enjoying a tremendous popular support, the organization took control of the Sanandaj municipality and began redistributing grain from the warehouses of big landlords among the needy population (see also Ghods, 1989: 48). In 1915, Mirza Kuchik Khan launched the Jangel Movement which eventually culminated in the formation of the Socialist Republic of Gilan in Rasht, on June 4, 1920 (Ghods, P. 65). And finally, in 1921 a British orchestrated coup detat took place in Iran and reached its culmination in bringing to power a military dictator, known at the time as Reza Khan the Cossack.

Having enjoyed the unconditional support of the British, Reza Khan was able to suppress numerous socialist, nationalist, and separatist movements all over Iran. As early as 1925, Reza Khan was able to replace the ruling Qajar Dynasty with his own Pahlavi Dynasty. Soon after, he centralized power and authority in Tehran, terminated the semi-autonomous status of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, banned the usage of all non-Persian languages in any written form, and set out to enforce his Persian racist ideology throughout the country.

Ever since Reza Khan's usurpation of power, all nationalities and ethnic groups in Iran had been living under a constant fear, humiliation and oppression. They were witnessing the eradication of their native culture, language, history and heritage on a daily basis. The new monarch had centralized government, had introduced Farsi as the only legitimate Iranian language, and had placed a ban on the languages of other nationalities. The languages of other nationalities were repressed either as an imperfect dialect of Farsi, or as an alien, non-Indo-European language, such as Turkish or Arabic.

The officially fabricated Iranian history was rapidly replacing the existing oral and written histories of various ethnic groups. Under the official history, all peoples living in Iran were to have the common 'Aryan ancestry'. The non-Persian nationalities were written new histories in line with Persian racist ideology. They were not encouraged to be proud of who they were, because according to the dominant ideology, their heritage and culture were nothing to be proud of! They were required to be assimilated to 'the superior Indo-European race and culture'; and if they didn't acknowledge the 'superiority of Persian Indo-European race', they would then become subjected to mockery, humiliation, marginaliztion and punishment.

The Azerbaijani Turks, who were very proud of their heritage and accomplishments, were among those most subjected to racist and chauvinistic assimilationist Aryan ideology. In major Persian literary works, and in Persian literature in general, the Azeri Turks were referred to as "donkeys" (see also Baraheni, 1977). They were regarded as subhuman until such time as they openly admitted their inferior Turkish origins and their assimilation into the supposedly superior Persian Aryan race.

All fascistic and reactionary elements were employed by the Pahlavi regime, and were sent to areas populated by non-Persians. These kinds of government employees were serving in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in such positions as governors, mayors, teachers, registrars, and all kinds and sorts of big and little officials. For instance, a man named 'Mostowfi' was sent to Tabriz as the governor of Eastern Azerbaijan. In his reporting of the national census that had taken place in Azerbaijan in the year 1940, he wrote : " According to the census, there are more than 25,000 donkeys in the city of Tabriz" (Dad, 1941: No 8, 18; JAMI, P. 262). If this is the attitude of the highest government official in the province, it's easy to imagine what would be the attitude on the part of the military personnel, gendarmerie, and other low-ranked government officials. It was these kinds of fascistic and racist attitudes that brought the sentiments of Azeri people to a boiling point and paved the way for demands for autonomy and independence through the democratic movement.

The breakout of World War II brought about the conditions for various national, ethnic and anti-racist sentiments to explode. On August 25, 1941, the Red Army invaded Azerbaijan, pushing the Pahlavi regime's military out of Azerbaijani territory. Following these changes, an ethnic organization called The Azerbaijan Society was formed and started publishing a journal titled Azerbaijan. The journal was written in Azeri and Farsi languages and aimed to expose the racist nature of Pahlavi dictatorship.

Mir Jafar Pishevari, the future leader of Azerbaijan Democratic Party, was an experienced journalist publishing a paper called 'Azhir' in Tehran. He was a 50-year-old native of Azerbaijan who had spent most of his life in Baku and had returned to Iran after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Due to his anti-government activities, he had been imprisoned by Reza Shah's regime for 12 years. After Reza Shah's fall, Pishevari, along with other political prisoners, had been set free. Upon his freedom, he had come to Tehran and started publishing his newspaper Azhir.

In October 1943, Pishevari was nominated from Azerbaijan to the 14th Majlis (parliament) of Iran. The people of Tabriz had voted for him unanimously. Despite his victory in Azerbaijan, the Iranian Majlis had rejected his candidacy on the grounds that he was a communist, a traitor and disloyal to Iran's territorial integrity. Khoyi, another Azerbaijani deputy from the city of Tabriz had met the same fate as Pishevari.

The Azeris had viewed Iranian parliament’s rejection of their elected candidates as a direct insult on their integrity and their nationality (see also JAMI, 1978). Being an experienced revolutionary and journalist, Pishevari was aware of the extent of explosive conditions in Azerbaijan. In August 1945, he entrusted the editorialship of Azhir to friends and returned to Azerbaijan to form the Azerbaijan Democratic Party.

On November 23, the Central Committee of Azerbaijan Democratic Party issued a proclamation defining its aim as the obtainment of complete autonomy for Azerbaijan. The party made it clear that autonomy for Azerbaijan did not mean secession from Iran. The people of Tabriz warmly welcomed the formation of Azerbaijan Democratic Party. Following the ADP’s proclamation, a regional Congress of Azerbaijan that was composed of party supporters, designated a 39-membered commission to organize elections to a National Assembly.

On December 12 the provincial National Assembly was formally inaugurated in Tabriz. The assembly was composed of 101 deputies, all democrats and Azeri nationalists from various backgrounds such as workers and laborers, who were determined on demanding autonomy for Azerbaijan (see also Atabaki, P. 129). As its first important task on the day of inauguration, the National Assembly proclaimed the autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and designated a government under the premiership of Mir Jafar Pishevari, the founder of Azerbaijan Democratic Party.

The newly formed government of Azerbaijan announced that the autonomous state would be run on 'democratic principles'. It issued a program that granted women the right to vote; it announced that the private property would be respected but that the government would distribute to the landless farmers the state-owned lands as well as the lands of reactionary landlords who had run away from Azerbaijan.

Further, the government assured the Azerbaijani people that 'traitors and reactionaries' would be purged from the gendarmerie; that a 'people's army' would be formed from local militia groups; and that Azeri-Turkic would be the official language of the state.

Simultaneously with the Azerbaijani movement, a Kurdish movement took place in the province of Kurdistan, west of Azerbaijan. On December 15, 1945, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan proclaimed a Kurdish People's Republic. On January 21, 1946, Qazi Mohammad was elected to the presidency of the Republic. The Kurdish Republic set out to follow the democratic reforms and events taking place in the neighboring Azerbaijan. While sending observers to the Azerbaijan parliament, the Kurds maintained their distinct identity and insisted on the independence of the Kurdish Republic.

Following the negotiations between the two republics, a treaty was signed on April 23, 1946, between the Kurdistan and Azerbaijan governments. While emphasizing the mutual respect, cooperation and brotherhood between the two oppressed nations, the treaty provided for military alliance, exchange of diplomatic missions, fair treatment of minorities and common diplomatic action towards the Pahlavi regime in Tehran (see also Roosevelt, 1947).

Achievements of the Movement

The Azerbaijan Democratic Government quickly proceeded to carry out its plans. As a major step in eliminating feudal oppression, it started a land distribution program all over the Republic. On 16 February 1946, the National Assembly of Azerbaijan passed two important Bills regarding the land reform. Based on these Bills, lands belonging to reactionary feudals who had opposed the national government, or who had left Azerbaijan due to democratic movement, were to be distributed among landless farmers. Considering the fact that the majority of Azerbaijani feudal lords had already run away from Azerbaijan in the process of the democratic movement, this distribution amounted to a significant portion of agrarian land (see also Mehrban, 1982; Atabaki, 1993).

Moreover, the Bills asked for the distribution of all state-owned lands, along with the water rights, rivers, springs and ganats, among the peasants who lived on those lands and who cultivated them. The reform resulted in distribution of over 380,000 hectares of land amongst more than one million landless peasants (Tudeh 1978; Atabaki 1993).

Following the two mentioned Bills, another Bill was passed that dealt with the system of 'share-cropping’. Traditionally there was no viable agreement between the peasant and the landlord regarding the peasant's share of the crop. Normally it was left to the benevolence of the landlord to decide what to give to peasant in exchange for his cultivation of the land. The new Bill guaranteed to each farmer a minimum share of the crop which he produced on a landlord's land. Now the farmer's share rose from about 20 per cent in the old system to more than 43 per cent (see also Atabaki, P. 150). Considering the fact that about 75 per cent of the people in Azerbaijan were farmers at the time (Kazemi, 1980:14), the land reform illustrates the profoundly popular bases of the Azerbaijan Democratic Movement.

In the course of less than one year, the Democratic Government was able to lay the foundation of a modern educational system in Azerbaijan. In terms of education and pedagogy, the National Government completely revolutionized the Azerbaijani society. The first provincial university in Iran was built in Tabriz. Thousands of schools were built in small towns and villages all over Azerbaijan, accompanied by the introduction of compulsory primary education for all kids beginning at the age of six. For the first time, Azeri-Turkic became the official language in Azerbaijan and was taught in university, schools, and adult education centers, replacing Farsi.

For the first time in the history of Muslim Middle East, universal suffrage was introduced. Women gained the right to elect as well as to be elected. The ADP encouraged women to take active part in socio-political life of the republic. As a result, women participated in various positions from administration to teaching to working in the hospitals and even to serving in the national army of Azerbaijan (JAMI, PP. 289-95).

Important measures were taken to secure the rights of the workers and to underline the obligations of the employers. A labor code was introduced which limited the work to eight hours a day, introduced minimum wages, forbade child labor, acknowledged trade unions, recognized 1st of May as a national holiday, and established the right of the workers to social benefits (ADP, 1946).

A big texture company named Zefer was established. An orphanage was created to take care of needy children. The National Theatre Center was opened in Tabriz. A radio station was established. Numerous publishing houses were opened and countless newspapers, journals, magazines and books were published in the Azeri language (Berenjian, PP. 186-210; Javadi and Burril, 1989:251-55). Promotion of Azerbaijan's culture, history, language and music was greatly emphasized.

Under the Democratic government, all the banks in Tabriz were nationalized, holding more than 3,000,000 tomans at the time (see also Lenczowski, P. 289). Furthermore, a commission formed from representatives of Ministries of Trade, Economics, and Finance was called upon to establish trade connections with foreign governments. William Douglas, an American Jurist, who had chanced to be traveling in Azerbaijan shortly after the democratic movement, has summarized his observations thus:

I had assumed from press reports that Pishevari was not only a Soviet stooge but a bumbling and ineffective one as well. I learned from my travels in Azerbaijan in 1950 that Pishevari was an astute politician who forged a program for Azerbaijan that is still enormously popular... Pishevari's program was so popular--especially land reform, sever punishment of public officials who took bribes, and price control--that if there had been a free election in Azerbaijan during the summer of 1950, Pishevari would have been restored to power by the vote of 90 per cent of the people. And yet, not a thousand people in Azerbaijan out of three million are communists. (1951:43-50)

And finally, in the words of a scholar, under the democratic government, "Azerbaijan had achieved more in one year than it had during the twenty years of the Pahlavi regime" (Swielochowski, 1995: 149).

The Fall of the Republic

The elections for the 15th Majlis (parliament) of Iran were to begin on December 7, 1946. At this time, the Soviet forces had already left Azerbaijan and the Soviet consulate in Tabriz was pushing the ADP for negotiation and peaceful settlement of the issues with Iranian government. Qavam us-Saltana, the Iranian prime minister, after promising a major oil concession to the USSR, had returned to Tehran from his Moscow trip. The oil concession had been granted to the Soviets on the condition that it be ratified by the future Majlis.

The oil concession did not only mean a lion's share of Iran's oil for Russia, more importantly, it meant the security of Soviet borders in Iranian northern zone, particularly in the rivalry with the British and the newly arrived Americans. The Soviets were very concerned about the security of their borders with Iran and an enormously beneficial oil concession meant that their active presence in Iranian affairs would be guaranteed. After extorting the oil concession, now the Russians badly needed its ratification. As a result, the speedy election of the new Majlis was vitally important for the Russians.

Qavam had made it clear that the elections would not be held unless the government was in a position to supervise them all over the country, including Azerbaijan. The existence of an autonomous Azerbaijan had thus become an obstacle for the ratification of Russian oil concession. Without considering any ethical, ideological, or political consequences of their actions, the Russians decided to side with Iranian Pahlavi regime, pressing ADP to surrender!

In his now famous letter to Pishevari, the Soviet dictator, Joseph Stalin, threatens the Azerbaijani leader due to latter’s diversion from “Lenin’s path”. He advises the Azeri leader that the advantage of Azerbaijan’s working class, as well as the working peoples of Iran and the whole world, would only be maintained through ADP’s cooperation with Prime Minister Qavamus-Saltaneh (Araz, 1996).

In the meantime, the British, now working hand in hand with Qavam, had engineered another scenario in the south. In September 1946, a puppet Qashqayi chief in the south led his Qashqayi tribes to capture a number of towns and villages. They then issued a list of demands asking for autonomy similar to that of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. They made it clear that if the government did not destroy the autonomous republics, the Qashqayis would capture more towns and would constitute their own republic! The ADP considered the Qashqayi rebellion as a scenario orchestrated by the central government in order to crush the autonomous republics (JAMI, PP. 374-97).

Through the Qashqayi rebellion, the British manifested their strength to Iranian ruling elite and, thereby, further emboldened Qavamus-Saltaneh in his determination to destroy the autonomous republics (see also Lenczowski, P. 307). Around mid-October, Qavam formed a new cabinet and reached an agreement with Qashqayi chiefs in the south, promising them that he would use all in his power to protect Iran's territorial integrity, and to return Azerbaijan and Kurdistan back to the mother-land. Meanwhile, George V. Allen, the newly appointed American Ambassador to Iran, made it clear that his government was supportive of Prime Minister Qavam's 'democratic decisions' and would do whatever it could to implement them (Lenczowski, P. 308).

On the pretext of supervising parliamentary elections, on November 24, 1946, Qavam ordered the troops to march into Azerbaijan. The American Ambassador to Iran called the decision "quite normal and appropriate" (New York Times, Dec. 7, 1946). On December 3, Pishevari assured the Azerbaijnis that the national army of Azerbaijan was ready to defend the republic. He made it clear that there would be "death but no return" to the colonial conditions (Azerbaijan, Dec. 3, 1946).

On December 10, Qavam's army reached Azerbaijani territory. The first confrontation took place in the outskirts of the town of Miana. The Azerbaijani army pushed the invading forces back and advanced towards Zanjan (JAMI, P. 415). Nevertheless, two days later, the ADP, under heavy pressures from the Soviets, decided to give up resistance and allow the Iranian army enter into Azerbaijan.

The premier of Azerbaijan, Jafar Pishevari, rejected the Soviet demand to surrender and argued in favor of resistance (JAMI, PP. 416-17). The other Central Committee members of ADP followed the Soviet line. Pishevari resigned from the government and left for Baku. On December 12, 1946, the remaining ADP leaders called on all Azerbaijanis to abandon resistance and to allow the Iranian army a peaceful entry into Tabriz.

The Iranian army, however, looked like anything but peaceful. Conscious and assured of non-resistance on the part of Azerbaijanis, the army, accompanied by gangs and thugs hired and armed by local landlords, entered Azerbaijan and savagely massacred its unarmed people. William Douglas has summed up his account of the invasion:

When the Persian Army returned to Azerbaijan, it came with a roar. Soldiers ran riot, looting and plundering, taking what they wanted. The Russian Army had been on its best behavior. The Persian Army--the army of emancipation--was a savage army of occupation. It left a brutal mark on the people. The beards of peasants were burned, their wives and daughters raped. Houses were plundered; livestock was stolen. The Army was out of control. Its mission had been liberation, but it preyed on the civilians, leaving death and destruction behind. (1951:45).

After the invasion of Azerbaijan, the Shah's army marched into the neighboring Republic of Kurdistan. The Kurdish leaders had already set up a 'War Committee' to deal with Shah’s army. When they heard the news of Azerbaijan's surrender, disagreement and controversy fell among the leaders. In the end, they decided to follow the Azerbaijani leaders and agreed on non-resistance. The 3,000 Barzani Kurds refused to put down their arms and were forced to fight their way through Iranian army to the USSR. This event illustrated the extent to which the Shah's army was weak and defenseless in the face of a popular resistance on the part of Azerbaijani national army and people.

The leader of Kurdistan Democratic Party, Qazi Mohammad, was hanged in Mhabad, along with his supporters. Mass executions of participants, sympathizers, and those suspected of supporting the national movements were performed in public, followed by the burning of books, magazines and pamphlets published in ethnic languages. Shortly after the fall of national governments, the “Book-Burning” ceremonies became a source of celebration and entertainment for the members of the dominant Persian race and their invading army. The racist Persian elite made it clear that the “Book-Burning” rituals were conducted for the purpose of sealing the destiny of Azeri-Turkic in Iran once for all (see also Heyat 1983; Berengian 1988; Haqqi 1993, Farzaneh 1999).

The world renowned North Azerbaijani poet, Semed Vurghun, recited a poem in 1952 World Peace Congress held in Paris, by way of a protest against massacre of Azerbaijani people. The poem was titled “Book Burning”, and it was addressed to the Shah of Iran who was referred to as “the butcher”. Below I have rendered parts of Vurghun’s poem into English:

Hey Butcher!
Don’t you know
The pile upon pile of books that you’re burning
Are symbols of a thousand creativity,
Desires of a thousand hearts?
Hey Butcher!
They’re in my language
Those proverbs, those poems
In each of them
Hearts of a thousand mothers are beating
In each of them
Thousands of children are laughing
Tel me butcher
Do you understand this?
Hey Butcher!
What are those gallows?
Who are those upon them?
It’s no game, Butcher!
The blood that you’re drinking like a wolf
Is my people’s blood
Those hanging from your gallows
Are my flesh and blood, my people
Do you understand this, Butcher?

The invading army stayed in Azerbaijan for five years, continuing the persecution of ADP supporters. After five years the Shah declared national amnesty in Azerbaijan and the military rule was lifted. The Persian chauvinistic propaganda, along with a relentless campaign against the democratic movements continued. The 12th of the December, the day of occupation, was commemorated as a national holiday and was celebrated in all government offices, schools and streets. The young Mohammad Reza Shah was praised as the mighty hero of "Azerbaijan Crisis" and "The Bringer of Azerbaijan to the Bosom of the Mother Land". Eyewitnesses and unofficial Azerbaijani sources have estimated the number of people killed in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan during the occupation to be over 50,000 (see also Hasanpour 1994; Ferdoust 1992).

Notwithstanding the roles played by the US, the USSR, and the Britain in the defeat of the movement, one important internal factor remains central in the fall of the two republics. And that is the role played by the leadership. Although the ADP leaders played an essential role in the formation of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, they nevertheless failed to do their duties as leaders of a revolutionary movement. Instead of tying their destinies to the destiny of Azerbaijani people, they tied the peoples' destiny to the demands of Soviet leaders.

From the beginning of the movement, the ADP failed to produce a comprehensive literature outlining the goals of the movement. Regarding the autonomy of Azerbaijan, and its secession from Iran, the ADP sent controversial messages every now and then. It appeared that the relationship between Tehran and Moscow determined the tone and the mood of ADP announcements. When the people's revolutionary sentiment had reached its climax, the ADP leaders worked as mediators to calm the people down.

The change that ADP leaders introduced was conservative and reformist, not revolutionary and sovereigntist, as the people would have wanted. As a result, while the ADP followed the conservative line advocated by the Soviets, the revolutionary demands of thousands of workers and peasants remained unanswered. And when the oppressed peoples of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan needed their leaders the most, the leaders turned their back on the people and by announcing their surrender, opened the gates of the republics to the invading army.

Undecided and perplexed, with no leaders and no commanding centers, thousands of peasants and workers laid down their arms, stood by and silently watched as Shah's invading army plundered their belongings and murdered them one after another. And all this because the leaders of ADP had chosen the Soviets' trade and security considerations over the independence and autonomy of their own people and their own Republic!

Conclusion

The second world war has left a lasting impact on the struggle of Iran's various nations for self-determination. As a direct result of the war, Iran was invaded by the Soviet and British forces; the Pahlavi regime's oppressive military was curtailed, and Iran's dictator, Reza Shah Pahlavi was deposed and forced to exile.

Free from the tyranny of central power, the oppressed nations of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, along with other groups such as workers, farmers, and women all over the country, were provided with an invaluable opportunity to demand their legitimate national, social, economic and political rights. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was formed on December 12, 1945, followed by the formation of the Kurdish Republic a month later.

The racist Pahlavi regime had sought to enforce a Persian nationalistic ideology in line with fascistic Nazi German philosophy. Members of various non-Persian nationalities living in Iran had either to subscribe to a supposedly common Aryan ancestry, or else be humiliated, marginalized and suffer numerous punishments.

Azerbaijan's democratic movement was a genuine struggle grown out of the necessity to counter Persian racism, hegemony and language imperialism. The nationalistic and socio-political demands of Azerbaijani people were legitimate demands rooted in their culture and history. Although the ADP leaders failed to lead the struggle to victory, obtainment of autonomy and unification with northern Azerbaijan have, nonetheless, remained an ideal for millions of Azeris in both sides of the river Araz.

Lack of democracy coupled with unbearable lingual inequality and systemic discrimination against non-Persians came to play a very central role in the demise of Pahlavi dynasty in Iran. The people of Azerbaijan, along with other oppressed nationalities and groups, joined in the struggle against the absolute monarchic regime and eventually managed to bring it down through the 1978-79 popular revolution. The role of Azeris in the overthrow of Pahlavi regime was so decisive and so significant that after the triumph of the revolution, the people of Azerbaijan were accorded the title of "The Heroic Nation of Azerbaijan" (Sistani, 1990:34).

Shortly after the revolution however, and more significant, after the consolidation of clerical power, there did not occur any considerable change in the status of either Azeri people or Azeri language. Nor did come into existence any democratic rule and institution. More than this, in respect to issues concerning human rights, particularly women's rights and freedom, the situation even worsened and kept deteriorating. The rapid deterioration in socio-political sphere, coupled with the destructive impact of 8-year Iran-Iraq war, came to play a major role in determining the nature of future struggle.

The ADP leaders failed in that they tied the destiny of Azeri people to the economic and security considerations of the USSR. After the failure of 1978-79 Iranian revolution, it seems that the Azerbaijani political parties and intellectuals are thinking twice before tying the destiny of Azeri people to maintenance of Iran's territorial integrity.

The proclamation in 1991 of an independent Azerbaijan in north of the borders has forwarded a catalyst that sends the pendulum swinging back again. The achievements, experiences, and failures of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic have become a source of learning and understanding that provide invaluable lessons for a fresh start. The Azeri intellectuals are finding the idea of emancipation within an Iranian state increasingly becoming impossible. Meanwhile, discourses concerning Aryanization and de-Aryanization of various nationalities living in Iran continue as ever...




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Afshar, M. ”Aghaznameh” in Ayende. Vol. I. No. I. Tehran, 1925:5

Aliev, S.M. "The problem of Nationalities in Contemporary Persia" in Journal of Central Asian Review. Vol. 14. 1966.

Altestadt, Audrey L. The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule. Institution Press, Standford University: 1992.

Atabaki, Touraj. Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-Century Iran. London: British Academic Press, 1993.

Azeri, Ali. Qiyam-e Sheykh Mohammad-e Khiyabani der Tabriz. Tehran: 1955.

Baraheni, Reza. The Crowned Cannibals: Writings on Repression in Iran. New York: Vintage Books. 1977.

Berenjian, Sakina. Azeri and Persian Literary Works in Twentieth Century Azerbaijan. New York University Press: 1992.

Blucher, Wipert. Zeitwende in Iran. Biberach an der Riss. 1949.

Cottam, R.W. Nationalism in Iran. London: University of Pittsburgh Press:1979.

Dei, G.J.S. Anti-Racism Education: Theory and Practice. Halifax, Fernwood Publishing: 1996

Dei, G.J.S. “Knowledge and Politics of Social Change: the implications of anti-racism” in British Journal of Sociology of Education. Vol. 20. No. 3. Carfax Publishing: 1999.

Douglas, W.O. Strange Lands and Friendly People. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1951.

Ergin, M. Turk Dili ve Edebiyati Dergisi. Nov. 1950.

Fathi, Asghar. (ed.) Iranian Refugees and Exiles Since Khomeini. California: Mazda Publishers. 1991.

Fawcett, L.L. Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijani Crisis of 1946. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1992.

Ghods, M.R. Iran in the Twentieth Century. London, Adamantine Press: 1989.

Haqqi, Behruz. Lehezati az Zendegi-ye Sefer Qehremanian. Neshr-e Azerbaycan, Alman: 1993

Heyat, Javad. “Regression of Azeri Language and Literature under the Oppressive Period of Pahlavi”. Paper prepared in advance for participants of The First International Conference on Turkic Studies. Indiana University: May 19-22, 1983.

Hitichins, Keith. "The Caucasian Albanies and the Arab Caliphate in the Seventh and Eighth Centuries" in Iran under the Safavids. ed. R. Savory. Cambridge University Press: 1980.

Hodder, Ian. "The Interpretation of Documents and Material Culture" in N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln. eds. Handbook of Qualitative Research. Sage:1994.

JAMI (Jebhe-ye Azadi-ye Mardum-e Iran). Gozashteh Cheragh Rah-e Ayandeh Ast (The Past Is the Light on the Path to future). Tehran: 1979.

Javadi, Hasan and K. Burrill. "Azerbaijan. X. Azeri Literature in Iran" in Encyclopaedia Iranica. Vol. 3. ed. Ehsan Yarshater. Costa Mesa, California, Mazda: 1989.

Kaseb, A. Monhani-ye Qodrat dar Tarikh-e Iran (The Circle of Power in Iran's History). Tehran: 1989.

Kasravi, Ahmad. Azeri ya Zaban-e Bastani-ye Azerbaijan. 3rd ed. Tehran: 1946.

Kazemi, Farhad. Poverty and Revolution in Iran. New York University Press: 1980.

Koprulu. M.F. Azeri Edebiyati. Istanbul: 1958.

Lenczowski, George. Russia and the West in Iran: 1918-1948. New York. Cornell University Press: 1949.

Mehdi, Kamran. Adabiyyat va Incasanat (Literature and Fine Arts). Baku. 1980.

Minorskyii, V. History of Shirvan and Darband. Cambridge University: 1958.

Pisyan, N. Az Mahabad-e Khunin ta Karane-hay-e Aras (Frm Bloody Mahabad to the Banks of the Aras). Tehran: 1949.

Rayees-Nia, Rahim. Azerbaijan dar Seir-e Tarikh-e Iran (Azerbaijan and the Evolution of Iranian History). 2 Vols. Tabriz: Nima Publishers. 1990.

Rezun, Miron. The Iranian Crisis of 1941. Wien, Bohlau: 1982.

Roosevelt, Archie "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad" Middle East Journal. July 1947.

Sistani, Iraj Afshar. Negahi b-e Azerbaijan-e Sharghi (A Look at Eastern Azerbaijan). Tehran. 1990.

Sunny, G.R. Transcaucasia. University of Michigan: 1983.

Swietochowski, T. Russia and Azerbaijan. Columbia University Press: 1995.

Yazdi, M.H. Arzesh-e Masa’i-ye Iran dar Jang (The Value of Iran's Contribution to the War). Tehran: 1945.

Zanjani, Ahmad. Khaterati az Ma’muriyathay-e Man dar Azerbaijan (Memoirs of My Assignments in Azerbaijan) Tehran: 1974.

Zehtabi, M.T. Iran Turklerinin Eski Tarixi. Ikinci chap. Tebriz:1999.

Read more ...

Ethnical varieties; threat or opportunity

By: Yusof Azizi Banitorof
Translated By: Naser Noori

General view
Unfortunately still some of the political groups regard ethnical variety and plurality as a menace for our country, even little number of them denies such a variety. They try with a kind of prejudice and partiality to implant their mentality as objectivity, but recent years events in different parts of the country revealed that historical veracity of the ethnic variety in Iran, is a persistent geographical reality which callous mentalities can not ignore it eternally and of course if they do so, they will jeopardize both themselves and the country.

What does history say?
Some historians believe that prior to the assault of the Aryans, the ethnicities living in this country had peaceful and united coexistence and were managing their territory with a kind of federative system.

Ehsan-e-Yarshater says about this: " Aryans that from the second millennium BC headed for Iran gradually, and faced the natives such as Elamites, that were more civilized than them and some of the natives had (hand) writing system and their delicate drawings on the potteries, statues and objects, which were buried with dead, (in Silak, Susa, Tappe Hesar, Marlik and the like) were indicators of the centuries- long evolution in the civilization road. But when Aryans attacked Iran, by passing of time Iran natives had been decrepit and their internal strength had been declined. (“Letter of Iran” quarterly, 12-th year, third number.)

Such days last year in solitary confinement in Ahvaz I found an opportunity to study the book "Beihaghi History" for not the first time (I had studied the book several times before), of this time the book had been proofreaded by Nafisi. The proofreader in the margin of the text has written an interesting point about the ethnical variety and plurality of the Achaemenid and Sassanid empires and also he has figured the administrative system of that era as a kind of federalism. After Islam this variety continued and even during the Feudal System era we observe the emergence of autonomous countries. Seyyed Ahmad-e-Kasravi speaks about the 80 years of the autonomous sovereignty of the Moshashaiyan in Arabia (present Khuzestan) during 9th century. Also during this era there are Azerbaijan lords (atabaks) and Fars lords (atabaks) independent sovereignties.

During Qajar era, the system of Iran was been called the "protected countries system" and indeed Qajar empire was formed from several large states or countries like Arabia state, Kordestan state, Azerbaijan state, Gilan state , Khorasan state. These states all show ethnic variety of Iran during that era.

In constitutional revolution, in addition to the Persians, Azeri turks, Bakhtiaries and Armenians directly and Arabs and Kurds indirectly were involved. It should not be forgotten that Sheikh Khazal, the governor of Khuzestan during that era, did not spare sending any kind of aid to constitutionalists. During this era the "Iran a multinational country" expression entered to the political literature of Iran and Iran nations and ethnic groups could seal the constitutional law.

After victory of the Islamic revolution at Bahman 1357, also the constitutional law of the Islamic Republic of Iran in several principles recognized ethnic variety and plurality and the minimum ethnic rights for the Iranian ethnic groups were considered. This action was done with the presence of cultural and political representatives of ethnic groups in the process of compiling the constitutional law and with the support of progressive parties. At the summer of 1358 in a seminar which was taken place with the initiative of Mr Hasan Habibi, designer of the constitutional law of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in Tehran University, in addition to the writer, Dr Heiat, Mr Saleh Nikbakht, Dr Saram-Addin Sadegh-e- Vaziri, Dr Lahiji, the late Professor Notghi, the deceased Tovagh Vahedi and other representatives of ethnic groups had participated; but unfortunately that minimum earning, i.e, the principles related to the rights of the Iranian nations and ethnic groups have not been put in practice after 27 years.

It is necessary to point to a bitter and catastrophic event in Iran's history which gave rise to many racial fanatic prejudices and ethnical injustice in this territory and that is succeeding to the throne of the Phlavi dynasty. The process of "Nation-State" which should be formed on the basis of citizen's rights and ethnic rights, as a result of suppression of both individual and group rights was changed to a defective and curtailed one. In deed in the Phalavy era Iran apparently a national state and inwardly was continuation of the previous empires.

Dariush Ashuri, Iranian contemporary sociologist, writes about this matter that: "Empire means a large rule unit in a wide geographical area in which a ethnic group with a predominant language and culture reigns over other several ethnic groups and emperor and ruling system is the symbol of this sovereignty" ( Madraseh(School) Quarterly, Fall 1384) also he says in continuation that: " Reality is that these expressions, i.e., foreign language, foreign culture, foreign history, foreign race especially in countries which have had a background of empire structure, has little conformity with historical reality" (the same reference). Dariush Ashuri adds: "Modern nations came into appearance from the heart of the nationalizing process in the modern era, not from the eternal historical phenomena. United and collective identity should be sought among ethnic groups. Ethnic groups often have single collective memory, language and religion and probably single race. But nations in a modern terms, are combinations of ethnic groups" (the same reference.)

National solidarity and threatening policy

Superiority-seeking policy of Reza-shah, which completely took a fascistic form and the slogan "one nation, one race and one language", was its ambitious goal and in this way he utilized aid of chauvinist theoreticians like Mohammad Ali Furughi, Ahmad Kasravi, Mahmud Afshar, Saiid Nafisi, Malek-e- olshoaraie Bahar, Zabih Behrouz, Sadeghkiya, Farehvashi and such other people and also he took advantage of the anti-Arab and anti-Turk reflections of the opponents like Hedayat, Alavi and Zarrinkub. This policy inflicted the greatest damages on the historical unity, brotherhood, solidarity and coexistence of Iranian nations and ethnic groups. Indeed this policy justified and theorized injustice and unfairness toward non-Persian ethnic groups.

The effects of that oppressive scourge still are evident on the framework of Arab, Kurd, Turk, Baluch and Turkmen compatriots. Many of the current elite, writers and thinkers have been trained in such a superiority-seeking culture. This anti-dissident …….culture, in the beginning was common among elite but it didn't take much time to transform into a massive culture and appeared in the form of insult, humiliation and derision of the non-Persian ethnic groups.

National oppression is the central part of the national problem and a contiguous entirety which is composed of different cultural, linguistic, religious and racial components. National (ethnical) oppression paves the way for economical and social inequities.

With the change of "protected countries" to "the Imperial Government of Iran" we entered a perilous and horrendous cycle that even the national revolution of Bahman 1357 couldn't ameliorate this cycle. They imposed the centralized and mono-national system on the multinational and semi-federal Iran and this lack of accommodation between content and container, in the past eighty years, has sometimes shown itself in the form of riot, unrest and ethnical insurrections. According to the public confession, among them present authorities, our country in the past twenty five years not only has not been set free from that defective cycle but also, on field of centralism, the state has been exacerbated. This means that administrative, political, cultural and economical affairs have been centralized in the capital and central areas of Iran. Now country faces with a dangerous situation, namely "center and perimeter". Turk, Arab, Turkmen and Baluch-dwelling areas form the perimeter which have had little share of the past year's development plans.

This menacing political and economical approach of national solidarity enjoys a century ideological support which is the superiority-seeking and splendor-wanting ideology of one of the ethnic groups. In fact, the main idea of this ideology is just the ethnocentric ideology which previously was pointed to.

Among other policies which menace national solidarity, are assimilation and population changes. For this purpose, Mahmud Afshar was the first who proposed Reza-shah to cause Arab and Turk teachers and employees to migrate to other Persian-dwelling areas. Even he exceeded this bound and proposed to remove infants of ethnic groups from their family and transfer to Persian families.

Non-execution of the principles related to ethnic groups, especially the principles 15, 19 and 49 of the constitutional law of the Islamic Republic of Iran is also one of the other threatening factors which authorities have an obligation that with the complete implementation of these principles and equally for all ethnic groups, attenuate the severity of the ethnical tensions and pave the way for solving the basic problem.

But seemingly some ethnical prejudices and fanaticism have suspended these principles. In writer's opinion, the most urgent work which the government should do in cultural domain is the execution of the 15-th principle of the constitutional law from the beginning of the educational year 1385-86.

The government and Ministry of Education should endeavor that from the beginning of the educational year, Azeri Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, Baluchi and Turcoman literature and languages, be taught. This issue can help decrease ethnical gaps and enhance national reconciliation; also government should allow all the ethnical publications which have been banned in one or two years ago, to be published again and should give positive response to tens of applications of applicants for publishing magazine and paper in ethnical and local languages- among them Arabic in Khuzestan-; and instead of punishing the civil and cultural organization give them opportunity to pursue their activities. Of course beside this problem government should take action to modify economical inequities and to lessen different pressures. In order to achieve this purpose short-term and long-term methods can be utilized.

Opportunities of ethnical multiplicity

Here some of the opportunities resulting from the solving of the national problem in Iran will be pointed to. By the teaching of the ethnic languages in a systematic and scientific way in schools, after several years there will be staffs that are proficient in live and important languages like Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish, Turkmen and Baluchi. These staffs can work in all of the political, diplomatic, cultural and literal fields and compensate some of the deficiencies of the society.

In the meantime, by the acknowledgement of the legal ethnic rights, the membership right or at least inspection right in accredited regional organization can be granted to the country, in this condition nobody can avoid attending of Iran in the Persian Gulf cooperation council, Arab League Organization or Turkish-speaking countries organization or other similar organizations. Also in cultural domain, cultural staffs and forces of these ethnical groups can be good and meritorious translators in order to translate cultural, artistic and literal literature of Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish, Turkmen and Baluchi into Persian or to translate Persian books into these languages.

In short time to solve the ethnic groups’ problem it is necessary to proceed toward a kind of native federalism which basically was present in a traditional and historical form in this country about 80 years ago.

To administer justice to the ethnic groups in long term will be a good criterion to the plans which can provide national interest of Iranians. Of course here national interest is not from a narrow view of a particular ethnic group or a social class or a dominant political party, but national interests means providing of all the ethnic groups’ interests and gradual reducing of historical animosities and tensions among subsequent governments of Iran and neighboring countries; of course this matter is congruent with global developments.

If Iran can establish a federal state internally, it can be the pioneer of a kind of confederation with the neighboring countries.

Iran has common frontiers with countries which those who speak the same language, have the same race and have the same religion, of the six main Iran’s ethnic groups (Persians, Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen and Baluchs) live in those countries; thus Iran can be center of the confederation circle which Iraq, Syria, Republic of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan (and perhaps in farther future, Afghanistan, Turkey and countries around Persian Gulf) can be included. Of course this is an ambitious but a practical plan. It should not be forgotten that Islamic Empire during the dehiscence of its civilization was a proof of this condition. That time ”Yaghut-e- Hamavi”, “Ebn-e-Batuteh”, “Sadi-e-Shirazi” or “Nasser Khosro” when wanted to travel from one side of the Islamic World to other side didn’t need passport and basically borders among these countries had not political and cultural meaning but merely were geographical.

Now European Union has the same state that we had in the golden era of Islamic Empire. Is it impossible for us to achieve that state? Undoubtedly this is possible but it is dependent upon several factors. The most important factors are recognition of democracy and human rights and ethnic groups’ and minorities’ rights and implementation of these rights.

Of course Europe in order to become united began from economy and then reached politics. In Europe, unity achieved not at the expense of ethnic groups’ and minorities’ rights but by providing them within the framework of the law of each one the United Europe countries.

Internal Variety and Global Developments

Our time is the era of the gradual demolition of different foundationalisms. At the end of the last eighth decade world witnessed annihilation of the communist foundationalism and at the beginning of the 21-the century observed the fall of religious foundationalism of Taliban in Afghanistan and decline of Bathite nationalism in Iraq. In other words, globalization era is the era of passing from national state to democratic state.

In author’s opinion, the ideology of the extremist Fars nationalism which sometimes appears in the form of Pan-aryaism and Pan-farsism will not a better destiny than bathit’s ideology; even in its moderate form, i.e., Mosaddegh nationalism, if it wants to persist upon its sixty years ago policy about the definition of “Iranian identity” and neglecting existence and rights of Iran’s ethnic groups, will not have a better fate than them.

Of course it doesn't mean that we will witness the ultimate demise of the nationalistic and sociologistic policies; but these policies in order to continue their life has no other choice except consistency with the modern global discipline and should keep distance from foundationalism, monopoly, anti-opposition and dictatorship and should acknowledge the persistent reality of ethnical variety and multiplicity and observing democracy and human rights for all of the ethnical factors and religious and political minorities of the Iranian society.

So it is based on the right reason to be harmonious with the global developments and not to resist against them.
Our time in one of its aspects is in the meaning of the attenuation of the organization of the national governments. From other particularities of this era is the appearance of the foreign countries meddling in other countries’ affairs which this interference shows off itself in different forms. Undoubtedly this factor isn’t unprecedented in Iranians’ contemporary history. The annihilating effects of this case exactly were witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Of course in Iran with co-understanding and dialogue between all political and ethnical factors of the society and respect to their different viewpoints and refraining from any kind of violence and by utilizing peaceful and civilian instruments it can be prevented from foreigners’ interference in internal affairs and ethnical variety can be converted into an opportunity for progress and development.

Emphasis upon ethnical identities and ethnical and religious right in the world and defense of the international laws and organization from these rights and identities is another aspect of this era.

If we pass from the relative solution of the national problem (ethnic groups) in Western Europe which has been started from 21-th century and now has continuation, we will get to Eastern Europe which at the last of the previous century witnessed intensification of the national problem in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and former Yugoslavia. The ultimate ring of this chain was independence of Montenegro from former Yugoslavia.

Islamic world also has not been distant from these significant developments. Recognition of the Amazighi language (barbarians’ tongue) in Morocco and Algeria and solving of the twenty years long problem of the upheaval of Zangis in Jordan and also settlement of the Kurds problem in Iraq and establishment of democracy in these two countries and becoming official languages of the Tajick, Uzbak, Baluchi, Nurestani and also Shiite and Esmailiie (beside Pashto language and Sunnite religion) in Afghanistan all are indicating the development that Islamic world witnessed in globalization era.

It is necessary to remind that in the historical turning points, some of the material instruments have performed an important role. In constitution movement, the material tool “Telegraph” laid the ground for the Iranians’ revolution and in the revolution of the Bahman 57 “Cassette” undertook this role. But now material instruments in the developments related to democracy, human rights, ethnic groups’ and minorities’ movements don’t play any role. Among the most important instruments in the globalization era are satellite, internet and mobile (in particular s.m.s).

In the writer’s opinion modern global conditions have decreased the impact of the traditional nationalism (Bathitte, Rezakhani, Naseri, Mosaddeghi, ….) much more than before and increased impact of the ethnical and religious nationalism.

What has been said about globalization is not in the meaning of yielding to all aspects of this process. Interaction with globalization can be a dialectic one; i.e. positive aspects that appear in democracy and human rights and ethnic groups’ rights can be accepted but negative aspects should be criticized.

Basically attempt to put an end to national (ethnical) oppression and establish ethnical equality in all cultural, linguistic, religious, political and economic fields is an antidote to all of threats, and an opportunity for the all-out progress and development of the country.

Switzerland is a good example for the voluntary union of different ethnic groups. In fact, not Germans, not French and not Italians despite having developed and powerful countries in their neighborhood and speaking same language want to separate from Switzerland. The mystery of this strong unity should be explored in granting of all the civilian and ethnical rights in this country and not in other thing.

At the end, it should be reminded that Iran is a wide flower garden of miscellaneous flowers and its beauty is hidden in this variety. Thus no gardener has this right to care just on kind of flowers and deprive other flowers from water and life. Result of the extreme care of a flower and neglecting others will lead to a monotonous and wearisome garden. It is up to us to prevent from the spoiling of these flowers and keeping historical variety and mulitcoloredness of this flower garden; this is useful for all of us. (end)

Read more ...

Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Internat

Speech of Fakhteh Zamani

On March 24, 2009, Mrs. Fakhteh Zamani, President of the Association for the Defense of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran and Mr. Ahmad Batebi, a spokesperson for Human Rights Activists in Iran gave a presentation to the Canadian parliament regarding the current status of human rights in Iran.

Mrs. Zamani opened the discussion with a brief presentation on treatment of Azerbaijanis as an ethnically marginalized minority that is barred from linguistic and cultural expression. Mrs. Zamani, who is herself of Iranian Azerbaijani descent, cited examples of the oppressive treatment by the Islamic Republic of Iran on ethnic Azerbaijanis simply for promoting linguistic rights. She mentioned the case of Reza Avaz-Pour, 17, who was sentenced to 15 months in a political prison for stating that his mother tongue would never die; 5 university activists in February 2009 who were charged with establishing illegal groups and disturbing national security after they campaigned to promote linguistic rights; and Mr. Farhad Mohseni, 25, who was tortured and killed in June 2008 for similar activities.

She goes further to describe her own experience in Iran as a member of a marginalized minority group. Mrs. Zamani remembers the Iranian media’s discriminatory nature toward Azerbaijanis and her inability to speak her native tongue openly. Upon immigrating to Canada, she became well aware that these discriminatory actions were not covered in the Western media outlets. Three years ago she set out to increase awareness for her cause, which has intensified since the May 2006 Azerbaijani uprising. She has continued her work despite attacks from opposition groups. She currently speaks with the families of Azerbaijani victims to make sure their stories are heard.

Mr. Batebi followed this presentation by giving statistical information on human rights violations in Iran. He started off mentioning censorship as the principal problem. He described that within the past year, 29 cases of newspapers shutting down and 26 reporters who had been tried for spreading propaganda, 21 of whom were found guilty. He goes further to explain human rights violations committed on students, student groups, women’s rights groups and religious groups. His figures showed the following data on political arrests, totaling 278: 42 arrests of Baha’i activists and 11 execution verdicts, 51 Christians arrested, 131 Sunnis arrested of which 19 received execution verdicts.

After Mrs. Zamani and Mr. Batebi’s presentations, Canadian MPs were allotted some time for questions. Mr. Mario Silvia asked Mrs. Zamani what concrete steps the Canadian parliament could take for their cause. Mrs. Zamani’s response was that allowing her to present her case and raising awareness were the first and most important eps. Following up, MP Mr. Bernard Bigrsas asked what measures the Canadian Parliament could do in response to the violations. Mrs. Zamani’s response was to increase the importance of oppressed minorities in UN resolutions against Iran. She also stated that she would like to see more resolutions to bring awareness of the issue within the Canadian Parliament. Mr. Birgras then asked if Mrs. Zamani would like to see the cases brought up before an International Tribunal. Mrs. Zamani’s response was that while this would be “fantastic”, for now she just wants to see more awareness of the issue.

MP Wayne Marston began by noting the use of the internet as a powerful tool of raising dissent within Iran. He then asked if there had been any impact from the UN. Mrs. Zamani explained that her experience with the UN had been limited to special support from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

MP David Sweet began his commentary by noting that these human rights abuses in some way mirror the events that precluded the Holocaust. He went on to ask Mrs. Zamani who had been attacking her. Mrs. Zamani responded by saying opposition groups surprisingly more than the Iranian government.


Fakhteh Zamani’s Presentation to the Canadian Parliament’s Subcomittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development

Distinguished members of the House of Commons, Ladies and Gentlemen.

As most teenagers in Canada are getting ready for their summer break, Azerbaijani Iranian, Mohammad Reza Evezpour who is just 17 will soon start serving yet another 15 months prison sentence. This young activist is no stranger to detention, imprisonment and torture. Since age 13, he has been arrested and tortured repeatedly for the simple non-violent act of stating that his mother tongue will not die.

Five university activists, Hossein Hosseini, Asghar Akberzadeh, Ardashir Karimi, Behruz Alizadeh, and journalist Rahim Gholami were sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment by the Iranian revolutionary court on Feb 02, 2009 for the simple act of promoting their linguistic rights. Their trials were not public and without a lawyer present. They were charged with "establishing illegal groups with the intention of disturbing the national security". These activists will be sent far away from their homes to dangerous prisons all over the country. These exiles will prevent family visits, will stop the flow of information about their conditions and basic welfare, and will disconnect them from the outside world. It may sound ironic to say that their families are lucky. At least they will know where their loved ones are.

On June 11, 2008 the worst fear of one family came true. Twenty days after Farhad Mohseni’s arrest by officers of the Iranian ministry of Intelligence, his tortured body was handed over to his family for immediate burial. He was 25 years old.

As Iran’s uranium enrichment program continues to be a focus of international attention, the human rights situation in Iran continues to deteriorate. While the activities of various student and women’s rights movements, as well as individual cases of journalists, writers, scholars, and human rights defenders, are somewhat known to the outside world, regrettably this is not the case with minoritized non-Persian communities. The Azerbaijanis and other non-Persian ethnic groups are Iran’s invisible population.

For over 80 years, all non-Persian minorities in Iran have been victims of serious human rights violations. They have endured racial discrimination, forced assimilation, suppression of their language and culture under both the Pahlavi and Islamic governments. However, as a person of Azerbaijani background, I am here to speak about this particular community: the minority group which well might be a numerical majority but is kept in a minority situation in terms of access to power and resources.Since early childhood, I have been exposed to the racial discrimination against the ethnic group into which I was born. As a school girl, I was not allowed to speak my mother tongue, Azerbaijani Turkic. I never saw text books written in my language. I was not taught to read and write my language or learn about my culture and history. As Iran’s only official language Farsi, the Persian language was imposed on us. We were forced to learn Persian language, Persian history, and Persian culture as the common identity of all Iranians.

I have experienced my ethnic group routinely and openly insulted on radio, television and in the state run national press. Even now, my people are depicted as intellectually challenged and are dehumanized as “donkeys” and cockroaches”. Racial discrimination is still with us. Banning of all non-Farsi languages continues, ethnic groups, particularly Turks and Semites are dehumanized.
Iranian regimes have been the biggest threat to the realization of human rights for Azerbaijanis in Iran. Paralleling the internal repression by the government, the Azerbaijani struggle is ignored by the international community and remains invisible to western media such as the BBC, and European broadcasts in Persian. Even Iranian human rights activists, often fail to mention Azerbaijanis and other minorities when they speak of human right violations in Iran.

About two years ago, after hearing of wide spread arrests in the Azerbaijani region ofIran and sensing a total indifference on the part of Iranian Human rights groups towards all Azerbaijani cases, I came to the realization that I must take up the cause.Straightaway I could see the effects of repression and forced assimilation to which the Azerbaijanis were subjected in the course of last century. I and others, who have spoken about Azerbaijani rights, have been regularly denounced as traitors and separatists, and have faced insults and threats not only by members of the dominant Persian group but also by some assimilated and Persianized members of the minority communities.

Since May 2006 uprising in the Azerbaijani region of Iran, Azerbaijani activists have been hit hard. Many are in prison, some are missing, and as I mentioned before some were killed. Those of us fortunate enough to live in societies where we are entitled to full political rights can reach out to help the less fortunate. We are asking the international community to be aware of the situation in Iran and to take action on behalf of those who have no voice.

When I ask activists or family members who have lost a loved one, or have someone in prison, if they have a message, they ask me to speak about their struggle for freedom of expression, democracy, and human rights. But for them as Azerbaijanis the struggle is also about eliminating racial discrimination and having a right to their own language and culture. Their message can be summarized in these words by Aung San Suu Kyi, the imprisoned Burmese leader: “please use your liberty to promote ours.”

Read more ...

Speech by Hedayat Soltanzadeh in Brussles Conference, EU Parliament, 1-2 April 2009

Draft of speech
Ladies and gentlemen

As a representative of Azerbaijani Federal Democratic Movement, first of all I have to express my thanks for organisers of this conference and in providing me the opportunity to speak on behalf of South Azerbaijanis, the largest nationality without political and cultural rights in Iran, while its size of population is more than three times of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the north and its magnitude in terms of political activists and scientific cadres are paramount with the Persians.

Azerbaijanis were always in the forefront of the all democratic upheavals in modern times and by reliance on such a tradition and legacy of the past that we are trying today to put on a common pool the efforts for a democratic change for all nationalities in Iran.

To be faire, I have to say that all political and cultural Azerbaijani activists share the idea of self-determination, but they may have different perceptions on its connotations and how it could be materialised in the socio-political context of Iran.

I believe that the term derives its meaning from the nation-state and carries with itself the political rights of a given nation for statehood. As the first historical experience in French revolution has demonstrated, the idea of the self-determination originally did mean a democratic control of a nation to state apparatus. It is with such an understanding of the sovereignty of a nation that Azerbaijani Federal Democratic Movement considers the concept of self-determination and the prospect of democratic governance.

In a multi-national country, the application of the idea of self-determination could be nothing else than the common sharing of statehood and equality of the collective right of all nationalities to different levels of the power sharing. The political tools of such a common sharing of statehood and realisation of self-determination in a multi-national society could only be a federative state. It necessitates that the distinct identity of the different nationalities within a country to be recognised, respected and enshrined in the constitution of the federative state. Modern history is a rich source experience on this matter, from the host country of this conference to Canada, Switzerland, Brazil and others, and more important, the current move of the Europe on that direction. It is also rich source theoretical insights, by taking into account that most nationalities in Iran , including we Azerbaijanis are a divided nation. And it is a common fact that in multi-national countries, distinct national identities are one the defining features of federalism.

The present political structure of our country does not provide the minimum opportunity to reshape it on a federative basis. In addition, it is more rigid to be reformed.

Within the context of the Iran, we have a double anomaly of political structure which affects the question nationalities: in the first place, the existence of an ideological religious system with multi-level apartheid policies vis-a-vis of the whole society from one hand, which I categorise it as totalitarian, and : secondly ,the antinomy of one national political structure based on the single political power of one nationality, namely the Persians , and the imposing of Farsi language by force, in such a multi-national multicultural society, who compose the majority of the population on the other hand. This has caused ideological ambiguity even within the opposing groups. Some may equate any claims of rights with separatism. Others may think that establishment of simple individual rights or observing of human rights, could lead to the normality in political system. While such steps have its own credentials, they cannot guaranty the requirements of a federative state which is based essentially on the collective rights of the different nationalities within defined frontiers of single state.

We may imagine the removal of the present totalitarian ideological political system from the political scene of Iran , without any change in the national oppression , as it happened with Revolution of 1979 and with the change of the monarchy to Republic Islamic, which moved on instantly on the reinforcement of national oppression . However, the ability to establish a federative state demands a change on the foundations of the one nationality political structure within a multi-national society, and pertinent to it, the change in the prerogative of Farsi language on detriment of other languages. Preserving of a one dimensional political structure will create a constant tension within a multi-national society, preventing of a peaceful existence of.

One of the negative effects of national discrimination is the creation of first world-third world relationship within the Iranian society as all physical and human development investments are being carried out mainly on the Farsi speaking areas, even if in economic terms , lacking any rationalism. The growing importance of knowledge in social capital of societies will push more than ever the oppressed nationalities in our society into the margin of life, and in my view, national discrimination assumes a class formation role, making them unskilled workers of the dominant nation.

Now the question I may pose is that: can a democratic system be imagined without a democratic solution for the suppressed nationality issues in Iran? I believe that the democratic solution of the nationality issues is one the main building blocks of the democracy in our country. I believe also that it is a simultaneous process of a democratic change in Iran. We have not one abstract phase of realisation of the so-called "Democracy" and another phase of finding out the solution for the nationality oppression. Elimination of the national discrimination constitutes itself a part of any democratic change. To achieve it , it is not enough that an ideological religious government to be replaced by an apparently secular system. While secularism and free elections are necessary elements of good governance, they cannot per se guaranty the existence of a fully democratic system. We need to take further steps. We need that the one dimensional political structure on the governance based on dominance of Persian nationality and disguised under a false "nationality of Iran" and pretence of Farsi as the common language of all nationalities, to be replaced by a pluralistic multi-national and multi-language political system, reflecting the reality of Iranian society. Because, Iran is only a name of geographic area and per se does not indicate any national identity. And its size and shape have never remained unchanged. Therefore that will be a misrepresentation of the history to identify all nationalities with a common indicator of Iran as nationality which is practically interpreted as Persians and with the language of Farsi.

Finally, any democratic solution for eliminating of national discrimination and establishment of a democratic federative political system can come from within Iranian society. Democracy cannot be realised by military invasion of external forces. They can create a long lasting mess, but surly not democracy, and invasion to Iraq or Afghanistan are good examples it. We don't believe that the democracy could be built on the skulls of victims of violence and military intervention. Even if it may appear as climbing of a rocky mountain, Iranian society has enough maturity and civic wisdom to achieve the noble end of democratic governance, accommodating the wishes of equality between all nationalities in Iran. It is only possible with convergence of all democratic movement inside of the country, Solidarity of the nationalities, the movements of the women for gender equality and teachers and labour movements for social justice and freedom. To build a real democratic political system, we need not only solidarity and putting hand in hand of all nationalities in Iran, but also we need to democratise it by internalising the drive for social justice and freedom of masses, the ideal of equality of women with men in all areas of social life with right to self-determination. In such a case, the building blocks of the democracy will be laid down by convergence of the different civic movements and establishment of a democratic federative system will not be far from the sight. And as David Hume once had said, the force is always on the side of the people and whenever it rises, its'd will be obeyed.

Thank you
H.Soltanzadeh

Read more ...

MRG Article on Fakhteh Zamani


All over the world, ordinary women, men, and children are fighting for the rights of their communities to be recognized. Fakhteh Zamani spoke to MRG about her work in support of Iran’s minorities.

A published expert in wireless communications, Canada-based Fakhteh Zamani is better known for her determination to remedy injustices suffered by Iran’s minorities. Fakhteh, an Iranian Azerbaijani, left Iran more than18 years ago but she remains passionate about her homeland and uses modern communications methods to gather and share information about minorities.

Fahkteh’s concern for the numbers of young minority members under arrest and subjected to torture led to her creating the Association for the Defense of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners, but she condemns Tehran’s abuses against all minorities.

Iran – a nation of concealed minorities

Iran is home to considerable communities of Azerbaijainis, Baluchis, Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen, who are not all Shia Muslim but also Sunnis, Christians, Bah’ais and Jews. Minorities are jointly estimated by some to make up close to half of Iran’s population, and they constitute a disproportionate element of the prison population.

Fakhteh’s activism started when she realised hardly anyone knew about the abuses against Azerbaijainis in Iran. She later took on cases involving Baluchis when she discovered how many were being executed while the world remained unaware.

Disturbingly many were youths under 18 years of age – legally children under UN conventions. By dint of sending emails, making phone calls and asking questions, Fakhteh started receiving information from witnesses and relatives of the oppressed and condemned - and threats from opponents wanting to silence her.

Life in Iran for minorities is complex. There have been charges of voting irregularities and minorities sometimes fall foul of the authorities if they protest against provocative statements and actions. In a country where the media is well controlled, cartoons depicting Azeris as cockroaches in 2006 caused huge offence: the editor of the publication was imprisoned- albeit temporarily - but authorities moved against protestors with such force that hundreds were arrested and Azeri websites reported many deaths.

Repression and control of minorities

Minorities are concentrated in the country’s periphery and contain a wealth of oil, minerals and rich agricultural areas along Iran’s borders. Fakhteh tells how this gives Tehran the excuse for repression of minorities - ostensibly in defence of the nation. She says that in some areas aquifers have been diverted, indigenous peoples removed and Persian families moved in.

One group, the Baluchis, are particularly targeted by repressive measures - Tehran apparently fears that Baluchi unrest in neighbouring Pakistan, may spread over the border. But Fakhteh says hundreds are on death row and well over a thousand estimated to be in prison after trials - many of them young men under 17.

Few minority representatives with any status within Iran risk speak out while Tehran preaches the importance of national unity. Any reports of human rights violations of minorities coming from Washington prompt charges of destabilisation from Tehran against minorities. So Fakteh stresses that support for human rights from other nations is doubly welcome.

Champions such as Fakhteh are vital to Iran’s minorities, and as she notes her email inbox gets fuller every day. While the intricacies of bluetooth communications may no longer be her main focus, it is thanks to technology that Fakhteh is able to fight for minority rights from her base in Canada.

http://www.minorityrights.org/7596/so-what-do-you-do/fakhteh-zamani-.html

Read more ...

Evolution of the Azerbaijani Language and Identity

Javad Heyet - Paper Presented to: The Symposium on Azerbaijani Language and Idendity
University of Malmoe

The Turkish language of Azerbaijan or Azerbaijani language belongs to the Oghuz group, and is spoken in Iran as well as the republic of Azerbaijan, eastern Anatolia and Kerkuk region in Iraq. The formation of Azerbaijani language as a nationwide language is related to the immigration of the Turkic tribes and peoples to Azerbainan, though not exactly synchronous with it. There is difference of opinion among the linguists as to when exactly this language developed into a folks‐scale language.

Western turcologists believe that the language took the form of a nationwide language simultaneously with the immigration of the Oghuz Turks at the beginning of the 11th century from the central Asia to Azerbaijan through Iran. The literary works began to emerge from the 13th century. The scholars of North Azerbaijan and ex‐Soviet authors date this evolution back to the 7‐8th centuries (A. Demirchizade etc.). Even some scholars consider Azerbaijan to be the original homeland of the Turks.

According to my own research, the northern part of Azerbaijan was subjected to Turkish elements beginning the 7th century B.C., by the immigration of various Turkic tribes from the central Asia, such as Schythes, Bulqars, Huns, Sabirs, Agajeris, Pecheneks, Kengerlus, On‐Oghurs, Sari‐Oghurs, Khazars, and finally Qipchaqs, thus the turkicisation process was completed in the north as early as the 7th century A.D., whereas in the south, this process still waited to be intensified by the immigration of Oghuz‐Qipchaq and Uyghur elements in the 11‐13th centuries. In these centuries the territories of southern Azerbaijan were conquered and settled by Seljuk Turks (Oghuz), whose settlement was later intensified by the Uyghur (who accompanied Mongols), Ag‐Qoyunlu, Qara‐Qoyunlu, Turks arriving with Tamerlane from Central Asia, and later by the Qizilbash (Oghuz) tribes arriving in the 16th century and joining Shah Ismail Safavi. The language of all the native inhabitants including the Tats and the immigrating Mongols was converted to the Turkish language due to their melting within these Turkish elements.

The establishment of Oghuz dialect as the dominant language of Azerbaijan was made possible only after domination of the Oghuz element in the ethnic make‐up of the population of Azerbaijan, i.e. after the 11th century, though other Turkic dialects such as Qipchaq and Uyghur and even the Tat and other Azeri dialects had played a certain role in this evolution, and Arabic and Persian words entered the language due to the Islamic and the Iranian influence.

The Turkish of Azerbaijan contains a written literary language and many oral dialects. Early literary works in the Azerbaijani language include Izziddin Hasan Oghlu, Nessir Bakui and Hindu Shah Nakhchivani, who wrote his famous lexicological and grammatical work called Sahah‐al‐ajem in the 13th century. The oral tradition is older and dates back to Dede Qorqud legend. The literary style of Dede Qorqud marks the early phases of the Oghuz language, when the differentiation between the Azerbaijani and Anatolian dialects had not set in yet.

The evolution of Azerbaijani language has been divided into 3 periods by A. Demirchizadeh as follows:

1 – The formation and evolution of the Azerbaijani on the basis of a comprehensive ethnic language (Umumxalq Dil), 11th century up to the end of 18th century.

2 – The stabilization of the literary language as a national language, 18th century up to early 20th century.

3 – The contemporary period, early 20th century up to present.

The first period can be divided into 3 stages as follows:

1 – The beginning stage (11‐15th centuries). In this period the Oghuz dialect was dominant and certain language elements from Qipchaq‐ Uyghur and sometimes synonyms (qosha sözler, paired words) are present in parallel, as for example Yaxshi and Eyu, ben and men, qilmaq and etmek, ayitmaq and soylemek and demek, ol and shol and o, varmaq and getmek, tamu and cehennem, uçmaq and behisht etc. The U phoneme was dominant in the second syllable of the words and also in the suffixes, as for example eyu, altun, qamu (hami), versun (versin). This situation had persisted until the end of the 18th century and had taken its final, present day form after the emergence of the poet Vaqif. The most notable figure belonging to this period was Nassimi (14th century).

2 – Khatai and Fuzuli stages (16‐17th centuries). In this period the Turkish language was developing in parallel to the Persian language, and was the official language used in the Safavi court and the military establishments as well as the administrative circles. In this period the Turkish language influenced the Persian language strongly by providing many loan words and military terms to it, and paved the way for a unification, and the difference between the written and the oral language almost disappeared. The qoshma poetical form was introduced to the classical literature by the poetry of Shah Ismail Khatai.

Fuzuli was the most notable Ghazal (lyric) poet of the period, who wrote lyric4 divans in Turkish, Persian and Arabic. His Leyla and Medjnun is considered to be the most burning and aestethic example of mathnavi of this kind. The school of Fuzuli is continued at contemporary times. Most Azerbaijani poets wrote their divans under his literary influence.

3 – Vaqif stage (18th century). Vaqif was a realist poet who introduced many innovations in the form and content of the Azerbaijani language and literature. He chose qoshma as the formal basis of his poetry, and used a relatively pure linguistic style, reflecting the traditions and life styles of the Azerbaijani people.

In this period the literary language took a unique and general form, and qoshma was effectively introduced into the literary tradition.

The phonological and grammatical elements of the language acquired unity and were stabilized, and new words replaced the older ones, and the language acquired its present day characteristics. In the 19th century (1812) the northern part of Azerbaijan was separated from Iran and annexed to the Russian Empire, but the linguistic process continued in the northern part, and the morphology acquired its present day, uniform characteristics. In the new period the emergence of journals like Ekinchi, Fiyuzat, and Molla Nassreddin helped stabilize the prose. School books and grammatical books were edited in the mother language, which helped stabilize the orthography and pronunciation of the language, and the standard style replaced the former complicated scientic prose styles.

In the year 1918 the literary language was declared as the official language, and after 1920 this situation continued under the Soviet rule.

In the 19th century the Marthia literature (poetry dedicated to the tragedy of Imams) enjoyed extensive development in the Iranian section of Azerbaijan, but during the 20th century the written language was banned under the Pahlavi regime. This situation continued up until the onset of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, with the exception of a single year (1945‐46) during which the government of the Democrat Party of Azerbaijan was in charge in Tabriz.

After 1979 with the settlement of the Islamic regime a new period began in the history of language and literature of the Iranian Azerbaijan. Many journals and publications appeared in the Turkish language alone or mixed Turkish and Persian languages. Today, there are more than 50 regular journals, although certain of the journals had a relatively short lifetime.

Varliq journal started to be published early 1979, and continued regularly up to now, both in Turkish and Persian, presenting essays on linguistics, as well as literature, history, folklore and some polemical issues. This journal has now acquired the status of a school, where the most learned Azerbaijani scholars publish their articles. The Varliq journal was pioneer in stabilizing the orthographic styles as well as the stabilization of the written language norms in the Iranian Azerbaijan.

Hundreds of books and journals have been published in Iran in the past 24 years, which contribute effectively to the promotion of linguistic features in the Azerbaijani language. The language of Varliq is based on the common Azerbaijani literary language, except that the Russian and Latin words are used with much less frequency in comparison to the literary styles of the northern part of Azerbaijan.

Malmoe, 15 April 2003

Read more ...

Fakhteh Zamani: Minority Forum Speech

Madam chairperson, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Forum Participants:

It is a well-known fact by now that education in the mother tongue is very central to intellectual, emotional, spiritual and educational development of students. It is, and should be, an undeniable right of all ethnic groups to study, read and write in their natural mother language.

This right, however, has been denied to Iran’s non-Persian ethnic groups: i.e., Azerbaijani-Turks, Kurds, Baluchs, Turkmens, Arabs, Lurs, Gilaki-Mazandaranis, and others.

These ethnic groups constitute the numerical majority in the country. Yet, they are forced to study in Farsi, which is the language of Persian ethnic group. The Persian language has been imposed on the majority-non-Persian population since 1925, the year of Reza Shah’s takeover of political power and establishment of Pahlavi Dynasty. Ever since then, Farsi has been elevated to the status of Iran’s only official language. It is the only language of instruction, education, and government in a country which is one of the most diverse, multicultural and multi-lingual countries of the world.

Ever since 1925, Iran’s diverse ethnic and national communities have been struggling for the right in education in their own natural mother language. The Azerbaijani Turks, for example, constitute about 37 percent of the total population in Iran (well over 20 million) and have been demanding the right to education in their language since 1925. The Pahlavi regime brutally suppressed these demands; and so does the current Islamic Republic. While the constitution of current Islamic regime allows for the studying, reading and writing of non-Persian languages along with Farsi, the government doe not honour its own constitution and keeps arresting, abusing and persecuting those who demand the implementation of this constitutional right.
The Azerbaijani-Turks have been demanding the right to education in their own language, Azeri-Turkic, through peaceful means, from writing collective letters to Iranian authorities to staging peaceful, non-violent demonstrations.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Allow me to conclude by sharing with you two famous mottos of the Azerbaijani community regarding their language and its use in educational centers:

Ana dilim olen deyil Ozge dile chonen deyil
My mother tongue will not die Nor will it be supplanted by other languages

Oz dilinde medrese Olmalidir herkese
Education in the mother tongue Is a must for everyone

Thank you very much!

Forum on Minority Issues

Read more ...

Vancouver woman risks her life to expose the persecution of Azerbaijani Iranians

Tara Carman, Vancouver Sun

Then on May 12, 2006, the cockroach cartoon was published in an Iranian national newspaper and thousands of Azerbaijani Iranians took to the streets. The protesters, mostly unarmed, were brutally repressed by security forces. In a 2007 report on human rights in Iran, Amnesty International estimates that "hundreds, if not thousands, were arrested and scores were reportedly killed by the security forces."

There is a haunted look in Fakhteh Zamani's eyes as she recalls guiding Iranian activist Vahid Davarpanah through the streets of Turin, Italy.

He asked Zamani to describe the buildings around them and she couldn't find the words because the streetscape was so unlike anything he would have seen in his native country. He could not see them for himself because he was blinded by one of the 90 pellets fired into his body by Iranian security forces with riot guns. His crime: protesting a cartoon published in a state-run newspaper that compared his people -- Azerbaijani Iranians -- to cockroaches and suggesting 10 ways of exterminating them. Davarpanah was in his early 20s and unarmed at the time.
When Zamani asked him if he would do it all again, he said: "That was the best day of my life. For the first time we could go out and ask for our rights."

After the protests in May 2006, Davarpanah escaped to Italy, where he was treated for his injuries. When Iranian embassy officials came looking for him at the hospital, he fled to Switzerland, where his application to stay as a refugee has so far gone unanswered. He lives in that country without legal status, afraid to leave his apartment, blinded and alone.
Azerbaijani Iranians are ethnic Turks who form about a quarter of Iran's total population, which the CIA World Factbook pegs at about 66 million. Persians constitute just over half the population and other minorities, including Kurds, Arabs and Turks, form the other 25 per cent. Azerbaijani Iranians live in the northwest corner of Iran, which is bordered by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey. Like most Iranians, Azerbaijianis practise Shi'a Islam, but they speak Azeri Turkish rather than Persian.

The plight of Azerbaijanis and other ethnic minorities in Iran has slowly taken over Zamani's life. From her apartment in downtown Vancouver, she communicates by instant messenger with her network of contacts in Iran, who tell her -- often at great risk to themselves --about Azerbaijani activists who have been detained, tortured or killed by Iranian police for demanding language rights. They are often accused of being separatists who want to break up Iran. Zamani, who is also Azerbaijani Iranian, takes down their reports, translates them and sends them to Amnesty International officials in London, who publicize the cases. She has also formed a non-profit organization in Vancouver called the Association for the Defence of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners (ADAPP), which she funds mostly out of her own pocket.

As an Azerbaijani growing up in Iran, Zamani said she experienced some discrimination, but was shielded from the worst of it because her parents were well known in the community. She grew up in Tabriz, the largest city in the Azerbaijani part of Iran. Her father's family had been landowners for generations, but in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution her family's land and belongings were seized, their house was burned down and her father was imprisoned and threatened with execution.

In school, Zamani and her classmates were forced to speak Persian, even though most were Azerbaijani and spoke only Azeri. After the revolution, the government amended the Iranian constitution to protect minority languages and cultures, but it was never enforced, Zamani says, recalling that her classmates were beaten or fined for speaking their native language.

"There is a story that this kid of a friend of ours -- he saved up his allowance, gave it to the teacher and said 'This is, like, 20 words of Azerbaijani ... and I'm paying you [the fines] in advance so I can speak it,'" she recalled.

"I was not punished because [the school authorities] knew my parents. They would keep me in the principal's office and I would cry and refuse to speak."

Many Azerbaijani Iranians get frustrated and drop out of school, limiting their options later in life, Zamani said, adding that some become ashamed of their ethnicity.

"Humiliating jokes and printing things -- like being called cockroach and donkey -- has become part of [Iranian] culture. They joke, and if you say 'This is insulting,' then they would turn to you and say 'You are not cool. Why don't you take insults?' "

After high school, Zamani went to Ankara, Turkey. There she met her future husband, Shahrouz Torfakh, an Azerbaijani Iranian who had fled to Denmark after being imprisoned while still in high school for owning banned books. He was later accepted into Canada as a refugee. Zamani said his experience is one reason she does the work she does.

"He told me about his time in prison. They were teenagers and ... several times [guards] put a gun on their heads. Also, when he was in Denmark he had to be treated for the tortures he suffered. All his ribs were broken when he was in prison and his back was cut, just for owning books."

Zamani moved to Ottawa to be with her husband. She had strong enough marks in math and science that she was accepted by the University of Ottawa on government scholarships, even though she spoke no English. She completed an undergraduate degree in physics with a specialty in microwave engineering, then moved to Vancouver to work on an emergency preparedness project with a professor at the University of B.C.

But just as she was getting settled in a new city, she heard about some Azerbaijani teenagers who had been arrested in Iran. "One of them was a first-year university student. He was in the same prison that my husband was in when he was a teenager. He was studying architecture and my husband is an architect. Somehow I felt, what would I want someone else to do for him in that time when he was there as a kid and being tortured? So I thought of helping these prisoners. I called around and to my surprise, some of these teenagers had been missing for months," Zamani said.

"I tried to find Iranian human rights groups who would help out and to my surprise, they were not interested at all."

Zamani told her supervising professor that she was going to "do something for my community for an hour or so [a week]." She looked for human rights organizations willing to take on the cause. An official with one prominent international group told Zamani that if families of detained activists wanted to make a statement it had to be in Persian, Iran's official language. Amnesty International was more receptive; its representatives told Zamani they would publicize these cases if she would document and translate them.

Then on May 12, 2006, the cockroach cartoon was published in an Iranian national newspaper and thousands of Azerbaijani Iranians took to the streets. The protesters, mostly unarmed, were brutally repressed by security forces. In a 2007 report on human rights in Iran, Amnesty International estimates that "hundreds, if not thousands, were arrested and scores were reportedly killed by the security forces."

Zamani was overwhelmed with requests for help from the families of detained activists. She used to contact the families by phone, but Iran's intelligence service has now tapped the lines of known activists, forcing them to move their correspondence to the Internet.

"As time went on and we got some publicity, I started receiving some reports that people were imprisoned for speaking to me. At the beginning I did not believe that the government would put my name on a court order. So I asked these people to scan and send me a copy of the court order. After that, we started communicating through the Internet and I saw court orders with my name on them, like, 'for speaking to Fakhteh Zamani.' "

So far, activists charged with speaking to Zamani have been sentenced to six months in prison. Some have been tortured, Zamani said, but not as much as prisoners whose cases aren't made public.

Zamani began getting death threats herself when she started going on satellite television and radio stations broadcast in Iran and talking about minority rights. Her parents live in Iran and are regularly called in for questioning by intelligence service agents. Zamani said her father tells the agents that they have no control over what she does and that she doesn't listen to them. The authorities have already taken their land, their home and many of their belongings.

"They are kind of safe," she said with a nervous laugh. "They have not much to lose except their lives. ... I told them on the phone that there is no way that I would be bullied."

Zamani is gaining an international reputation for her work. In March of 2008 she was invited to Washington to give a speech to the U.S. House of Representatives' Iran working group. When she began talking about minority rights in Iran, she was interrupted, heckled and almost physically attacked by other Iranians, said Kathryn Cameron Porter, whose organization, the Leadership Council for Human Rights, organized the meeting.

"Of all the years I've been in Washington -- and I came here in 1980 -- it was the most difficult meeting I've ever attended," Porter said in a telephone interview from Washington.

"When Fakhteh spoke, several of the people got right in her face. It was very threatening. ... In Fakhteh's case, I think it was compounded by the fact that she was a woman," Porter said, adding that police had to be called to remove the half dozen men who were threatening Zamani. The men never identified themselves.

Zamani says she is always on guard, even though the Vancouver police have taken the threats against her seriously and worked hard to protect her.

"I am always afraid. ... The simple things in your life change. I used to look forward to flying and travelling, but now I face anxiety before travelling ... especially after being threatened in Congress, because I don't know where the threat comes from," she said.

"I used to go out jogging early in the morning. I stopped that after my first phone call saying that they would kill me.

"Very simple things that I used to do, I don't do."

tcarman@vancouversun.com

© Copyright (c) The Vancouver Sun


Read more ...

The Return of the Subaltern: International Education and Politics of Voice

Alireza Asgharzadeh

In this graphic image of tongue-cutting there is an echo of Baraheni’s own self-amputation. For his mother tongue too was cut out during the rule of Pahlavis (1925-1978) in Iran where Baraheni was forced to write in “the language of the nation.” For as long as he has been a writer, Baraheni has been writing in the imposed tongue of “the nation.” For this 70-year-old Azeri writer, writing in the language of the oppressor has been an excruciating act of self-mutilation, a painfully slow performance of hara-kiri, the traditional Japanese form of suicide, that has been uninterruptedly going on for more than four decades.

In a rapidly globalizing world, it is becoming a major task of international education to study a variety of sociopolitical, economic, developmental, and intercultural relations, at the heart of which lie issues around subalternity, diversity, language, and dialogue. In its current state, how well prepared is the field of international education to deal with these complex issues? Through an exploration of narratives from various intellectual, cultural, and linguistic traditions, this article maintains that (a) concerns around critical dialogue and freedom of expression are universal concerns applicable in/to different environments and cultures; (b) such concerns need to be situated within the wider issues around diversity, multiculturalism, multilingualism, human rights, peace, and social justice; and (c) international and global education can take on this challenge by critically engaging various issues emerging from conditions of subalternity, politics of voice, and multiple identities, as well as a variety of diasporic, multicultural, postcolonial, and global contexts.

the original paper is published in:
http://jsi.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/12/4/334

Read more ...

At the Dawn of the Cold War: The Soviet-American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941–1946

Jamil Hasanli

The 21-Azar (1324/1945) is an important day in the history of Iranian Azerbaijanis. At that point in history, Southern Azerbaijanis established their autonomous national Parliament (Milli Majlis) under the leadership of "Demokrat Firqesi", only to be toppled a year later (1325/1946) by the brute military forces of the central government (Pahlavi's Regime). Thousands of Southern Azerbaijanis were either killed, executed or forced to flee to the neighboring countries and hope for democracy and self determination was vanished.

"[Hasanli] draws on an extraordinary range of newly available documents in this detailed and nuanced examination of an under-explored front in U.S. and Soviet relations. Recommended."— CHOICE

For half a century, the United States and the Soviet Union were in conflict. But how and where did the Cold War begin? Jamil Hasanli answers these intriguing questions in At the Dawn of the Cold War. He argues that the intergenerational crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan (1945-1946) was the first event that brought the Soviet Union to a confrontation with the United States and Britain after the period of cooperation between them during World War II. Based on top-secret archive materials from Soviet and Azerbaijani archives as well as documents from American, British, and Iranian sources, the book details Iranian Azerbaijan's independence movement, which was backed by the USSR, the Soviet struggle for oil in Iran, and the American and British reactions to these events. These events were the starting point of the longer historical period of unarmed conflict between the Soviets and the West that is now known as the Cold War. This book is a major contribution to our understanding of the Cold War and international politics following WWII.

Table of Contents:

* The Penetration of the Soviet Troops into Iran and the Strengthening of the Soviet Position in Iranian Azerbaijan
* The Intensification of Soviet Policy in Iranian Azerbaijan
* The Struggle for Oil and the Government Crisis in Tehran
* End of War in Europe: Decisions of Moscow and Iranian Azerbaijan
* Creation of the Democratic Party and the Idea of Autonomy
* Decision of the Popular Congress of Azerbaijan
* Establishment of the National Government of Iranian Azerbaijan
* The Situation in Iranian Azerbaijan and the Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers
* The National Government of Iranian Azerbaijan: Between Autonomy and Independence
* January 1946: Beginning Reforms in Tabriz
* February 1946: Qavam As-Saltanah's Moscow Visit
* The Starting Point of the Cold War: Iranian Azerbaijan, March 1946
* The Withdrawal from Iranian Azerbaijan and The Oil Policy of the Soviets
* The Starting of Negotiations between the Central Government and Azerbaijan
* The Strengthening of the US Influence in Iran
* The Failure of Stalin's Policy in Iranian Azerbaijan
1Jamil Hasanli is a member of Milli Mejlis (parliament) of the Republic of Azerbaijan.


http://www.rowmanlittlefield.com/Catalog/Singlebook.shtml?command=search&db=^DB\Catalog.db&eqSKUdatarq=0742540561

Read more ...

Iran in the Caucasus: Keeping Balance in Volatility

By Tigran Martirosyan

When Iran embarked on its bid to build bridges in the south Caucasus, the regional states worried given the Islamic Republic’s reputation of propagating radical Islam, attempting to export revolution, and supporting radical political groups. In retrospect, Iran has acted as a moderate and balanced player in the region by placing the geopolitical, economic, and security aspects of its national interests over ideological or religious motives. In an environment where the degree of volatility had dramatically increased due to the emergence of three post-Soviet states, Iran has become preoccupied with securing stability along its borders through pursuing a complex set of economic, national security, and foreign policy interests.

What are the interests that formulate Iran’s largely cautious and pragmatic policy in the south Caucasus?

First, advancement of economic interests and regional cooperation. Iran’s economic problems and its desire to promote non-hydrocarbon exports have driven it to search for new markets. Newly independent neighbors in the south Caucasus, detached from the world trade and economy, offered new opportunities for Iranian exports. For them, Iran is a feasible transit route that offers access to the Persian Gulf and hence to world markets. In addition, access to Iran’s pipeline and transportation network offers oil-rich Caspian states an opportunity to reap profits from transporting energy resources. In an attempt to gain new markets, Iran began to expand its influence in the region by providing technical assistance, promoting economic projects, especially in oil and gas exploration, and by supporting regional economic integration. Iran’s incentives for regional cooperation involve not only improving overall economic performance but, perhaps to a greater degree, safeguarding common security interests, preventing unilateral external domination in the region, and preserving regional stability to minimize the risk of ethnic separatism at home.

Second, preservation of domestic stability. Separatist tendencies of Iran’s ethnic Azeris heavily affect its behavior towards the region. The Azeris in Iran are generally considered a well-integrated component of Iran’s multiethnic society, have a comparatively weak Azeri identity, and consider themselves at least as much Iranians as Azeris. However, the oppression of their nationalist claims by the authorities in Tehran suggests that they constitute a far more pressing problem for Iran than is observed from the outside. In this context, the emergence of an independent Azerbaijani republic adjoining the Azeri-populated regions of Iran has considerably increased the threat to Iran’s security and internal stability. The fact that the Azeri unification movements exist -- albeit behind closed doors -- in both the Azerbaijani republic and the Iranian Azerbaijan, has been an annoying thorn in Iranian-Azerbaijani relations. Iran has thus exerted great effort to force the Azerbaijani government to affirm its neutrality toward the movement.

Third, conflict resolution and enhancement of regional stability. Guided by peaceful resolution of conflicts as a priority in its regional policy, Iran has played a responsible role in trying to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. When the conflict erupted into a large-scale war, Iran’s fear of an ethnic Azeri uprising at home in solidarity with Azerbaijan prompted it to contain Azerbaijan in support of the Armenians. However, when Armenian military advances threatened to spill the fighting over into Iranian territory, Tehran voiced its criticism of the Armenians. This duality suggests that Iran is in favor of neither a strong Azerbaijan, nor a strong Armenia. Rather, Iran is interested in keeping both nations in equilibrium by means of occasional pressure on the stronger side. Although Iran’s mediation efforts did not bring a settlement, they did lead to brief cease-fires and contributed to international efforts to stabilize the region, a fact that was recognized even by the U.S. From Tehran’s perspective, involvement in the conflict has given Iran leverage to curtail Turkey’s and subsequently, NATO influence in the region. In taking advantage of its ability to maintain steady relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as of Armenia’s mistrust towards Turkey’s mediation, Iran has become the only regional actor that had both motivation and opportunity to play a reasonably impartial mediating role in the conflict.

Fourth, avoidance of overall geopolitical isolation. International isolation has prompted Iran to search for regional partners, which it has found mainly in Russia and Armenia. The major incentive for Iran’s cooperation with these two countries was a strategic response to Washington’s emphasis on expanding influence in the region through its partnership with Turkey and Azerbaijan. This “alignment of powers” has created a polarization primarily in pipeline politics and in division of the Caspian Sea, thus placing the north-south axis vis-à-vis the east-west corridor. Both Iran and Russia would be devoid of energy resources if the Caspian were delimited, because they would almost entirely remain within the territorial waters of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Hence, Iran and Russia supported the formation of an international regime, based on which Caspian states would jointly exploit all energy resources. In recent years, Iran has expanded trade relations, military contacts, and technical cooperation with Russia in nuclear field. Tehran also sees a strong role for Russia as the guarantor of stability in the region. For Armenia, Iran provides a way out of the Azerbaijani and Turkish blockades. Fifth, exploration and transportation of Caspian energy resources. Iran’s discontent over the division of ownership of the Caspian Sea and its southern territorial waters affects its regional policy, especially as more pro-Western forces seem to have an effect on the policies of Caspian states regarding exploration of the Sea. After Azerbaijan concluded an agreement on exploration and transportation of its oil and gas -- the so-called “deal of the century” – with a consortium led by Western oil companies, Iran acquired a 10% share of the deal and is now a partner in one of the offshore consortia. However, Iran’s principal interest is an oil pipeline that passes through Iran to the Persian Gulf, not Turkey, a prospect that would give Iran more control over the outlet of Azerbaijan’s oil. Iran is also interested in oil swapping deals with the Caspian states that would enable shipping crude oil from the region to the refineries in northern Iran in exchange for proceeds from delivery of equal amounts of Iranian oil for export from Persian Gulf ports.

Finally, containment of heavy Western domination. Iran’s policy is affected by a fear that the U.S. may take a powerful stand in the south Caucasus either directly or through its major regional ally, Turkey. Because of this fear, Iran made every attempt to dissuade regional states from establishing close ties with the U.S. However, in the past few years Iran has displayed a desire for improved relations with the West, and the U.S. seems to be reciprocating. Apart from its central objective, Washington’s reciprocity may seek to counteract the weakening of Turkey, contain the Iranian-Russian rapprochement induced by U.S.’ long-standing policy of isolating Iran as a rogue state, take preemptive steps against the risk of arms proliferation, and explore the Iranian option of exporting Caspian oil. If Khatami’s government stays on the course of reform despite the sporadic crackdowns by conservative forces, the U.S. may eventually recognize Iran as a stabilizing factor in the region.

In sum, the pace and scope of domestic reforms and the movement toward accommodation with the West will eventually determine the nature of Iran’s short- and long-term policy in the south Caucasus. Iran currently lacks the resources to become a major regional actor. The country is not in the position to make massive investments into the Caucasus economies and is unlikely to emerge as an attractive market for regional products. The poor performance of the Iranian economy can hardly be a pattern that the regional states would wish to follow. As long as Iran remains politically isolated, it will be severely constrained of the difficulties it faces in raising foreign direct investment and in gaining a bid for itself as a major pipeline route. Because Iran’s relations with the regional states can offer a way out of international isolation, develop alternative trade and economic opportunities, contain conflicts that potentially threaten Iran’s security, and enhance its overall political prominence in the world, Iran will continue to behave as a balanced player in the south Caucasus.

Mr Tigran Martirosyan is director of programs at Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, a Washington DC-based policy research center affiliated with the Johns Hopkins University-SAIS. Prior to this, Mr Martirosyan held a senior position at the foreign ministry of Armenia, specializing in the assessment of U.S. foreign and national security policies toward the south Caucasus.

The original paper was published in: http://www.caucasus.dk/publication14.htm

Read more ...

AN INTERVIEW WITH ALIREZA ASGHARZADEH

INTERVIEWER: Lisa A. Hamdoon, University of Toronto

Lisa: I have just finished reading your book, Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism, and Democratic Struggles, and must say, am quite impressed. I mean, this book is nothing like the others on Iran and the Middle East. In general, I never find the work coming out of Middle East departments to be critical. Is your work critical because you work outside conservative Mideast departments? Can you tell us what makes your book so different?

Alireza: Thank you Lisa. My work is critical for many reasons. First of all, I am deeply rooted in the critical tradition of social scientific research and consider myself and my work to be a part of this rich tradition. I have always valued critical thinking and reflection, and try to illustrate this through my work. Secondly, the environment is of course very important. If you work in environments that stifle critical reflection, if you work with individuals who do not know the first thing about critical thinking and freedom of expression, of course you won’t be able to produce critical work. If you work in the departments which still espouse positivistic research methodologies of the 1940s and 1950s, of course you won’t be able to do anything of significance. Such methodologies usually consider praising of the dominant order (e.g., patriarchy, racism, sexism, nationalism, nation-statism, the homeland, the nation, the ruler) as positive, impartial, and objective research; but when you critically engage issues of marginality, systemic oppression and exclusion, your work is considered to be “emotional,” “non-objective,” “non-scientific,” etc. Maybe that is why the Middle East departments in general are not able to produce critical work. Particularly, the work coming out of these departments on Iran is for the most part a regurgitation of Orientalist and Aryanist views on Iran’s history, culture, ethnography, anthropology, philology, antiquity, etc. With the exception of a few works, you don’t come across anything challenging, different and fresh.

Lisa: Is that why some of these academics show hostility toward critical work and critical thinkers such as yourself?

Alireza: Yes, that could be one of the reasons. We have to realize that most of these individuals have built reputations for themselves around a repetition and regurgitation of Orientalist views on Iran. So when someone like me comes along and says that, for instance, Iranian is not synonymous with Persian and that Persians are but one minority ethnic group in Iran, constituting about 36 percent of the total population, these folks get furious and start calling us names, this and that.

Lisa: Recently I came across a review of your book written by Dr Kaveh Farrokh and posted on a number of Iranian sites, including one titled “Aryamehr.” The reviewer labels your work as anti-Iran! How would you respond to this?

Alireza: These kinds of labels are normally used in dictatorial environments and by individuals with extremely undemocratic mindsets. Such labelling represents a very reactionary approach to any kind of text. What does it mean for a book to be anti-Iran? Imagine that you write a book criticizing the Canadian government’s approach to Aboriginal peoples, and then someone turns around and labels your work as anti-Canada! Or someone critiques the caste system in India and is labelled as anti-India! These are fascistic methods that are used to stifle free expression and to silence the voice of dissent. My work exposes the unbearable racism and Hitlerite Aryanism practised in Iran since 1925. In any racist situation, there are those who benefit from racism and there are those who suffer from it. Those who benefit from the existence of racism and systemic oppression in Iran label my work as anti-Iran. It is as simple as that. But they are in the minority. My work speaks to the suffering and marginalization of Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Turkmens, Baluchs, Lors, Bakhtyaris and other excluded groups such as women, workers, peasants, students and so forth. And these are the oppressed majority in Iran.

You have to realize that in all racist environments, the dominant group who benefits from racism comes to believe that it has the sole ownership over the entire country. Just as it seeks to define ‘the nation’ in terms of its own ethnicity and identity; so too it imposes its language on the entire population, masquerading it as the so-called “national language;” its history masquerades as “the national history,” its identity becomes the identity of all peoples living in that country. So if someone critiques the privileged position of this dominant group, that critique gets identified as a critique of the entire ‘nation’ and country. This exclusionary act in itself testifies to the existence of racism and systemic oppression in Iran. The way they try to intimidate us, to silence us by threatening to get us expelled from our jobs, all these McCarthyist methods show that we are dealing with very undemocratic and indeed fascistic mindsets. In my book I clearly show that this racism is not limited to the government in power but includes many writers and intellectuals from the dominant group as well. You say they identify my book as “anti-Iran” on a website called “Aryamehr.” You might be interested to know that “Aryamehr,” the site you say has published this review, in Persian means “the light of Aryans!” This title alone should suffice to expose the kind of ugly racism with which we are dealing here. So, is it any wonder that those glorifying “the light of Aryans” to call an anti-racist book “anti-Iran”?

Lisa: In addition to you, other authors and academics like Brenda Shaffer, Mehrdad Izadi, and Naser Pourpirar are also identified as “anti-Iran.” How would you comment on this?

Alireza: Brenda Shaffer wrote a wonderful book in 2002 titled "Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity." Through this work she studied, among other things, the impact of the independence of northern Azerbaijan on the processes of identity formation in southern or Iranian Azerbaijan. Brenda’s research showed that the independence of northern Azeris has a major influence on how Azeris of Iran (will) identify themselves. She reached a conclusion that contrary to the dominant perspective, Iranian Azeris view themselves as a distinct ethnic group within Iran. That is to say, they are cognizant of their distinct history, their language, their ethnicity, and their nationality; and they are aware of their differences with other ethnic groups such as the Persians, the Kurds, the Arabs, and so on. This was a sound scholarly observation that had been misrepresented by generations of Orientalist scholars. So when the book came out, these so-called scholars of Iranian studies started dismissing it, obviously not so much from a scholarly standpoint but for a variety of ideological reasons.

However, those of us who were active in the field knew very well that Brenda had hit the nail right on the head. Azerbaijanis were a divided nation and any development in one part of this nation would inevitably influence the other part. Now after five years since the publication of Brenda’s work, everybody can see how objective and accurate her study was; and how vacuous her attackers have been. All you have to do is take a look at what is going on in the streets of Tabriz, Urmiyeh, Aradabil, and Zanjan; see how hundreds of thousands of people came out on May 22 last year to reclaim their Azerbaijani and Turkic identity; take a look at the prisons in (south) Azerbaijan and you’ll see they are full of individuals identifying themselves as “hoviyyat-talab” (reclaimers of identity). Brenda Shaffer had hypothesized this situation several years ago, when the Azerbaijani movement in Iran was still quite invisible. If her book is not a scholarly work, then I wonder what a scholarly work is, filling of thousands of pages about Div-e Sepid, Ashkboos, Rostam-e Dastaan, and other mumbo-jumbo from the Shahnameh of Ferdowsi? Or weaving colourful narratives about “Takht-e Jamshid” or Persepolis, an Orientalist constructed Achaemenid palace that now local Iranian historians, architects and engineers prove with certainty that never existed?


Lisa: Naser Pourpirar is also labelled as Anti-Iran. I noticed you reference him quite a bit in your book. What is his story?

Alireza: Naser Poorpirar (or Pourpirar) is a very intelligent historian, and a very complex character. I respect him for his originality and his independent research, but I don’t agree with his methodology and with some of his conclusions.

Lisa: How do you mean? Can you expand on it a bit more?

Alireza: You see, in my book I explore some aspects of an emergent anti-colonial and critical historiography in the region. In Africa, for example, we have T.O. Ranger who initiates over 40 years ago the importance of writing African history from an African standpoint, based on African epistemologies and methodologies. And in India, we have the Subaltern Studies Collective, a group of researchers and scholars who come together in early 1980s and begin writing a history of India and South Asia from the standpoint of the subaltern, the marginalized and excluded. This kind of historiography is not a top-down method of history writing; it is a bottom-up historiography. And this is a major departure from all sorts of elitist, ‘nationalist,’ Orientalist and colonialist historiography. Well, in Iran this historiography starts effectively with Naser Poorpirar. For the first time in Iran’s modern history, a local historian decides to take on the challenging task of re-examining a history written by foreign missionaries, travellers, priests, ambassadors, anthropologists, philologists, and historians. And this local historian is Naser Poorpirar. No one else has done this before him. In Iran he is the first to produce a local historiography by exposing misconceptions and misrepresentations inherent in the Orientalist historiography of Iran. He has done a great job in this field and he will be remembered because of this.

Lisa: What about the problematic area of his work that you mentioned?

Alireza: You might have noticed that my book starts with a mild criticism of Edward Said’s Orientalism. I critic Said for failing to properly discuss “Aryanism.” The reason for this is, in an Iranian context we are dealing with Aryanism more than anything else. As a matter of fact, in my book I show the evolution of this concept of “Aryan race” from its inception up to the emergence of fascism and Nazism in Europe. I show clearly in the book how Adolph Hitler’s definition of this term does not differ that much from its current definition in dominant Iranian literature. In an Iranian context then, we need an interrogation of this concept of ‘Aryanism’ more than any other term. Poorpirar does not do an effective job in this area. Aryanism, moreover, was a discourse constructed to reject Judaism, Semitic races and biblical religions. It was an anti-Semitic and anti-Jewish project from the very beginning. How can such a project be manufactured by the Jews? And herein lies a major contradiction in Poorpirar’s methodology.

Lisa: Is he saying Aryanism is constructed by the Jews?

Alireza: He does not discuss Aryanism per se. He tends to indicate that the current animosity among different ethnic groups in Iran and in the region is a result of historical Jewish conspiracy. Now the way I see it, there are several things wrong with this picture. To begin with, various non-Persian ethnic groups in Iran have no animosity against the dominant Persian group. All they want is to be treated equally as equal citizens of their country. It is only the elites of Persian group and their culture that constantly humiliate other groups as subhuman, lacking in culture, lacking in civilization, lacking in linguistic abilities, and so on. For instance, the Persian culture identifies Turks as donkeys (Tork-e khar); it identifies Arabs as dogs (Taazi), and so on and so forth. It bans the languages of non-Persian groups and seeks to supplant them by its own Farsi language. Obviously, here we are dealing with a racist and colonial condition in which one group dominates others. There is a huge power configuration and power imbalance at work here that Poorpirar’s conspiracy theory does not and cannot address.

Instead of focussing our attention on Persian racism and its elimination through our democratic anti-racist struggles, he wants to divert our attention to some historical wild goose chase regarding Purim, this and that. Now I have nothing against doing historical research; but I am against linking in a deterministic way the events of 2500 years ago to contemporary situations. Contemporary conditions require contemporary solutions. It is not a Jewish conspiracy that today the language of the Kurd, the Turk, the Arab, the Baluch, the Lor and the Turkmen is banned in Iran. It is a result of an 80-year-old racism. Of course, we should go back to history and try to see what has happened that we have ended up this way; we should try to analyze, if we can, the historical roots and causes of our contemporary problems. But this is different than getting ourselves stuck in the swamps of history. An engagement with history is useful insofar as it provides insights for our contemporary issues. Historicism, antiquarianism, and a superficial fascination with ancient history will not solve our contemporary problems.

The other loophole in Poorpirar’s conspiracy theory is the phenomenon of colonialism. For the most part, Aryanism and bio-genetic racism were discursive constructs to justify the colonization of other lands by white Europeans. The idea was that the white Nordic race was a superior race genetically, mentally, and culturally while other races were inferior and could not create higher civilizations, could not properly run their own affairs, could not manage their own resources. It was thus seen as a mission of the white Aryan race to colonize these supposedly inferior races and run their affairs for them. You cannot single out Iran, as Poorpirar does, and say that in the case of Iran it was a Jewish conspiracy to infiltrate Aryanism into the country, but in the case of India, for example, it was the work of British colonialism. This historical conspiracy theory does not hold much water.

Furthermore, if the current racism in Iran was a result of Jewish conspiracy, then the presumably anti-Zionist Islamic regime in Iran should have done away with this racism immediately after dethroning the shah and seizing the political power in 1979. But why didn’t they? Why doesn’t the current Islamic regime lift the ban on Non-Persian languages? Why does it not allow these languages to become languages of instruction, of schooling, of reading and writing for their speakers? Is this too a Jewish conspiracy? Is the current Islamic regime in Iran controlled by the Jews as well? The historical conspiracy theory is a ridiculous argument promoted particularly by the government of president Ahmadinejad and his fundamentalist supporters. Thinkers like Pourpirar, in order to survive and to write, capitalize on these foolish sentiments so that they may get some kind of immunity from Iran’s sensor and torture organizations.

Lisa: So why doesn’t the government do these things that you mention?

Alireza: Well, why didn’t the apartheid regime in South Africa relinquish its power and its racism willingly? Why does not any group benefiting from systemic racism denounce its power and give away its privileges willingly? Why does any dictatorial person or regime cling on to power till the last moment? It is about power and privilege and maintaining it forever. As I discuss in the book, Iranian racism is not limited to the government and state apparatuses. There are many intellectuals, academics, writers and thinkers outside the government circle that support this racism. You cannot identify a dozen Persian intellectuals who support the lifting of the ban on the use of non-Farsi languages, let alone fighting for the human rights of their oppressed countrymen! These members of the dominant group do not support the anti-racist struggle of non-Persian communities in Iran simply because they themselves benefit from the ongoing racism. They are not on the receiving end of racism and they benefit psychologically, materially and culturally from the smooth functioning of this racism. At this day and age one would expect that as intellectuals, writers and scholars they would start familiarizing themselves with their own privileged position, and would start interrogating such position. Unfortunately this has not happened in Iran. It has happened in India, in South Africa, and even in Euro-western contexts by interrogating notions of “whiteness” and “white privilege;” but not in Iran and amongst Persian intellectuals.

Lisa: In the book you talk of democratic struggles for a democratic Iran. How does your version of a democratic Iran look like?

Alireza: In order to answer your question, we have to ask another question: What should an Iranian version of democracy be based on? In my view, the first step should start from the acknowledgment that Iran is a diverse multi-national, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural society. Any democratic system should be based on a humane, fair and equitable management of this rich diversity in economic, linguistic, educational, political, and socio-cultural realms. This could be the real bases for a democratic Iran. How well prepared are Iranian intellectuals to come down off the clouds of abstraction and discuss democracy in the real society, among real communities of difference? Obviously, those exiles who have the ears of the White House and Hollywood and who are awaiting to bring back the monarchy through “the baby shah” are not even close to understanding democracy. Likewise, those who mistake democracy with Arab-bashing and Islamophobia, on the one hand, and a return to a supposedly golden era of “the Aryan race” of Cyrus and Darius and Xerxes have no idea about democracy. What I mean by democracy is a way of running the affairs of one’s community/society which is based on principles of human rights, equal access to resources, respect for difference, respect for freedom of expression, and more importantly, respect for the right for self determination of individuals, communities, and ethnicities. This right for self determination includes political, economic, cultural, and collective rights and freedoms at both individual and communal levels. This kind of democracy cannot be imposed either from above or outside. It has to be developed and implemented in accordance with the requirements of local conditions, local needs and demands of diverse communities.

Read more ...

Baku Looks South

David Nissman


The April 1995 merger of four Southern Azerbaijani political parties in Iran into the Front for the National Independence of South Azerbaijan (FNISA) further complicates relations between Baku and Tehran and between both and Moscow. In an appeal to the Azeri people, the movement argued that "the appearance of the independent republic of Azerbaijan has created a genuine basis for the unification of South and North Azerbaijan." While officials in Baku have dismissed the importance of the new group and denied that they were behind it, the FNISA and the groups comprising it may have a bigger political role in the future than did earlier bodies that sought the reunification of divided Azerbaijan.

This is the third wave of such movements in this century, but the earlier two were more cultural than political in their aspirations, largely because until 1991 there was not an independent Azerbaijan in the north. Indeed, most of the 20 million plus ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran--a third of the population--dismissed the Azerbaijan SSR as a Soviet puppet. Even Azerbaijanis within the Soviet Union did not begin to talk about a unified Azerbaijan until the fall of the shah, except for a brief period during and immediately after the Soviet occupation of northern Iran during World War II.

The Division of Azerbaijan and Its Reawakening

The historic homeland of Azerbaijan was divided between Russia and Persia by the Treaty of Turkmenchai in 1828, and the borders set by that treaty remain in force today. While Soviet historians routinely argued that this treaty divided the Azerbaijani people, in reality the new line was more political than cultural. The northern part of the Azerbaijani territory became subject to Russian rather than Persian tax collectors and other bureaucrats, but there was not yet any sense of a national awakening. That took place only during the second world war, when Moscow occupied northern Iran under the terms of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty.

Historically, Southern, or Iranian, Azerbaijan, has been ethnically Azeri Turkic. The region's major city, Tabriz, was a major center of Azeri culture until the rise of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925. Under Reza Shah, Tehran adopted a strong centralizing and anti-Azeri policy. This policy was so thoroughgoing because many in Iran feared that Moscow posed a serious threat to Iran and would use Azeri co-ethnics to advance its borders. One Soviet commentator, R.A. Seidov, wrote in 1985 that Tehran sought to "extirpate the Azeri language, assimilate the Azeri Turks, and isolate them from neighboring Soviet Azerbaijan."

This division was called into question the first time when Soviet forces moved into northern Iran in 1941. Moscow imported a large and highly educated contingent of Soviet Azeris to control the local population, and after four years of occupation, Moscow set up the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in northern Iran. But when the Red Army left Iran on May Day 1946, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic quickly disintegrated. By the end of the year, all of its officials and many of its citizens had fled to Baku. Moscow said it had withdrawn as a result of Western pressure, but in 1986 Azerbaijani researchers in the archives established that the Red Army had been pulled for Soviet national interests: "the national liberation of the people of Southern Azerbaijan were sacrificed to Stalin's unjust oil policy and pretensions." This cloudy language refers to the April 4, 1946, agreement between Moscow and Tehran setting up a joint Soviet-Iranian oil concern.

But out of these developments the "One Azerbaijan" movement began in 1947. Three forces were at work: the large emigration of Southern Azeri intellectuals brought a new element to the politics of Baku, the politicization of Northern Azeris who had served in Iran, and the gradual loosening of Soviet ideological supervision of cross-border ties because of Moscow's overconfidence in its ability to control Iran. As a result, and unexpectedly during the period of high Stalinism, there was an outburst of literary activity in Baku that was nationalist in both form and content. The books and articles that poured forth on this subject were called the "literature of longing" and remained important until 1953--the year of Stalin's death and also of the return of the Shah to Tehran.

For the next quarter of a century, literary events concerned with "One Azerbaijan" yielded pride of place in Baku to several special institutions that had been created by the Soviet authorities to deal with issues concerning Southern Azerbaijan and Iran. Research centers, literary liaison groups and educational institutes interested in this subject continued to grow. While all were nominally under Moscow's control, most were dominated and in fact controlled by ethnic Azerbaijanis, frequently those with longstanding ties to the south.

After the fall of the Shah, a literary explosion took place in the South, often with the help of Baku. Virtually all the new journals and radio stations called for the establishment of a cultural and national autonomy for southern Azerbaijanis within the Iranian state. Soviet Azerbaijani institutions stepped up their operations there, taking the line that Azeri language institutions there should be developed to the maximum extent possible. That was also a popular position in Baku with much resonance among Azerbaijanis in the Soviet Union. And unexpectedly for Moscow, these two new national awakenings came together and formed a sense that both groups belonged to the same people and had only been divided by Moscow and Tehran.

The Islamic Republic and the Independence of the North

Ayatollah Khomeini by 1983 had reimposed the Shah's restrictions on the use of the Azeri language in Iran. Southern Azeri nationalists went underground and looked north for salvation. Baku responded, pressing for an easing of restrictions on border crossings. Talks between Moscow and Tehran in 1989 to liberalize trade between the two countries were hailed in Baku. And in August 1989, the Baku party daily called for changes in Moscow's approach that would allow direct ties between Azerbaijan and Iran. Moscow did not respond, but the article articulated a goal that has continued to animate Azeri intellectuals in both north and south.

At the end of 1988, massive demonstrations in Baku protested the expulsion of Azeris from Armenia, but as the meetings dragged on into their second month, speakers began to talk about other issues, including the expansion of ties with the South. The Azerbaijani People's Front which emerged at this time also pushed this issue. Its regional chapters in Nakhchyvan, the non-contiguous part of the republic, were especially active in this regard. When the Moscow-Tehran talks failed to make a breathrough, the Azerbaijanis took matters into their own hands, holding meetings on the banks of the Araz river which divides the two countries. Ultimately, Azerbaijanis from both sides tore down the border fences on December 31, 1989.

Two years later almost to the day, the Soviet Union dissolved and Azerbaijan became independent. As a result, the "Southern question" was transformed, now being subordinated to issues of building an independent state in the north and the prosecution of an expanding war with Armenia. Iran represented a source of capital and a source of political support as Azerbaijan attempted to join the Middle East. As a result, Baku had to avoid doing anything that could undermine its new ties with Tehran. An irredentist campaign clearly was not a good idea, and the government discarded the movement for unification with the South.

By the end of 1994, however, several factors--the convergence of Iranian-Russian geopolitical interests especially on the status of the Caspian Sea, Iran's support for pro-Islamic groups in Azerbaijan and for Armenia, and Tehran's continuing unwillingness to allow Azeri-language institutions to emerge in northern Iran--led to the revival of the Southern question in Azerbaijan. In November, a conference in Baku convened by the People's Freedom Party featured a keynote address by Piruz Dilenchi, a representative of the Southern Azerbaijan National Liberation Party. Dilenchi argued that almost 1,000 Azeri youths were being trained by Tehran to foment an Islamic revolution in Baku. He and his colleagues also talked about the repressions Tehran was visiting upon Azeris in Iran itself. In December 1994, the Baku Information Center of the Southern Azerbaijan National Liberation movement released an appeal by Azeri students in Iranian universities asking that Azeri Turkic become the language of instruction in Southern Azerbaijan.

Consequently, Baku is caught between geopolitics and culture as it seeks to deal with the Southern question. The new alliance may take off but without much help from the current Azerbaijani government. Deposed Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey, however, probably spoke for many when he told Moscow's Literaturnaya gazeta March 1 that he would devote "the rest of my life" to reunification. But given all the contradictions in this situation, Elchibey and other Azerbaijanis are likely to have to live very long lives if they hope to see "One Azerbaijan" become a reality.

Dr. Nissman is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and the author of "The Soviet Union and Iranian Azerbaijan" (Westview, 1987).

Publication: Prism Volume: 1 Issue: 2
May 12, 1995 03:00 AM Age: 14 yrs
Category: Prism

Read more ...

Wobbly Mosaics, Ethnicity and Crisis of Identity (in Iran)

Majid Khosravi Nik

Decades of one-dimensional and intrinsically suppressive grand policies imposed on the diverse groups of Iranian society and the hegemonic central government rule in promoting a unique “identity” devoid of any room for any multicultural models have now become the main source of discontent and protest in various levels of society in Iran.

The international frenzy and panic over Iran’s nuclear ambitions continues as the diplomatic chess game is turning increasingly twisted with Russia playing a clandestine double agent role, squeezing economic, political and strategic benefits out of Iran while keeping an eye on the thermometer of its relations with Europe and USA.

While the world is ushered fully into the hardline, fundamentalist picture of Iran- which is ironically the most socially secularized country in the region- and its populist sensational “president” AhmadiNejad, the country is at the threshold of historical moment in terms of its diverse ethnic grouping and a crisis in what is to be called “an Iranian identity”.

Quite predictably, in recent years after a long history of mainly two authoritarian systems of Pahlavi shahs and the current Islamic theocracy and the historical processes of the society in moving from a strictly rural, uneducated population to mainly urbanised, educated one the diversity and disharmonious nature of the ‘Iranian Identity’ is becoming increasingly salient in social and political make up of the society inside and outside Iran.

Decades of one-dimensional and intrinsically suppressive grand policies imposed on the diverse groups of Iranian society and the hegemonic central government rule in promoting a unique “identity” devoid of any room for any multicultural models have now become the main source of discontent and protest in various levels of society in Iran.

The unrest and street clashes of ‘Azaris’ or ‘Turks’ (names being highly sensational) in last July, is an example of the signs of years of unresolved tensions. Azaris who are the dominating ethnographic element in north western part of Iran decided to demonstrate a hugely disproportionate protest against what was considered to be an insulting caricature in one of the national newspapers in Iran. The unprecedented protest turned nasty when masses of angry Azari demonstrators took to the streets and openly and proudly claimed their identity followed by vandalism of public buildings and belligerently loaded anti- Persian slogans in more extremist circles.

In a more recent example -but in a more controlled and limited scale- in November the ethnic ‘Lurs’ students openly expressed their discomfort and anger about their social representation and negative stereotypes against them in public culture of Iran.

Iran is a country of diverse “groups” created not only in terms of ethnicity, but also religions and or sects. In terms of ethnicity which is the main factor, there are ‘Azaris’ in North West, ‘Lurs’ in West, ‘Kurds' in West and northwest, Arabs in south and south west,Baluchis, in south east, Gilakis in north and more of other smaller size ethnic minorities. While these groups have the element of “ethnicity” as their distinctive factor, at times the religious sectarianism (Shiite and Sunni) adds to the complexity of the situation as some of these groups are mainly Sunni muslims in contrast to Shiites who are the majority, i.e. Kurds, Baluchis. In the mean time occasionally language turns out to become a much greater identity element than the sect i.e. Arabs, Kurds and Azaris. Thus, ethnic groups in Iran may draw –with varying degrees- on their language, ethnicity, religious sect or a combination of all these to distinguish themselves from the hegemonic official Persian-Shiite identity in center.

Apart from the element of religious sects such as being Shiite or Sunni there are also some much smaller religious groups. Zoroastrians, Christians, Jewish, Baha’is, and Sufis are among the existing religious groups who (need to) draw on their religions as the main factor for building an identity while each one of these groups enjoys (or suffers from) different degrees of legality and practical means; Zoroastrians on one side and Bahai’s on the other side enjoy and suffer from the most and the least relative freedom in the country.

‘Persians’ the dominant ethnic group as ethnic group in majority and the “default” Iranian identity are actually very marginally ahead of the population of ‘Azaris’. However, the historical, cultural and linguistic dominance of Persians in Iran and the glorious periods of Akamaidian Persian empire of olden time Iran has always given Persians and Farsi speakers a predominant role in social aspects of the contemporary Iran both in secular Shah’s and Islamic theocracy regimes. After revolution the Iranian as Shiite-Muslim identity was enforced as the hegemonic official/political fields and interestingly now drawing on the “Iranian as Persians” identity is revived in opposition to the Shiite-Islamic identity of the current system.

Iranian-Persian identity was re/created in the modern context of Iran about six decades ago by Reza Shah Pahlavi, the influential figure in contemporary history of Iran who decided to “build” (or as some may like to say “revived”) a modern Iran after he was deeply influenced by Ataturk of Turkey and his ideas. In the process of ‘nation building’ and re/creating a new powerful modern Iran and in contrast to the former Ghajar dynasty who were Azaris, Iran was given a Persian identity and grand policies were developed to facilitate such an agenda.

Implementation of these inherently authoritarian policies did not create significant apparent discomfort as the country was transforming from a traditional, rural life style to more modern (although may be considered to more on the face) urbanised life style which in effect caused a mass migration from rural areas to big cities- mainly the capital Tehran- and creation of a large middle class city dwellers and hence mixture of different ethnic groups and establishment of Farsi as the dominant language of power and consequently some time later a social association of fluent Farsi speaking with more elegant social class.

Hopping over numerous intermittent facts and historical twists, the domination of Persian identity and the hegemonic discourse and rhetorics in different levels of social, political and public arenas did not create a major conflict until many years later in the rein of the son of Reza, Mohammad Reza Shah when signs of self consciousness’ among middle class, city dwellers with different ethnic identities were seen. However, with the surge of Islamic revolutionary rhetorics and the unitary element of Islam (or Shiism) as the almighty factor, the tension between the now middle class religious peoples (of diverse ethnicities) in cities and the monarchical corrupt system of Shah caused a strong all encompassing pro- revolutionary Iranian as a Muslims identity against Shah which eventually toppled Shah in 1979 with the Islamic revolution.

Between the rather short period of the chaotic post revolutionary time and the time when Saddam Hossein launched a full fledged invasion on Iran, there were some serious stand off situations and separatist struggles in Kurdish areas of Iran which ended by a strong crack down from the revolutionary guards. In a short time when the Iraqi army was marching towards the centre with almost no organised resistance Saddam’s threat became so paramount and consequently 8 years of full fledged war brought about the atmosphere of unity and cooperation inside the country specially with overt support that that Saddam was getting as Islamic revolution in Iran was not -and did not claim to be- a favourable development for most Western Europe, Arab World and specially USA.

About 25 years after the revolution and passing through different phases of a devastating war and disputable economic and political reconstruction, the inherently diverse society of Iran now enjoying a huge population of educated middle class elements, the policies of the government about ethnic and religious groupings in Iran have been anything but lenient and flexible –with may be the exception of the first round of Khatami the reformist president in which there was a relative relaxation at least on the expressing the concerns. As the hegemonic dominant of Persian and Farsi language is now interwoven into fabrics of social life in a heavily bourgeois city lifestyle accompanied with social negative representations of “other “ethnic” groups on one hand and the growing dissatisfaction and crisis in representation of the official Persian-Shiite Muslim inside Iran and fundamentalist, political Islamist identity assigned by the international media on Iran as the Iranian identity for a hugely diverse and relatively secular body of people, gradually more and more signs of desperation from the official and international identities were re/constructed.

Persian as secular and western identity was strongly revived among Iranian outside Iran as the default reaction against domestically (officially) and internationally represented identities of Iranian as Islamist identity. Los Angeles and California of USA with a huge population of Iranian living abroad became the centre of projection of such secular and western Iranian identity followed more or less by other Iranian residents in Canada and Europe.

Inside the country, more historically established ethnic groups e.g. Azaris and Kurds started to distinguish themselves in an unprecedented pace with different agendas as Azaris identity struggle is a purely ethnic/ social one against “persianisation” of public sphere in Iran and Kurds’ identity has a loaded religious sect elements and the discourse of political suppression. Along with the known disputed circles in the past few years there has emerged- in the public eye- “new” disseminating discourse with strong political, social, and religious elements e.g. Arabs and Baluchis

One determining point in the new surge of these new and old social, cultural. religious and political identity struggles in Iran is the strong reaction against the domestic or international current propagated identities and the tendency to re/define identities as different from the official ones. There seems to be a deep diversion process in dissociating identities from the official central one. This is a new historical moment in ethnic relations of Iran as consequential to two different circumstantial reasons. The first one is that there has never been such a big middle class educated population with more or less established cultural awareness in Iran who- for different reasons- are not happy with their symbolic or practical representations in socio-political terms hence they have strong tendencies to differentiate from the central official identities. And second point is that Iran and Iranians are going through their lowest symbolic representation in the eye of international public. This second point is much more intensified when considering, the glorious historical past of Iran, the dissatisfaction and disapproval of most Iranian living outside Iran of the current Islamic theocracy (interestingly these people are the ones who are mostly affected by the internationally prescribed negative identity for Iranians) and serious (embarrassing) mismanagement of governance inside Iran has created a overwhelming crisis of identity in which Iranians are constantly struggling in promoting themselves as “different” from those identities and in doing so the Persian-secular identity seems to be the most practical and suitable choice. Thus, outside Iran the discourse of Persian-secular Iranian is a discourse of protest against the official domestic Islamic Iranian. Inside Iran also shares the same concerns about the heavily politicalized Islamic identity while “Persian” seriously a problematic identity as a replacement. That is, both inside and outside Iran, Iranians share the dissemination from the political Islamic identity while the solution adopted by Iranian expatriates- to revive “Persian” identity- seems definitely too essentialist and painful for many groups inside.

The point that may need to be emphasized again is that, current Iran compared to all these decades of Persian-centred discourse has never had such a powerful element to disagree with the ‘Iranian-Islamic identity’ projected by the official discourse in Iran after revolution. In other words Iranian identity crisis has its roots in undemocratic representation of local or national identities in terms of what people actually are and as the system is enforcing and imposing a political Islamist identity on all Iranians and this is the source of all cycles of cultural and political ‘diversions’ of different groups.

Unlike several examples of the move towards more conversions and unification, e.g. East and West Germany, the creation and expansion of EU, in Iran the process of diversion and distancing from the central official discourse is gaining a major momentum which potentially may lead to linguistic, cultural or even political separatist tendencies.

This is the crucial element differentiating the present status of Iran from all the former decades as on one hand people have drastically become conscious and self aware of their potential lines of difference from the official-government- created image of Iran and on the other hand they do want to do so as they are not happy with that image.

Nearly three decades of enforcing political Islam as the main theme of Islamic revolution on one hand and the widespread negative representation of Islam in general and Islamic Iran in particular have contributed to escalating the already wobbly mosaics of groups in Iran.

In the present Iran all the historical, ethnic, religious distinctions along with several decades of wrong policies and attitudes towards ethics minorities and groups hand in hand with strong urge of differentiating and refraining from the official assigned identities are producing sharper and sharper cultural and ethnic or even religious borders in different groups.

While there is a general mood for “differentialist” attitudes, each centre of conflict in the mosaics of Iran presents some how a unique case. Azaris case is a heavily cultural one, they now find themselves as victims of several decades of unfair and unsubstantiated negative and prejudiced cultural representations and evaluations thus, by drawing on their cultural heritage and the contribution to the country together with the sense of assigned unfounded underdog image they are even on the position of aggression. There is an acute awareness and protectionism of language in Azari areas which un-discriminatingly projects anti-Persian or Farsi attitudes. In the same line the known cultural sites in Azerbaijan are gaining more prominence and cultural festivals i.e. Babak Khoramdin, or anniversaries of historical figures i.e. Shatarkhan have evolved to scenes of explicit or implicit protests to which the government reacts by enforcing more authority.

Kurds present a historical, political and religious case, they are the group who have had most severe standoff with the central governments and been the most outspoken and aggressive in claiming their identity.

In south and south west the case of Iranian Arabs is a case of religious (to some extent), cultural and linguistic distinction which –similar to most other groups- does not and did not fit into neither Persian-secular identity of former Shah of Iran and the Persian-Shiite Muslim identity of current system. The cultural and political sentiments in this area are also very strong.

Lurs as an ethnic distinctive group have suffered more heavily on their social negative presentation entrenched in all levels of social life in Iran. They present a case where the identity has suffered enormously in being represented as a “rural” and “primitive” in a society where urbanisation and middle class bourgeoisie is endorsed as superior. Only very recently there seem to be signs of revival and awareness of the cultural identity among Lurs.

Baluchis in South Eastern poor province of Sistan and Baluchestan of Iran present a mostly religious conflict against the centrally projected of Shiite-Muslim identity. Baluchis are mostly Sunnis.

In such a scenario there are also religious minorities who may strongly identify themselves distinctively different from the unpopular official Muslim identity however, given their size strong social and political hegemony they may not pose an explicit friction.

It is also interesting to note that Iran is surrounded by neighbours who are similar –in one way or another- to these different ethic groups and more importantly they offer a more “favourable” identity to these people at least in such a time of chaos in identity for Iranians.

On the North West, Turkey’s officially projected identity (probably in contrast to its society) of secular- modern Turk can be more attractive than the official Persian-Islamic identity in Iran. Although most Azaris (who are also called Turks) may not be willing to call for such a separatist move mostly due to inherent or perceived differences with those Turks. This makes the situation more of a cultural confusion and identity crisis.

The new Iraq is contributing to the shaky situation of ethnic groups in Iran too. Kurds in Iran are now seriously looking up to Iraqi Kurdistan and culturally associate themselves with them while the official identity in Iran is resented by many Kurds.

In the same line Arabs see eye to eye with their counter parts in southern Iraq as Iranian Arabs (mostly Shiite) share both Arab ethnicity, language and religion while for many reasons they feel they have never been wanted in Iran in both before and after revolution.


This may help explain the heavily confrontational policies of the system in Iran against outside “enemies” e.g. USA. Such a confrontational position accompanied by perfectly suitable strong confrontational responses by USA and president Bush works in two folds for the system in Iran. First, it helps it push the cap harder on diversities and different voices inside Iran by ‘the-need-for-unity-discourses’ which has been the single predominant discourse in Iran after revolution and second it offers a cover for ongoing corruption, mismanagement, and human right issues in Iran. Cultural healthy debates are restricted and labelled as attempts to support the ‘enemies outside’ and the power stays centralised in the system. This also explains the practical suitability of long lasting anti-imperialistic rhetorics throughout all the life of Islamic revolution while American policies and attitudes confirm and further perpetuate the usefulness and justification of such rhetorics.

The present nuclear stand off is another useful opportunity in sharpening the US/THEM discourses in Iran and probably in USA while the real victim here is the process of democracy and political reforms in Iran.

The original paper was published in : http://www.iranian.com

Read more ...

The Position of Mother Tongue in Human Societies

Hamid Dadizadeh

“Identity”, as P. Krostrity suggests, “is defined as the linguistic construction of membership in one or more social groups or categories”. (1999)4 Identity is the tool by which every human being identifies himself or herself on the planet earth.

Language and Human Identity: South Azerbaijanis, a Case Study

The “primordial and enduring importance of our mother language” has repeatedly been emphasized by the world renowned researchers and writers. Mother language is referred to as “the homeland of our innermost thoughts”.1 The interrelatedness of language with other human faculties and senses takes us spontaneously to the position to pay more attention to the dimensions of language in the history of human civilization. One can approach the mother language from a variety of perspectives (e.g. educational, sociological, psychological, artistic/literary, historical, political, and post-colonial).

This paper will shed light on the position of mother language on defining the personal identity of those students whose mother language has been marginalized.

Matsura Koichiro, UNESCO Director General has reiterated the importance of mother language education and encouraged the world academic communities to highlight this important issue in order to defend those languages that are at the risk of dying out.2 This paper will also emphasize on the importance of mother language education not only it is “the intangible heritage of humanity”, but the mother languages are rich sources of identity and personal wealth of each nation and its citizens. In our contemporary world, in order an individual citizen or a nation to be able to participate in decision-making, and other democratic process, to have his or her voice to be heard, or have access to a “fair share of power and resources (either material or non-material) _of their native land, he or she has to be able to speak out, to negotiate and try to influence. The mother language is an inseparable part of every child. In other words, it is implicitly interwoven with the individual’s identity of every child genetically. The structure, vocabulary, and resources of mother language are buried in the every individual. It is the responsibility of democratic societies to facilitate the potentialities of linguistic heritage of child to flourish and endow the individual child with a rich source of power to communicate with others and prove his or her identity without any shame and marginalization.

In the second chapter, this paper will examine the relationship of mother language with human identities with special referral to the Southern Azerbaijan where more than 20 million Turkic Azeri speaking people reside. Iran, as a multilingual society has been practicing monolingualism in public education and in other aspects of the social life. The outcome of this policy however has resulted in deprivation of millions of Azerbaijanis from learning in their own language and practicing freely their culture and cultural productions. Meanwhile, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, on their 2002 issue of the Human Rights report has clearly elucidated the status of “Azeri’s” in Iran and ascertained the accelerating policy of assimilation of non Persian people in this country. For more clarification, however, a summarized list of the report from annex 111 shed light on this matter:

Denial of cultural autonomy;

Harassment and imprisonment of cultural activists;

The banning of the use of Azeri language in schools;

Changing or distorting Azeri geographical names.

The deprivation of marginalized minorities around the world has led Skutnab-Kangas to invent a declaration of children’s linguistic human rights, (1986)3, where he suggests that:

1-Every child should have the right to identity positively with her original mother tongue(s) and have her identification accepted and represented by others

2-Every child should have the right to learn the mother tongue(s) fully

3-Every child should have the right to choose when s/he wants to use the mother tongue in all official situations.

This paper will then discuss the meaning of identity and will explore the areas of internal and external identification with special reference to the educational system practiced in the Southern Azerbaijan of Iran.

What Do I Mean by the Identity?

“Identity”, as P. Krostrity suggests, “is defined as the linguistic construction of membership in one or more social groups or categories”. (1999)4 Identity is the tool by which every human being identifies himself or herself on the planet earth. That is why the ancient Greek philosophers believed that the only means of human distinction with other species is the language. We are embedded in our languages. With languages, we are being inherited a wide variety of characteristics and signs which distinguishes every single nation from others. Therefore, “language and communication are critical aspects of the production of a wide variety of identities expressed at many levels of social organization”, Krostrity1999. Identity is implicitly buried in human beings. And this is only human species that recognize and appreciate this identity. Identity gives meaning to human’s life. Identity is identity, there is nothing recognized as minority or majority when we speak of identity. The existence, presence and function of every human being in this universe are marked by his or her identities. The crucial component of this identity is language which composes the essence of human culture. It is with the whole branches of language production that human civilization has been extended through centuries and the artistic, literary, scientific and other precious human heritages preserved from fatal catastrophic events throughout history. Having said that, and keeping this in mind, one can understand clearly the deep concern and worries of UNESCO expressed on the press release no.2002-07 as following:

“About half of the 6000 or so languages spoken in the world are under threat. Over the past three centuries, languages have died out and disappeared at a dramatic and steadily increasing pace, especially in the Americas and Australia. Today at least 3,000 tongues are endangered, seriously endangered or dying in many parts of the world.”4

One of the endangered languages of our modern era is Azerbaijani language, the language of Turkic Azeri population of Iran. In the report of Economic and Social Council of United Nations, for the year 2002 we read:

“The Azerbaijani Turkic-speaking people of Iran (also referred to as Azeris) are recognized as the largest minority and may indeed be the largest group in the country. It appears to be accepted that about 12 million of them live in the north-west and that in the country as whole there may be as many as 30 million. It is asserted that the Azeris have lived on the Iranian plateau for thousands of years and that they predate the entry of Persian tribes to the area”.5

With the universal wave of enlightenment, Azeris in Iran has endeavored to return themselves, make themselves free from the alienation and assimilation policies of the former and existing rulers. The Azeri youth and intellectuals have been attempting to convince the Islamic government to implement the Constitutional Law of the Islamic Republic and enforce the rules and regulations the founders have authorized. In chapter two of this Constitution, the article 15 clearly explains the ethnic composition of Iran as a multilingual and multicultural society. The article 15 reads:”


The state and common language and script of Iran is Persian. Documents, correspondence, official texts and shall be in this language and script.

However, the use of local and ethnic languages in the press and mass media and teaching of their literature shall be allowed, besides the Persian language”.6 But, in the real world,” in Azerbaijan of Iran, as 21Azer.blog suggests,

”the Turkic language has been banned from schools and government offices. Since the Turkic language press shared the same fate, there were no Turkic newspapers or magazines published. Students were forced to speak in Persian in schools, and in the face of using their mother language they were fined and whipped”.7

It should be noted that despite all restrictions and pressures, the Azeri writers and artists attempt to be active in the field of ‘identity struggle’ by publishing articles, papers and books in their native language. However, the progressive teachers and students of southern Azerbaijan have played a crucial role in running this ‘identity struggle’ forward and communicating with people about the related issues in the field of learning. In this study, I interviewed several teachers in Azerbaijan who have been actively and conscientiously involved in covert mother language retention and maintenance and adopted the mother language teaching in scientific subjects, such as chemistry and physics, I came across to amazing and perplexing results. I used qualitative research methodology by providing the informants by the questionnaire. One of my study participants, a physics teacher in Tabriz high schools, Amogli, who has been science instructor for about 18 years in secondary schools, passionately addressed me by saying that:

“Oh, hamid, you cannot understand how I enjoyed teaching physics in Azeri Turkic language, the mother tongue of all 99 percent of these students. I was not allowed to do this, but the principal closed his eyes and let me do what I wanted. My students repeatedly told me that they understand the science much more clearly and easily when they are being taught directly in their own mother tongue”8.

Mother tongue instruction has been repeatedly and emphatically encouraged by experienced educators and pedagogues. Critical sociolinguists like Jim Cummins and Skutnab Kangas (1988) has written extensively on this issue. As a citizen of Southern Azerbaijan, I would like to mention that the deprivation of mother language instruction in formal education in this huge province and among all Turkic speaking population of Iran has resulted in catastrophic human loss and brain-drain from Azerbaijan. Thousands of Azerbaijani intellectuals turned their back to their motherland, and because of linguistic marginalization which is a form of violation of basic human rights, were uprooted from their native home and succumbed to displacement in other parts of the world. The assimilationist policies of Shah Regime had resulted in some of Azerbaijan students who were living in outside provinces and Tehran, to deny their original linguistic identity. The severity of this denial was so deep that some try to change their birthplaces from their birth documents. But the course of history and universal wave of ethnic enlightenment and consciousness and thanks to the information super highway and amazingly high speed internet, the transition from “shame to struggle” is noticeable now among this population.

It is unbelievable that in the Southern Azerbaijan, restrictions are still being imposed on this issue regardless of the constitutional law which I mentioned above. But in the course of ‘identity struggle’, all hurdles are being removed naturally by democratic demands of ordinary people. Since” language, as Jorgaqi 9 suggests,” means identity and we identify ourselves with the words we express in our different languages”, the importance and effectiveness of this vital sign of human identity must be considered by the law makers. Jorgaqi, as an ordinary citizen who lives out of her country as an involuntarily displaced person and experiences the separation from her mother language, expresses her thoughts in a passionate way:

Mother language is your first cry in this world showing that you are alive. It is the nicest, most impressive and sophisticated tool which gives meaning to the world. She goes on saying that,” language is the direct expression of your culture.”

The reader will understand the sensitivity of mother tongue instruction in Southern Azerbaijan of Iran when s/he pays attention to the historical background of this ancient nation. William Douglass, the USA Supreme Judge in 1940s who had traveled the middle East, has written extensively in regards to Azerbaijani people, their aspirations, emotions and potentialities. We read in his book,

Azerbaijan is a historic place. Here Zoroaster lived in the sixth century and taught the unending conflict between good and evil. Azerbaijan, being from time to time out of mind an international high way, has seen the crossing of many races.10

Historically, the people of Azerbaijan have been extremely proud of their language and culture. While they have been exposed to multiple foreign invasions, pillages, lootings and occupation, this people have suffered a lot from absence of their formal language instruction. And though the modern education was introduced in Iran by M.Roshdiyyeh, an Azerbaijani scholar and philanthropist, the dominant power separated this nation from their mother tongue instruction. This long time deprivation, humiliation and racism have caused a widespread interest among the intellectuals and a clandestine movement for national identity among Azeri people and freedom-fighters.

Bibliography

1-Matsurura, Koichiro, director general of UNESCO, 2001,
His Speech on the Occasion International Mother Language Day

2-Cummins and Kangas, 1988
Minority Education, from Shame to Struggle, 14-15, multiculturalism Matters, Toronto.

3-Skutnab Kangas, 1988,
Minority Education: From Shame to Struggle, 19-20

4-Linguistic Diversity,
UNESCO Press Relewase, No.2002-07
http://upo.unesco.org/press/3103798pr1.htm

5-Report of Economic and Social Council
United Nations, 2002, Commision on Human Rights, 58th session.

6-Constitutional Law of Islamic Republic of Iran,
Chapter Two, article 15

7-21- Azer.blogspot.com
8/4/2003, pp 34-35

8-Excerpts from the questionnaire No.1, pp3-4

9-Jorgaqi, Suela,
Proud of Being Multi-Lingual, 2003.

10-Douglass, William,
Strange Land and Friendly People, printed in the USA, 1948, pp-38-39

Read more ...

Azerbaijanis in Iran

Whenever we write or speak about "South Azerbaijan" and liberation movementof Azerbaijanis in Iran we miss very important conceptual details. Fist ofall, there is no administration unit named "South Azerbaijan". There are twoprovinces in Iran containing name "Azerbaijan". Has there ever been suchstate, officially recognised by international law (the only criteria ofmodern statehood)? What is meant by that?

Secondly, liberation movement of Azerbaijanis in Iran is separatistmovement, it targets dividing of Iran. I do realise that Azerbaijanis inIran have always been discriminated and deprived of basic rights. But tospeak about rights, to demand rights and higher involvement indecision-making is different from struggle for "liberation", that is,separation.

Idea that each state should be composed of one nation have lived its life.Today there are almost no mono-national states in the world, most of thestates are multinational, and true democracy requires equal politica! ! !and social rights for all ethnic groups inhabiting some particular state.Moreover, ethnic groups are not any more concentrated in particulargeographical areas, they live side by side. Not only Azerbaijanis, butKurds, Turkmens live in Iran, and none of them have any particular socialand particular rights. What if all of them would initiate "liberation"movement? Why then Iranian authorities should tolerate something thatchallenges unity of their statehood? And is not it this very fear of beingdivided that makes Iranian authorities so anti-Azerbaijani? Do we assumethat any discriminated ethnic groups is rights in demanding separation?

Azerbaijanis should also remember that it was particularly this pretextunder which Karabagh war was initiated (to "save discriminated Armeniansfrom Azeri dominance"). "But Armenians in Karabagh were not discriminated"-you may say. But this is not what I question here. I just want to point outto the fact that in today's world problems related to the ethnic minoritiesrights (remembering that Azerbaijanis in Iran are its largest ethnicminorities, together with others)(app 25 million added by BT) can be solvedthough democratic or simply political means and do not require territorialseparations and reorganisation of the whole state system (especially whenits only idea just worsened already tense situation).

That is why I think especially Azerbaijanis should be very careful inreferring to "South Azerbaijan" and "liberation movement of Azerbaijanis inIran". Emotions never solve problems.

I do not defend Iran. I am not Iranian. Just in opposite, I am Azerbaijani,and I think such approach is dangerous also from the point of view ofAzerbaijan. Because Azerbaijan is also multinational state. I do not haveenough knowledge about minority rights in Azerbaijan (I would be grateful ifanybody would inform me), but Azerbaijan had already troubles with"liberation" movements of its ethnic minorities. While, true democracies (ifdemocracy is still considered as an ideal) foresees incorporation ofminorities into decision making through political means (ensuring theirpolitical rights and social freedoms, for example). And I think this is forwhat Azerbaijanis in Iran should be supported.

No matter whether we like regime in Iran or not, it is our neighbour. Andespecially its position in Karabagh War showed that it does matter forAzerbaijan. What we have done to ensure friendly relations with thiscountry, even when we see that these relations have direct implications forAzeris living in Iran? Have we ever thought about consequences of ourinspirations?

Read more ...

FESTIVAL OF BABEK: THE LIVING SOUL OF AZERBAIJAN’S HISTORY

Dr Alireza Asgharzadeh

Every year in early July the Azeri town of Kaleyber becomes a colorful landscape of anti-colonial resistance against internal colonialism and oppression in Iran. People come from all over Azerbaijan in their hundreds of thousands to a place at the heart of which lies the famous Fortress of Bezz, a sacred sanctuary that sheltered a local resistance movement centuries ago. They gather in the town of Kaleyber to pay homage to their ancient hero, Babek Khorramdin, who over twelve centuries ago put up a fierce resistance against the invading Islamic/Arabic forces. Men, women, students, workers, peasants and farmers come to celebrate the birthday of Babek, this legendary figure who has now turned into the living soul of a people’s history of resistance and struggle. They pitch their tents around the Fortress of Bezz, the stronghold of Babek and his fighters for 23 years; they explore the Qala/Fortress from dawn to dusk; they gather around bonfires at night; they sing, dance, exchange ideas and read poetry.

This magnificent festival is not just about dance and poetry, though. There is more to it than meets the eye. People come here with their musical instruments, songs, dances, and poems to redefine themselves by means of their own culture, their own language, on their own terms. This is about the survival and resistance of an entire people in defiance of an internal colonial force determined to annihilate its very existence. By annihilating their means of communication, their language, their culture, and their historical rootedness the government seeks to annihilate the Azeri people’s authentic means of self-definition and self-expression. It is not surprising that the people’s slogans attest to their devotion to the language and identity to which they belong:

Azerbaijan is not dead - Azerbaycan ölmeyib
It has not abandoned its identity - Özlüyünden dönmeyib

Azerbaijan is awake - Azerbaycan oyaqdır
It preserves its existence -Varlığına dayaqdır

My mother tongue will not die - Ana dilim ölen deyil
It will not be supplanted by other tongues - Özge dile çönen deyil

The Azerbaijanis come to the Babek Qalasi to announce to the entire world that they exist as a people; that they are conscious of their own history and validate their historical heroes; that they are able to define themselves by means of their own culture; to articulate their condition through their own language. Here the real living history of the people of Azerbaijan comes face to face with the official/national history of the ruling elite, a history fabricated during the Pahlavi era, and reinforced in the Islamic Republic. This is where the culture of resistance explodes through artistic talents, intellectual creativities, and in the songs and poems of the masses of people. The festival becomes a moving, breathing manifestation of history, culture, and all sorts of communal activities, where the latest published books are exchanged; the clandestinely printed articles and pamphlets are distributed; the latest CDs and tapes are sold. Here, songs, poems and ideas of liberation are smuggled from tent to tent. The Iranian government finds all these cultural paraphernalia, musical products and literary activities extremely dangerous. Why? Because they are produced in the forbidden tongue of the people of Azerbaijan, the Azeri-Turkic: an endangered language that the government has openly condemned to death by forbidding it to become a language of education, of instruction, correspondence, and governance.

Last year, the Iranian government was determined more than ever to prevent the people of South Azerbaijan from celebrating the birthday of their historic hero. So it brought out its repressive forces to the Babek Qalasi. Local activists estimate that there were over 40,000 revolutionary guards, Basiji militia, and plain-clothes secret service agents temporarily stationed around the Fortress of Bezz, apparently to engage in military exercises. They put up checkpoints at all major roads and alleys leading to the town of Kaleyber. They harassed the pilgrims at every opportunity they got. They confiscated the drivers’ registration and car ownership documents. They wrote down the license plate numbers of the cars carrying passengers and pilgrims. They interrogated the pilgrims inside the cars, buses, and in their tents. They rented, before hand, hotel rooms, hostels, and rental spaces where the pilgrims were going to stay. They marked the open areas around the Qala as spaces reserved for military exercises. They pitched large khaki tents in every available nook and cranny.

The government also dispatched groups of religious fanatics to perform the ritual of chest and back beating to mourn the death over 13 centuries ago of Hazrat-e Fatemeh, the daughter of the Prophet Mohammad, the anniversary of whose passing apparently coincided with the birthday of Babek. So the mourners came in black shirts, with mournful faces and long beards. There were thus rituals of mourning, accompanied by shrill chants of the eulogy speakers; the performers of “shaxsey” and “vaxsey,” where the names of Imams and holy figures were chanted in one voice, in an attempt to invoke their sacred memory. In the midst of the commotion and mourning frenzy, a Basiji militia fell down a cliff, and having broken some limbs, drowned in a pool of water underneath.

The pilgrims came, nonetheless. They sought shelter in people’s houses, in whatever empty spaces they got, and they pitched their tents among the tents of the military personnel, in the belly of the beast, as it were. In the dead of night, many a pilgrim was taken away, for questioning, interrogation, and who knows what. Some were released later on; some are still gone, without a trace. Various reports indicate the number of detainees to be in hundreds, among whom are women and young students. The government used all the tricks in the bag of all dictatorships to prevent this event from taking place. From intimidation to psychological warfare to open arrest and detention, it used all it could to prevent the Azeris from participating in this festival of commemoration and remembrance. But the tricks did not work; the intimidations, coercions and detentions failed. The people came out to defy the culture of fear, threat, and oppression. And they succeeded.

As usual, the dominant Fars-centric media and press censored the event. This dominant media, particularly its extension abroad, is run by a bunch of pseudo-democrats and pseudo-intellectuals who dismiss the legitimate demands of non-Persian communities as backward, traitorous, and reactionary demands. They brand the democratic struggle of these communities to restore their human rights as inspired by the imperialist powers and ill-intentioned neighbors. They do not see it as problematic that their language (Farsi) has masqueraded itself as the national, official, and mother tongue of the majority of people in Iran. They regard it as perfectly normal to impose their mother tongue on others. But when a non-Persian community asks for its right to education in its own language, that community becomes pan-Turkist, pan-Arabist, or pan-Kurdist. It is perfectly normal for them, for the Persians, that is, to talk about ‘the greater zone of Iranic culture,’ to share the latest literary and artistic innovations with other Farsi-speaking groups in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and elsewhere. But when an Iranian Azeri expresses his/her love for the language, music, and literature developed by his/her co-ethnics in the Republic of Azerbaijan north of the border, this Azeri becomes a separatist, a traitor disloyal to Iran’s territorial integrity.

That is how the dominant Farsi-speaking group has always treated non-Persian activists, be it during the Pahlavi era or in the Islamic Republic. And the marginalized, oppressed minority activist has always defended him/herself by confessing that s/he is not a traitor; that s/he too is a human being and has human rights. That is how a leading Azeri poet, Bulut Qarachorlu, had understood the situation and articulated it under the Pahlavi rule:

Men demirem üstün nejaddanam men
Demirem elim ellerden başdır

I don’t say I belong to a superior race
I don’t say my people is better than others

Menim meslekimde, menim yolumda
Milletler hamısı dostdur, yoldaşdır

In my ideology, in my approach
All peoples are friends and comrades

Ancaq bir sözüm var: men de insanam
Dilim var, xalqım var, yurdum-yuvam var

But I have this to say: I too am a human being
I too have a language, a people, a place I call home

Yerden çıxmamışam göbelek kimi
Adamam haqqım var, elim-obam var

I have not sprung from the ground like a mushroom
I am a person with rights, rooted in my community

Anyone who knows anything about colonialism will know that the current condition of Azeris in Iran is the condition of a colonized people. Imagine a distinct ethnic group numbering over 30 million, without a single school where they can read and write in their own language. This is a people whose contributions are not reflected in works of history, literature, anthropology, sociology, and other genres which are produced only in the dominant Farsi language. This is a people who is denied the right for self-definition, self-expression, and self-identification in its own language and through its own voice. Shockingly, even the very designation ‘Turk’ identifying this people is distorted and misrepresented as “Tork” in the dominant language, evidently to make it more convenient for the speakers of the imposed language.

A few years ago I was working as the editor of a bilingual (Azeri and Farsi) journal. In my capacity as the editor, I had the luxury of rendering various Turkic/Azerbaijani terms and names as they were spelled in the original language. Thus, in the Farsi section of the journal, wherever relevant, I always wrote ‘Turk’ as opposed to the Persianized version “Tork.” Mount “Savalan” was always written as “Savalan,” as opposed to the Persianized “Sabalan.” The River Araz was always spelled as “Araz,” instead of the Persianized ‘Aras,’ and so on and so forth. So one day I ran into this rather angry-looking professor of Persian literature, with whom I had prior acquaintance. After exchanging the usual pleasantries, in a self-righteous tone he bellowed at me:

-Buddy! You have to get your acts straight. What is this so-called journal you’re publishing? You can’t even spell out your own name correctly! Who has ever seen “Tork” written as “Turk” in Farsi?

Humorously I replied:

-I am decolonizing my name in your colonizing language, buddy! “Turk” is how I call myself in my own language, and that is how I will write it in your imposed language. If you don’t like it, then do not impose your language on me!

Of course, I was able to engage in this act of decolonizing because I was writing from the privileged positions of exile and editor. These privileged positions had empowered me to challenge the oppressive misrepresentation of myself, my language, and my people in the dominant language. Decolonizing acts usually start with seemingly minor acts of self-definition and self-expression. However, such acts have the potential to give rise to larger and more organized demands for such significant rights as cultural, religious, and linguistic autonomy. For instance, using demands similar to the notion of the right for self-determination, the Inuit community in Canada managed to secure an autonomous self-governing Inuit homeland in 1991. They adopted the name ‘Nunavut’ to refer to the Indigenous land of the Inuit of the central and eastern Arctic, and to the new Territory of Nunavut in Canada's eastern Arctic. In the Inuit language of Inuktitut, Nunavut means "Our Land." The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement is the largest native land claim settlement in Canadian history which establishes clear rules of ownership and control over land and resources in the new Territory, with an area of approximately two million square kilometres, or one-fifth of Canada's landmass. As they say, a journey of one thousand miles starts with a single step.

The Azerbaijani Festival of Babek is a major decolonizing movement initiated by the people of Azerbaijan in an attempt to resist the Iranian government’s politics of assimilation, and cultural/linguistic annihilation of non-Persian communities. It is imperative that Azeri intellectuals and activists articulate this festival to the world as it is, that is, without tarnishing its anti-racist spirit. Now more than ever we need to show to the world that this movement is rooted in the legitimate struggle of the Azerbaijani people for democracy, human rights, and the right for self-determination. As such, Azeri writers and intellectuals ought to try and cleanse this movement from undemocratic tendencies, signs and symbols that serve to project negative images to the outside world. The Festival of Babek is a manifestation of the living soul of Azerbaijan’s history. It embodies the continuous movement of the Azerbaijani people for equality and justice. We are all responsible to carry this movement to its final destination within the guiding principles of democracy, human rights, and anti-racist vision.

Read more ...

Iran’s Latest Ethnic Revolt

Yet that seems to be happening in Golestan, one of Iran's 30 provinces, with the ethnic Turkmen community seething with anger against Tehran. It all started on Jan. 4, when a gunboat of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps shot and killed a 20-year-old Turkmen fisherman in the coastal waters of the Caspian Sea.

FACING ethnic revolts in both Baluchistan and Kur distan, the last thing that Tehran might have wanted was a similar problem in another corner of Iran with a non-Persian majority.

Yet that seems to be happening in Golestan, one of Iran's 30 provinces, with the ethnic Turkmen community seething with anger against Tehran. It all started on Jan. 4, when a gunboat of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps shot and killed a 20-year-old Turkmen fisherman in the coastal waters of the Caspian Sea.

The authorities claim that the fisherman, one Hissmauddin Khadivar, had been part of an illegal fishing expedition whose 30 or so members were later arrested and that his death was an accident.

As news of the incident spread, bands of angry Turkmen, some armed with daggers and sticks, attacked government offices and set vehicles on fire. One group attacked a police station; another tried to lay siege to the local Revolutionary Guard barracks near the fishing port of Bandar-Turkmen.

Eyewitnesses say the riots lasted until late Sunday night (Jan. 6), ending after reinforcements flew in from other cities. Over the two days, more than 300 people were arrested and taken away to unknown destinations. A spokesman for the Turkmen Human Rights Group said dozens were injured. How many might have died is unclear, because the Guard took some of the injured with them, ostensibly for hospitalization in other towns.

In the following days, anti-government demonstrations rocked a number of other cities, including Gonbad Kavous and Quchan, where Turkmens are a majority. A state of emergency remains in force in Bandar Turkmen and Gonbad Kavous.

The Turkmen anger appears to have been so strong and widespread as to oblige the government in Ashgabat, capital of neighboring Turkmenistan, to stop its flow of natural gas to Iran, provoking a diplomatic tussle with Tehran.

Turkmens number around 2.2 million and form a majority in Golestan province. They are also present in North Khorassan (along the border with the former Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan) and the Caspian province of Mazandaran. Turkmens say Iran has gerrymandered them across four provinces to curtail their political influence by denying them the number of seats they might otherwise have won in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Iran's ersatz parliament.

An Altaic people sharing racial roots with the Uzbeks, the Kazakh and the Kyrgyz, the Turkmens are easily distinguishable from other Iranians thanks to their skin color, slanted eyes and other Asiatic features. Their distinct languages, Yamut and Koklan, are related to Turkish, Korean, Chinese and Japanese. And they are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims, while some 86 percent of Iranians are Shiites.

In the 1920s, Iran's Turkmens rose in revolt and declared a Soviet Republic with support from Moscow. The short-lived republic was destroyed by Reza Khan, the general who became Iran's shah in 1925. Over 200 Turkmen chiefs were hanged and hundreds of families transported far from Turkmen territories. After the fall of the shah, the Turkmens again rose in revolt. Their so-called republic was soon crushed by the Revolutionary Guard, ordered by Ayatollah Khomeini to treat the rebels as "miscreants waging war on Allah." The Guard hanged hundreds of militants and threw thousands into prison camps until the mid-'90s.

Khadivar isn't the first Turkmen fisherman to be killed in an incident involving the Guard's naval units in the Caspian. Since Tehran banned unauthorized fishing in the inland sea in 1996, dozens of men in search of caviar-rich sturgeon have died in clashes with security forces.

Why did Khadivar's death trigger such anger? Some observers point to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's economic policies, which have produced a 17 percent inflation rate and thrown thousands out of work. Unemployment among the Turkmens is estimated at 40 percent, three times the official national rate.

Another grievance is the government's refusal to allow Turkmens even a toehold in local administration. All top jobs in Golestan and in Turkmen towns in other provinces are held by Shiites from other parts of Iran. The government prefers to employ migrant workers from Afghanistan and Baluchistan to work in the Turkmen area's vast state-owned cotton fields. And by making Caspian fishing a state monopoly, Iran has deprived many Turkmens of a traditional source of income.

Tehran has also imposed central control on water distribution from the River Atrak, reserving the bulk of it for state-owned farms and estates, owned by rich mullahs and Guard commanders, where few Turkmens work. Turkmen farmers, mostly smallholders, are left with little or no water.

Turkmens also complain of a massive government campaign to convert them to Shiism. While no permit is issued for building Sunni mosques, the number of Shiite places of prayer and mourning has multiplied in Turkmen towns and villages. Shiite mullahs from Qom conduct periodic conversion "raids" into Turkmen towns and villages, using the promise of jobs and perks as inducements.

Turkmens claim that they have the lowest life expectancy in Iran and that they are denied fair access to higher education. Those who manage to apply for university places are often turned away because they fail religious tests based on Shiism; their inadequate mastery of Persian reduces their chances further.

Tehran authorities blame the Turkmen revolt on "secessionists" and "counterrevolutionaries," allegedly supported by the United States. In fact, the revolt highlights the failure of a narrowly based ideological regime to understand the pluralist nature of Iranian society and the legitimate aspirations of its diverse component parts for dignity, equal opportunity and a fair share in decision-making.

http://www.nypost.com/seven/01142008/postopinion/opedcolumnists/irans_latest_ethnic_revolt_876610.htm

[ Back ]

Read more ...

We devote too much attention to a mostly stagnant Middle East

By Edward N. Luttwak - Tuesday, May 08, 2007

Why are Middle East experts so unfailingly wrong? The lesson of history is that men never learn from history, but Middle East experts, like the rest of us, should at least learn from their past mistakes. Instead, they just keep repeating them. The first mistake is "five minutes to midnight" catastrophism. The late King Hussein of Jordan was the undisputed master of this genre. Wearing his gravest aspect, he would warn us that with patience finally exhausted the Arab-Israeli conflict was about to explode, that all past conflicts would be dwarfed by what was about to happen unless, unless ... And then came the remedy - usually something rather tame when compared with the immense catastrophe predicted, such as resuming this or that stalled negotiation, or getting an American envoy to the scene to make the usual promises to the Palestinians and apply the usual pressures on Israel. We read versions of the standard King Hussein speech in countless newspaper columns, hear identical invocations in the grindingly repetitive radio and television appearances of the usual Middle East experts, and are now faced with Hussein's son Abdullah periodically repeating his father's speech almost verbatim.

What actually happens at each of these "moments of truth" - and we may be approaching another one - is nothing much; only the same old cyclical conflict which always restarts when peace is about to break out, and always dampens down when the violence becomes intense enough. The ease of filming and reporting out of safe and comfortable Israeli hotels inflates the media coverage of every minor affray. But humanitarians should note that the dead from Jewish-Palestinian fighting since 1921 amount to fewer than 100,000 - about as many as are killed in a season of conflict in Darfur.

Strategically, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been almost irrelevant since the end of the Cold War. And as for the impact of the conflict on oil prices, it was powerful in 1973 when the Saudis declared embargoes and cut production, but that was the first and last time that the "oil weapon" was wielded. For decades now, the largest Arab oil producers have publicly foresworn any linkage between politics and pricing, and an embargo would be a disaster for their oil-revenue dependent economies.

In any case, the relationship between turmoil in the Middle East and oil prices is far from straightforward. As Philip Auerswald recently noted in The American Interest magazine, between 1981 and 1999 - a period when a fundamentalist regime consolidated power in Iran, Iran and Iraq fought an eight-year war within view of oil and gas installations, the Gulf war came and went and the first Palestinian intifada raged - oil prices, adjusted for inflation, actually fell. And global dependence on Middle Eastern oil is declining: Today the region produces under 30 percent of the world's crude oil, compared to almost 40 percent in 1974-75. In 2005, 17 percent of American oil imports came from the Gulf, compared to 28 percent in 1975, and President George W. Bush used his 2006 state of the union address to announce his intention of cutting US oil imports from the Middle East by three quarters by 2025.

Yes, it would be nice if Israelis and Palestinians could settle their differences, but it would do little or nothing to calm the other conflicts in the Middle East from Algeria to Iraq, or to stop Muslim-Hindu violence in Kashmir, Muslim-Christian violence in Indonesia and the Philippines, Muslim-Buddhist violence in Thailand, Muslim-animist violence in Sudan, Muslim-Igbo violence in Nigeria, Muslim-Muscovite violence in Chechnya, or the different varieties of inter-Muslim violence between traditionalists and Islamists, and between Sunnis and Shiites, nor would it assuage the perfectly understandable hostility of convinced Islamists toward the transgressive West that relentlessly invades their minds, and sometimes their countries.

Arab-Israeli catastrophism is wrong twice over, first because the conflict is contained within rather narrow boundaries, and second because the Levant is just not that important any more.

The second repeated mistake is the Mussolini syndrome. Contemporary documents prove beyond any doubt what is now hard to credit: Serious people, including British and French military chiefs, accepted Mussolini's claims to great power status because they believed that he had serious armed forces at his command. His army divisions, battleships and air squadrons were dutifully counted to assess Italian military power, making some allowance for their lack of the most modern weapons but not for their more fundamental refusal to fight in earnest. Having conceded Ethiopia to win over Mussolini, only to lose him to Hitler as soon as the fighting started, the British discovered that the Italian forces quickly crumbled in combat. It could not be otherwise, because most Italian soldiers were unwilling conscripts from the one-mule peasantry of the south or the almost equally miserable sharecropping villages of the north.

Exactly the same mistake keeps being made by the fraternity of Middle East experts. They persistently attribute real military strength to backward societies whose populations can sustain excellent insurgencies but not modern military forces.

In the 1960s, it was Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt that was mistaken for a real military power just because it had received many aircraft, tanks and guns from the Soviet Union, and had many army divisions and air squadrons. In May 1967, on the eve of war, many agreed with the prediction of Field Marshal Montgomery, then revisiting the El-Alamein battlefield, that the Egyptians would defeat the Israelis forthwith; even the more cautious never anticipated that the former would be utterly defeated by the latter in just a few days. In 1973, with much more drama, it still took only three weeks to reach the same outcome.

In 1990 it was the turn of Iraq to be hugely overestimated as a military power. Saddam Hussein had more equipment than Nasser ever accumulated, and could boast of having defeated much more populous Iran after eight years of war. In the months before the Gulf war, there was much anxious speculation about the size of the Iraqi Army - again, the divisions and regiments were dutifully counted as if they were German divisions on the eve of D-Day, with a separate count of the "elite" Republican Guard, not to mention the "super-elite" Special Republican Guard - and it was feared that Iraq's bombproof aircraft shelters and deep bunkers would survive any air attack.

That much of this was believed at some level we know from the magnitude of the coalition armies that were laboriously assembled, including 575,000 US troops, 43,000 British, 14,663 French and 4,500 Canadian, and which incidentally constituted the sacrilegious infidel presence on Arabian soil that set off Osama bin Laden on his quest for revenge. In the event, two weeks of precision bombing were enough to paralyze Saddam's entire war machine, which scarcely tried to resist the ponderous ground offensive when it came. At no point did the Iraqi Air Force try to fight, and all those tanks that were painstakingly counted served mostly for target practice. A real army would have continued to resist for weeks or months in the dug-in positions in Kuwait, even without air cover, but Saddam's army was the usual Middle Eastern facade without fighting substance.

Now the Mussolini syndrome is at work over Iran. All the symptoms are present, including tabulated lists of Iran's warships, despite the fact that most are over 30 years old; of combat aircraft, many of which (F-4s, Mirages, F-5s, F-14s) have not flown in years for lack of spare parts; and of divisions and brigades that are so only in name. There are awed descriptions of the Revolutionary Guards, inevitably described as "elite," who do indeed strut around as if they have won many a war, but who have actually fought only one - against Iraq, which they lost. As for Iran's claim to have defeated Israel by Hizbullah proxy in last year's affray, the publicity was excellent but the substance went the other way, with roughly 25 percent of the best-trained men dead, which explains the tomb-like silence and immobility of the once rumbustious Hizbullah ever since the cease-fire.

Then there is the new light cavalry of Iranian terrorism that is invoked to frighten us if all else fails. The usual Middle East experts now explain that if we annoy the ayatollahs, they will unleash terrorists who will devastate our lives, even though 30 years of "death to America" invocations and vast sums spent on maintaining a special international terrorism department have produced only one major bombing in Saudi Arabia, in 1996, and two in the most permissive environment of Buenos Aires, in 1992 and 1994, along with some assassinations of exiles in Europe.

It is true enough that if Iran's nuclear installations are bombed in some overnight raid, there is likely to be some retaliation, but we live in fortunate times in which we have only the irritant of terrorism instead of world wars to worry about - and Iran's added contribution is not likely to leave much of an impression. There may be good reasons for not attacking Iran's nuclear sites - including the very slow and uncertain progress of its uranium enrichment effort - but its ability to strike back is not one of them. Even the seemingly fragile tanker traffic down the Gulf and through the Straits of Hormuz is not as vulnerable as it seems - Iran and Iraq have both tried to attack it many times without much success, and this time the US Navy stands ready to destroy any airstrip or jetty from which attacks are launched.

As for the claim that the "Iranians" are united in patriotic support for the nuclear program, no such nationality even exists. Out of Iran's population of 70 million or so, 51 percent are ethnically Persian, 24 percent are Turks ("Azeris" is the regime's term), with other minorities comprising the remaining quarter. Many of Iran's 16-17 million Turks are in revolt against Persian cultural imperialism; its 5-6 million Kurds have started a serious insurgency; the Arab minority detonates bombs in Ahvaz; and Baluch tribesmen attack gendarmes and Revolutionary Guards. If some 40 percent of the British population were engaged in separatist struggles of varying intensity, nobody would claim that it was firmly united around the London government. On top of this, many of the Persian majority oppose the theocratic regime, either because they have become post-Islamic in reaction to its many prohibitions, or because they are Sufis, whom the regime now persecutes almost as much as the small Bahai minority. So let us have no more reports from Tehran stressing the country's national unity. Persian nationalism is a minority position in a country where half the population is not even Persian. In our times, multinational states either decentralize or break up more or less violently; Iran is not decentralizing, so its future seems highly predictable, while in the present not much cohesion under attack is to be expected.

The third and greatest error repeated by Middle East experts of all persuasions, by Arabophiles and Arabophobes alike, by Turcologists and by Iranists, is also the simplest to define. It is the very odd belief that these ancient nations are highly malleable. Hard-liners keep suggesting that with a bit of well-aimed violence ("the Arabs only understand force") compliance will be obtained. But what happens every time is an increase in hostility; defeat is followed not by collaboration, but by sullen non-cooperation and active resistance too. It is not hard to defeat Arab countries, but it is mostly useless. Violence can work to destroy dangerous weapons but not to induce desired changes in behavior.

Soft-liners make exactly the same mistake in reverse. They keep arguing that if only this or that concession were made, if only their policies were followed through to the end and respect shown, or simulated, hostility would cease and a warm Mediterranean amity would emerge. Yet even the most thinly qualified of Middle East experts must know that Islam, as with any other civilization, comprehends the sum total of human life, and that unlike some others it promises superiority in all things for its believers, so that the scientific and technological and cultural backwardness of the lands of Islam generates a constantly renewed sense of humiliation and of civilizational defeat. That fully explains the ubiquity of Muslim violence, and reveals the futility of the palliatives urged by the soft-liners.

The operational mistake that Middle East experts keep making is the failure to recognize that backward societies must be left alone, as the French now wisely leave Corsica to its own devices, as the Italians quietly learned to do in Sicily, once they recognized that maxi-trials merely handed over control to a newer and smarter mafia of doctors and lawyers. With neither invasions nor friendly engagements, the peoples of the Middle East should finally be allowed to have their own history - the one thing that Middle East experts of all stripes seem determined to deny them.

That brings us to the mistake that the rest of us make. We devote far too much attention to the Middle East, a mostly stagnant region where almost nothing is created in science or the arts - excluding Israel, per capita patent production of countries in the Middle East is one fifth that of sub-Saharan Africa. The people of the Middle East (only about 5 percent of the world's population) are remarkably unproductive, with a high proportion not in the labor force at all. Not many of us would care to work if we were citizens of Abu Dhabi, with lots of oil money for very few citizens. But Saudi Arabia's 27 million inhabitants also live largely off the oil revenues that trickle down to them, leaving most of the work to foreign technicians and laborers: Even with high oil prices, Saudi Arabia's annual per capita income, at $14,000, is only about half that of oil-free Israel.

Saudi Arabia has a good excuse, for it was a land of oasis hand-farmers and bedouin pastoralists who cannot be expected to become captains of industry in a mere 50 years. Much more striking is the oil parasitism of once much more accomplished Iran. It exports only 2.5 million barrels a day as compared to Saudi Arabia's 8 million, yet oil still accounts for 80 percent of Iran's exports because its agriculture and industry have become so unproductive.

The Middle East was once the world's most advanced region, but these days its biggest industries are extravagant consumption and the venting of resentment. According to the United Nations' 2004 Arab Human Development Report, the region boasts the second lowest adult literacy rate in the world (after sub-Saharan Africa) at just 63 percent. Its dependence on oil means that manufactured goods account for just 17 percent of exports, compared to a global average of 78 percent. Moreover, despite its oil wealth, the entire Middle East generated under 4 percent of global GDP in 2006 - less than Germany.

Unless compelled by immediate danger, we should therefore focus on the old and new lands of creation in Europe and America, in India and East Asia - places where hard-working populations are looking ahead instead of dreaming of the past.

Edward Luttwak is senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington. This article first appeared in the British magazine Prospect (http://www.prospect/-
magazine.co.uk) and is published by permission.

Tags: American, Conflict, Gulf, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Middle East, Muslim, Palestinian, War

Read more ...

Complaint Letter...

Professor Reza Baraheni

I think that on the ethnic groups of Iran in your map of provincial divisions for Iran you have made serious mistakes, BBC could have easily avoided by going to Ethnologue.com.

The entire Western Azerbaijan has been called the land of the Kurdish people. The Eastern Azerbaijan has been cut of from the Caspian Sea, while the people of Astara to hundreds of miles to the south of that city are Azari - speaking people, and according to the statistics given by the Islamic Republic of Iran, more than half the populations of Tehran are Azari- speaking people.

On the exact percentage of the population of Iran’s ethnic groups also you can see the above source: Ethnologue.com. Any change in these and other facts by the BBC is totally irresponsible, and should be corrected as soon as possible. These and similar mistakes, which can be documented in many other cases by referring to the right sources, will give a wrong impression to the ethnic groups concerned, because they might in future refer to the BBC rather than going to scholarly texts available, and these mistakes might create all kinds of ethnic hostilities in the area, particularly inside Iran.

I have been interviewed many times by the BBC on its Persian and English programs dealing with the politics, literature and the languages of Iran and other places. I have been one of the sources mentioned in the BBC’s book on the Iranian revolution. The BBC should take immediate action to make the above suggested corrections. I will be more than happy to discuss this with anyone on your staff. Although I have been an advocate for equality for all ethnic groups of Iran, I have also been an advocate for the countries borders to stay as they are. We cannot afford an internal battle among the ethnic groups in Iran, as well as a battle outside our borders with our neighbors. Immediate responses, as well as immediate action to correct the wrong information on the site are required.

- Professor Reza Baraheni, Iranian (now Canadian too ) poet, novelist and critic; Professor of Comparative Literature, the University of Toronto; and former President of PEN Canada.

Read more ...

LAKE URUMIYAH IS DRYING

140 km-long Lake Urumiyah, which is an attraction center for swimming, water sports and boat activities, is at a great stake. Lake Urumiyah attracts a lot of people in summer with its beautiful beaches and salty water. Depending on its water containing many minerals, Lake Urumiyah has made its region one of the most beautiful and unique places of the world for the water therapy systems. This lake is unfortunately under the danger of extinction.

Within the borders of the West Azerbaijan, in the Lake Urumiyah National Park, which is under a ?so-called? protection and which contains islands, coasts, various kinds of plants and animals, and the area of 4810 hectares some kind of ecologic problems, depending on the increase in the saltiness level due to the decrease of the water level, are experienced. A meeting was hold in Tabriz in November 16 ? 17, 2007 on this issue.

In the above-mentioned meeting, to which relevant individuals and experts were attended from the cities of Tabriz and Urumiyah, it was declared that ?the negativities seen in Lake Urumiyah were mentioned to the relevant authorities in the year 2005, however no appropriate researches and studies were conducted on this issue.? In addition to this, it is reported that in the meeting, some points as ?as of November 300 milligram salt in one liter lake water was measured, and the reason for this is the decrease in the waters of the rivers flowing to the Lake Urumiyah, the future of the lake would be in danger if any measures do not taken, and the people living around would be affected negatively because of this reason? are discussed.

According to the experts, although the individuals attending to the meeting could not express the following facts openly, ?they point out that the central government is indifferent to the Azerbaijani States and insensitive to the problems of the region?. In addition to this, the experts underline that the area?s biological variety draws attention internationally and because of that reason the area was declared as a national park and taken under protection as ?a biosphere region? by UNESCO. It is suggested that the Government of Iran?s unconcerned attitude towards Lake Urumiyah would also set environmental organizations in motion.

(oursouthazerbaijan)

Read more ...

Persia's kings are history's great villains. Does the British Museum's show do them justice?

Guardian - By Jonathan Jones

Strange stillness ... part of the staircase of the Palace of Darius in Persepolis. Photograph: Martin Godwin

The title of this exhibition is a bit misleading. Forgotten Empire, the British Museum calls its spectacular resurrection of ancient Persia. Yet the Persians are as notorious in their way as Darth Vader, the Sheriff of Nottingham, General Custer, or any other embodiment of evil empire you care to mention. They are history's original villains.

In its day, which lasted from the middle of the 500s BC until the defeat of Darius III by Alexander the Great in 331 BC, the Persian empire ruled a vast portion of the then-known world from the Nile to the Indus. It connected the Mediterranean with modern Afghanistan. Rich beyond dreams, powerful beyond dispute, the great kings ruled from their mighty palaces at Susa and Persepolis, tolerating the religions and cultures of subject peoples and harvesting the creativity of near eastern civilisation that had already, before they came along, invented writing and urban life. It should have been enough to earn them historical immortality.

Yet, of course, the leader whose name resonates down the ages is Alexander the Great. The Persian kings, from their lofty thrones, perceived the turbulent islands on the western fringe of the empire as a marginal irritant, and yet the Greeks were their nemesis. For the Persians had the misfortune to be the others, the enemies - in short, the Orientals - against whom the first European civilisation defined itself.

The Middle East invented writing, but ancient Greece invented history. Herodotus, "the father of history", takes as his epic theme the struggle of the Greek city states against the vast Persian empire - and sees it as a war of liberation. The idea of democracy was born in the fight against Persian despotism: that is how Herodotus tells it. The Persian king Xerxes is the supreme overlord of all baddies, turning his eye on the plucky little Greek cities who, unexpectedly, fight back. Now you remember the Persians: the guys with the strange beards whom the Athenians beat at Marathon. Until Marathon, says Herodotus, "no Greek could even hear the word Persian without terror". In finding the courage to fight Persia, the Greeks discovered their own identity as citizens.

All western political theory is implicitly defined against the ghost of Persia - from condemnations of "tyrants" in the Atlantic republican tradition to Marx's caricature of "oriental despotism". In winning their nationhood, the Greeks consigned the Persians to a miserable place in the world's memory.

The most vivid portrait of a Persian ruler isn't even in this exhibition. It appears in a mosaic found in Pompeii, now in the Naples Archaeological Museum, based on a lost painting of Alexander the Great in battle. Through a tangle of horses, men and spears, Alexander charges. Darius stands helpless in his chariot, his face startled and appalled, like a frightened rabbit. So much for Persia!

This is how history is made - by writers and artists recycling stories and images down the centuries. This mosaic decorated the House of the Faun in Pompeii centuries after the fall of Darius; millennia after that, the victories of Alexander are still box office.

It takes Neil MacGregor's idealistic British Museum to put the Persian point of view. Everything about Forgotten Empire is calculated to turn history on its head. This is archaeology meeting world politics. The very existence of the exhibition is a diplomatic coup: in case you hadn't noticed, Persia is now Iran. The loans from Tehran that have made Forgotten Empire possible were negotiated before the recent change of government and had to be renegotiated at the last minute.

This is the kind of exhibition I expect of the British Museum. Here at last is the enlightening encounter with another culture that, in the Bloomsbury museum's years of decline, was replaced by crap like an Agatha Christie show. At the same time, it's laudably different from a Royal Academy blockbuster: less swank, more thought. I can promise you will not only be delighted by gold daggers and chariots but leave with a sense of Persian history. It's first rate.

So why was I disappointed? I was left flat - not by the superb show but by the Persian empire itself. The British Museum wants us to believe Persia was traduced by the Greeks. It wants to show us an alternative Persia from the evil empire vilified by Hellenic historians. Yet everything confirms this Greek "myth" of a supremely rich, powerful, bureaucratically faceless empire. The real difference between the Greek version and the version we get here is that the Greeks made the Persians glamorous in their villainy.

The Persian kings, their wives, ministers, soldiers and myriad subjects are a void at the heart of this exhibition. They don't emerge, in their own art, as individuals, only as warriors in profile, with the same neat beards. In Herodotus, the Persian ruler Darius, when he was told of Athenian support for rebels in Asia Minor, called for his bow, took an arrow, shot it into the air and cried: "Grant, O God, that I might punish the Athenians!" Compare that with the real voice of a Persian king, on a clay tablet telling of the construction of the palace at Susa: "Saith Darius the King: Ahuramazda, the greatest of the gods - he created me; he made me king; he bestowed upon me this kingdom, great, possessed of good horses, possessed of good men ..." The Greek fantasy of a monarch convulsed with anger, demanding his bow, is so much more dramatic, more human.

The same contrast between Greeks and Persians is unavoidable when you contemplate the most imposing monuments here. Unfortunately, they appear in a 19th-century collection of plastercasts; the reliefs that survive on the ruins of the palace at Persepolis are inaccessible, unless you fancy a trip to Iran. I find it hard to enjoy reproductions. Nevertheless, some judgments are possible. The celebrated frieze of various peoples paying tribute is imposing. But the figures have a static quality. No one runs, nothing overlaps. Even the wonderful carving of two immense lions, or the black stone mastiff from Tehran - an original - succeed through mass rather than movement.

If you wanted to claim, as a newspaper did this week, that Persia was "the greatest of all ancient civilisations" you'd be better off picking a venue other than the British Museum. Just a walk from the show are the Elgin Marbles - the frieze of the Parthenon created after the Athenian acropolis was razed by the Persians. The Greek masterpiece is full of motion and emotion, from horses barely reined in, to a heifer being led to sacrifice.

Where's the passion in Persian art? Its very beauty - and it is beautiful - lies in its strange stillness; you see this most in the painted brick profiles of palace guards. Yet this praise has to be qualified. This kind of glazed brick decoration isn't original to the Persian empire; they got it from Babylon - to be precise, from the neo-Babylonian kingdom that they subdued. This isn't about east versus west. With our idiocy being what it is, the British Museum runs a risk of confusing us into equating Persia with the near-eastern origins of civilisation. The Persian empire followed, and conquered, the Assyrians and neo-Babylonians - and was about two millennia after Ur. All these cultures were greater than Persia's, as a quick tour of the British Museum will indicate.

The Persian empire was admirably curious about the cultures it absorbed: in Egypt the Persian kings paid homage to Egyptian gods. It assimilated the cultural heritage of the entire eastern Mediterranean world, including that of Greece; a wonderful silver and bronze amphora handle in the shape of an ibex rests on a mask of a Greek satyr. But all this openness has an emptiness at its heart. No one is even quite sure what the Persians believed - how strange, in an ancient world so full of gods, from Osiris to Zeus to Jehovah, that only a single case is filled with religious offerings. Were they just boring bureaucrats?

Yet we do get a glimpse of what they loved. They liked to live it up. The most startling things here are gold and silver drinking vessels in the shape of horns - just a taste of the opulent lifestyle of the Persian court. That, too, becomes a little offputting as you admire one gold bracelet too many.

It sounds as if I'm kicking against this exhibition. I suppose I am, yet it is archaeology at its most impressive. You might even say it is archaeology versus history. The Greeks wrote history. The Persians are recovered here through archaeology - the study of objects retrieved from the sand. Yet history wins. The Persian empire visible in its surviving artefacts turns out to be as grandiose, luxurious and remotely despotic as Herodotus said it was.

· Forgotten Empire: The World of Ancient Persia is at the British Museum, London WC1, from tomorrow. Details: 020-7323 8583


Read more ...

Azerbaijani Youth Association in Sweden - Nergiz Nedaei

Dear Landsmen,

It is with great honor that I can share with you that the first parliamentary resolution in Europe and America, specifically about South-Azerbaijan, has been laid in the Swedish parliament. The resolution which was initiated and drafted by the Azerbaijani Youth Association in Sweden, was laid on October 31 by Mr. Hans Linde, a member of the Swedish Parliament and the Left Party’s representative in the Swedish Foreign Affairs committee.

The resolution gives a historical background to the ruling chauvinistic system in Iran as well as explains the situation of the South-Azerbaijanis today. It brings up not only the cultural discrimination in the country but also the systematic economical and social oppression conducted against the Azerbaijanis. The banishment of the Azerbaijani language in the school system and media as well as in all other public contexts, the distortment of the Azerbaijani history, the economical negligence of Azerbaijani regions, the Persification of Azerbaijani geographical names and the reducing of land areas bearing the name Azerbaijan, are given as examples of the Persian chauvinism and the forced assimilation of the Azerbaijanis in Iran. The resolution also mentions the mass demonstrations in the Azerbaijani areas in northern Iran, which took place in the end of May earlier this year. Through the publishing of the degrading article and cartoons in the state owned newspaper “Iran”, which initiated the demonstrations, the Iranian state’s anti-Azerbaijani propaganda is clearly identified. It is stated in the resolution that this is a part of the strategy of diminishing the national self picture of the Azerbaijani nation in Iran and a way to instill shame over their origin.

Concretely, the resolution proposes that the Swedish government within the UN, EU as well as other international bodies shall work so that:


1. the Azerbaijanis in Iran have the right to study and write their own history
2. the Azerbaijani language gets the status of an official minority language in Iran.
3. the Azerbaijanis in Iran have the right to freely use their language in both oral and written form and that the language is educated in the schools.
4. the right of the Azerbaijan people to build their own political and cultural organizations.
5. the right of the Azerbaijanis to preserve their culture and heritage.
6. the democratic, cultural and human rights of the Azerbaijanis are defended and secured.

The resolution will be treated within the Swedish Foreign Affairs committee, and will later be discussed in the Swedish parliament where Mr. Linde and his party will have to defend the above mentioned proposals. After voting, a final decision regarding the resolution will be taken.

The laid resolution is an official document recorded in the Swedish Parliament’s archive. It will be circulated among the parliamentarians as well as among journalists and academics working with questions concerning human rights and Iran, meaning that a great number of influential people will have access to this material, something that will contribute to the further enlightenment of the South-Azerbaijani matter.

Despite its small geographical size, Sweden is a leading country in the international community when it comes to human rights issues. Thanks to Sweden’s long tradition of defending victims of injustices and condemning repressive regimes it has gained great authority and respect among other countries. Thus, the fact that Sweden has chosen to engage in the case of South-Azerbaijan increases the attention around the question in the international community, especially within the European Union. The contents and the terms used in the resolution are also of great importance. For the first time the politically controversial terms “Persian chauvinism” and “South-Azerbaijan” as well as the numbers 30 million are used together in written form on the highest parliamentary level.

Organizations in the Diaspora have the possibility to fulfill their national duty in many ways. One way is through lobbying, a path that our organization has chosen. For several months we have been aiming for this resolution to be laid and have therefore worked hard and with focus for this to come through, among others things by a number of visits to the Swedish parliament and by establishing and nurturing contacts with members of the Parliament. During our work we have understood that if you believe you can achieve, something that concretely has been proven by this resolution. We believe that this resolution will help not only our organization, but all other Diaspora organizations, tremendously in their work to raise awareness about South-Azerbaijan. We also believe that thanks to the inspiration from our brave brothers and sisters inside, our Diaspora will continue to strengthen and continue to achieve great accomplishments in serving its nation.

Congratulations!

Respectfully
Nergiz Nedaei

The Azerbaijani Youth Association in Sweden



1. Proposal for parliamentary decision

1. The parliament makes known for the government as its opinion that Sweden within the EU, UN and other international bodies shall work so that the Azerbaijanis in Iran have the right to study and write their own history
2. The parliament makes known for the government as its opinion that Sweden within the EU, UN and other international bodies shall work so that the Azerbaijani language gets the status of an official minority language in Iran.
3. The parliament makes known for the government as its opinion that Sweden within the EU, UN and other international bodies shall work so that the Azerbaijanis in Iran have the right to freely use their language in both oral and written form and that the language is educated in the schools.
4. The parliament makes known for the government as its opinion that Sweden within the EU, UN and other international bodies shall work for the right of the Azerbaijan people to build their own political and cultural organizations.
5. The parliament makes known for the government as its opinion that Sweden within the EU, UN and other international bodies shall work for the right of the Azerbaijanis to preserve their culture and heritage.
6. The parliament makes known for the government as its opinion that Sweden within the EU, UN and other international bodies shall defend the democratic, cultural and human rights of the Azerbaijanis.

2. Background

Iran is a multicultural country with a population composed of several different ethnic groups, such as Azerbaijanis, Persians, Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Balochis, Armenians, Assyrians and others. Despite this, Iran is often erroneously regarded as a Persian state.

According to official statistics from Iran the Azerbaijanis constitute 24 percent (circa 17 million) of the total population of the country, while UN estimates the Azeribaijanis quantity to approximately 30 million. These are mainly concentrated to the Azerbaijani provinces in northern Iran, but are also in great amounts scattered around remaining parts of the country, especially in the capital city Teheran.

The Azerbaijani provinces in Iran are also referred to as South-Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan was divided in 1828 through the Turkmenchay treaty, between what was then tsar Russia and what is today Iran. The border went with the Araz River. The land north of the river accrued to the Russians and the land south of the river remained a part of the territories of the Gajar dynasty (parts of today’s Iran). Hence the expressions North- and South-Azerbaijan, where North-Azerbaijan refers to the Republic of Azerbaijan which after the collapse of the Soviet Union established an independent state, while South-Azerbaijan refers to the Azerbaijani provinces in northern Iran.

The Azerbaijanis belong to some of the oldest ethnic groups in the area with a history going back several thousand years in time. Since circa a thousand years back, until 1925 (with some exceptions)., the “Persian Empire” was ruled by Azerbaijani dynasties The last Azerbaijani dynasty (the Gajar dynasty) fell the year of 1925 when Reza Shah Pahlavi ascended the throne. Pahlavi was an enthusiastic adherent of the idea of the superiority of the Persian people and introduced with his entrance to power the vision of a Persian Iran. He now applied the Persian chauvinism in reality and laid the foundation of the assimilation politics that still prevails in Iran.

As a result of Reza Shah Pahlavi´s vision of a cultural homogeneous Iran, the Azerbaijanis in the country have for over 80 years had to endure oppression and violation of inhuman kind. They have had to suffer an assimilation politics which has aimed to eliminate all traces of their ethnical and cultural identity. Their history has been rewritten and deformed. Their language has been forbidden. They have had to endure ethnical cleansing and been exposed to coerced transportations of their own land. Sweden shall work so that the Azerbaijanis have the right to study and write their own history. This is what we would like the parliament to make known for the government.

But despite almost a century of oppression, insults and restrictions of their most fundamental human rights, the Azerbaijani’s fight for their legitimate rights and democracy has never ended. In 1945 after massive national discontent towards the central governments systematical oppression they managed to establish a self-governing regime in the Azerbaijani part of Iran. Only one year later it was crushed by the Shah. Thereafter followed executions of tens of thousands of Azerbaijanis on open squares and streets with the purpose to deter and discourage the people. The shah also captured and executed the whole Azerbaijani intellectual elite- an enormous violation of the human- and cultural rights of the Azerbaijanis.

Despite great setbacks and enormous resistance from the Iranian state, the protest movements in South-Azerbaijan are growing. The movement got a huge upswing when the Republic of Azerbaijan (North-Azerbaijan) gained its independence after the collapse of the Soviet-Union. The differences between the divided people became clearer than ever. The Azerbaijanis in Iran could witness how the Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Azerbaijan gained cultural rights and self-governance.

3. Situation today

The Azerbaijanis in Iran are today constantly struggling for their cultural and ethnical survival. The use of the Azerbaijani-Turkish language is forbidden in schools, as well as in all other public contexts. Incorrect and distorted history is taught in the schools where the Azerbaijanis are denied their Turkish ethnicity. Newspapers, journals and other publications in Azerbaijani-Turkish are forbidden and not a single Azerbaijani TV-channel exists. Sweden shall work so that the Azerbaijani language gets the status of an official minority language in Iran. This is what we would like the parliament to make known for the government. Sweden should within the UN, EU and other international bodies work so that the Azerbaijanis in Iran have the right to use their language in oral and written form and that the Azerbaijani-Turkish language shall be allowed to be educated in the schools. This is what we would like the parliament to make known for the government.

Political organizations are prohibited and culturally and politically active Azerbaijanis are being imprisoned, abused, tortured, and “disappears” on a daily basis. Their crime is to fight for their most basic human rights. Azerbaijani names are not allowed and geographical names on lakes, cities etc are constantly changed into Persian names. The Azerbaijani provinces are incessantly being cut up in peaces. To a beginning they were united in one region from which more and more cities and counties have been excluded. This results in that the Azerbaijani provinces, as time go by, make out less and less land areas. Due to economical discrimination, a mass emigration of Azerbaijanis to Persian areas has taken place, and still takes place. The newly arrived Azerbaijanis in these areas are met with discrimination and humiliating treatment.

As is being clear from investigations and reports regarding the different ethnic groups´ situation in Iran, the Azerbaijanis are “well integrated” into the Iranian society. This can be understood as if the Azerbaijanis are less oppressed than other ethnic groups. In reality it is the contrary. They have been exposed to violent oppression which has forced them to assimilation. The reason for this is the large number of Azerbaijanis, and their strong position in the Iranian society. They are often urbanized, well educated and capital strong. Many of Iran’s intellectuals have been, and are of Azerbaijani origin. The last century’s four national revolutions have all been led by Azerbaijanis. They have often started in South-Azerbaijan. Much energy and force has therefore been laid upon crushing all forms of ethnic consciousness among this group, since the regime knows that it’s first when the Azerbaijanis´ becomes nationally conscious that the question of minorities can cause real problems for the regime.

The strategy has been to abuse the Azerbaijanis psychologically and to crush their national self picture, so that they won’t have anything left to defend. . They want to infuse shame among the Azerbaijanis over their origin.

Sweden shall work so that the Azerbaijanis have the right to build their own cultural and political organizations. This is what we would like the parliament to make known for the government.

The latest example is from May 12 this year when the state owned newspaper “Iran” published a very humiliating article and some caricatures, where the Azerbaijanis were resembled to cockroaches living on the excrements of Persians. In the article, which’s headline was “How to prevent the cockroaches from turning us into cockroaches”, different methods of how to eliminate the cockroaches, i.e. the Azerbaijanis, were discussed. Massive demonstrations in the biggest Azerbaijani cities such as Tabriz, Urumiye, Naghadeh, Khoy, Miandoab, Zanjan, Ardabil and Miyaneh broke out in protest to the cultural oppression and the racist politics in the country. The demonstrations in South-Azerbaijan which lasted over two weeks are the largest since the Islamic revolution in 1979. The regime answered to the demonstrations with brutal violence, which resulted in dozens of dead, hundreds of injured, and thousands of arrested.

After for over 80 years been victims of a massive Persification campaign, parts of the Azerbaijani community in Iran are on the surface assimilated, whilst every Azerbaijani is a bearer of the Azerbaijani cultural heritage. The Azerbaijanis like all other peoples have the right to their own culture and cultural heritage. Sweden shall work for the Azerbaijanis right to their own culture and cultural heritage. This is what we would like the parliament to make known for the government.

Today there is a frightening silence around, and unawareness about, the oppression that the Azerbaijanis in Iran are living under. This is much a cause of the fact that the international community has not taken its universal responsibility and given the Azerbaijanis in Iran the attention and the political support which they are in need of. However the question is raising more and more attention among different human rights defending organizations, which are frequently reporting about the violations of the human rights of the Azerbaijanis in Iran.

The fact that the Azerbaijanis human rights are not respected in Iran is not acceptable. Their cultural rights must be respected in entire Iran. Sweden and the Swedish government have a responsibility and have to take part in the defense of the human rights of the Azerbaijanis. Sweden should play an active role within the UN, EU and other international bodies to break the silence around the oppression of the Azerbaijanis in Iran. Sweden should work so that the Azerbaijani question is brought up on the international agenda. Sweden should also in its bilateral contacts with Iran take every opportunity to promote the democratic, cultural and human rights of the Azerbaijanis. This is what we would like the parliament to make known for the government.

October 31, 2006

Read more ...

Basis of Iranian Nationalism(s)

Pouria Lotfi

I try, very briefly, to answer the question "what is Iranian nationalism?" This is particularly difficult since Iran is a multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic country. Iranian nationalism is not a uniform concept.

I try, very briefly, to answer the question "what is Iranian nationalism?" This is particularly difficult since Iran is a multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic country. Iranian nationalism is not a uniform concept. While one may argue that no concept of national identity that functions as a base for its respective nationalism is uniform, Iranian concepts of nationalism are diverse in the extreme. My goal is not to do a survey but rather to discuss broad factors that may be seen as encompassing the multiple facets of Iranian nationalism and provide a framework for discussing its general characteristics. For the purposes of this paper, I have identified three inter-related factors that provide the basis for Iranian nationalism(s): a strong sense of history or collective memory; a distinct, continuous culture; and geographical continuity. These are broad factors that can be may be seen as encompassing the multiple facets of Iranian nationalism and provide a framework for discussing its general characteristics.

This article is divided into the following sections for easier navigation:

Iran is what Shahrough Akhavi calls an "old new state" by which he means that "if one views it as a member of the third world societies, it nevertheless has an ancient tradition and history within roughly the same frontiers as those of today[1]." Thus, Iranian nationalism fits into the mould that Ryszard Kapuscinski has set for ancient civilizations. He writes: "Societies with a historical mentality are directed toward the past. All their energies, their feelings, their passions are dedicated to greater times already gone by. They live in the realm of legends and founding lineages[2]."

Scholars of the modernist school tend to negate the role of collective memory. The popular conception of nations and nationalisms is that they are fairly recent phenomena, arising around the time of the French Revolution or after. For modernists, the formation of nations is deeply rooted in the advent of modernity, with little consideration for the pre-modern historical context[3]. However, Anthony Smith's critique of the modernist perspective and his consideration of the historical roots of nationalism is particularly applicable to the Iranian case. He distinguishes two problems with the modernist argument. Firstly he argues that in the modernist theories, "the nation... is divested of 'identity'." It is, he goes on to say, "either conflated with the state, to become the 'nation state', or it is equated... with modern high culture." Secondly, he faults modernist theories as having as having a "tendency to rely on purely structural explanations." By this he means that they "trace the origins, rise, and course of nations and nationalism to the consequences of (uneven) capitalism, industrialism, militarism, the bureaucratic state, or class conflict, or a combination of these[4]."

Thesis

Few scholars would argue against the idea that there has been an Iranian identity long before the modern era. This is of course, not to say that there was an Iranian nation in the modern sense of the term, but there has long been the notion of "Iranianness" but it meant different things in different historical contexts. The Achaemenids regarded themselves as Iranian in insofar as Iranian signified a group of various ethnic entities sharing common linguistic, religious and cultural traits[5]. The Sassanian consolidated the definition of Iranian by adding a definite political and geographical facet to it[5]. In the Islamic period, this definition lost its political and religious connotations and became merely a cultural and geographical concept. Furthermore, in each period right up to the modern era, political and cultural elites have made use (even if in a selective or manipulative manner) of this common history to reinforce a collective sense of identity.

Early Iranian intellectuals did not create the Iranian nation ex nihilo: Qajar period thinkers started making extensive use of an Iran-centred history in formulating and promoting Iranian nationalism. As Mohamad Tavakoli Targhi argues, "The narratological centrality of Iran signified the emergence of a new conception of historical time differing from the prevalent cyclical arrangements of chronicles[6]." A glorified ancient past (particularly pre-Islamic) was used to establish an Iran-centred continuity directly connect with the present. It was in the Qajar era that intellectuals made the first attempts to imagine an Iranian nation. Writers such as Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh (d. 1878), Mirza Agha Khan Kermani (1853-1896) amongst others used history to "reawaken" Iranians in the face of imperialism and the countries declining fortunes. A perfect example of such a use is provided by ‘Abd al-Baha ‘Abbas (1844–1921) in his treatise al-Asrar al-ghaybiyyah li asbab al-madaniyyah [Hidden Secrets of the Causes of Civilization]. He writes, "O people of Persia! Look into those blossoming pages that tell of another day, a time long past. Read them and wonder; see the great sight." He gives a brief account of past glories, real and imagined, taken from sources such as the Old Testament, the Shahnameh, as well as contemporary European works, then implores his country men to: "Awake from your drunken sleep! Rise up from your lethargy!" In short he beseeches them to consider what they were and what they have become[7].

Closely tied to the collective memory is the idea of a collective cultural consciousness. Benedict Anderson, like Smith, stresses the cultural and historic roots of nationalism. He writes that nationalism is best understood, not with "self-consciously held political ideologies," but instead with "the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which — as well as against which — it came into being[8]. In the same way that the Greeks of the various city states saw themselves as having a Hellenic culture different from other, so too did Iranians distinguish between themselves and ‘others'. Granted, in the Islamic period, this "sense of Iranian community and culture" was "largely centred on the Persian language and literature[9]." There were however other subjective cultural traits that can be considered common to Iranian culture: the celebration of common festivals, notably the Iranian New Year; religious peculiarities common to the Iranian cultural area, and later, on the Iranian plateau, Shi'ism; common myths and legends; and distinctive material culture. To give but one example, it was this common sense of community that sided Safavid Turcomans with the Persians, against the Turkish Ottomans and Uzbeks. They held in common, religious beliefs (Shi'ism) and common history/myths (e.g. Iskandar Beg Monshi, hinself of Turcoman origin, writes of the armies of Iran and Turan when describing a battle between the Safavids and Uzbeks.[10]).

The Persian language is often fetishized as the common denominator of Iranian heritage and while this may have been true to in the pre-modern period it is less so today. In the pre-modern period Persian was not only the language of ethnic Persians - it was the lingua franca of the Iranian geographical area and beyond. Homa Katouzian writes: "Massive evidence of this broader Iranianism — which remained alive during the centuries of political disunity, mainly through the medium of the Persian language and literature — is provided by classical Persian literature[9]. However he goes on to say that the pan Persianist policies of the 20th century have "dealt a blow to the wider sense of Iranianism which had always existed", since the non-Persian minorities began to see themselves as subjects of discrimination[9]. It can thus be said that, despite the predominant conceptualizations of an Iranian nationalism based on language, Persian no longer has the same paramount status as it once had[11].

Finally there is the important physical aspect of Iranian nationalism that must be taken into account. This however provides an interesting contradiction: on the one hand Iranian history and culture are linked to a definite geographical context and on the other hand, the physical geography stood as a barrier against easy communication — a requisite for forming a nation[12]. These geographical barriers also kept the Iranian plateau relatively isolated. As Cottam states, "To the extent that geography was responsible for the uniqueness of Iranian character, culture, and history, it helped create a national particularism which in turn served as a catalytic force for the growth of nationalist sentiment.[12]" Thus there is a dichotomy where the Iranian geographical area was relatively inaccessible to foreign influence but was also to centralized political control. Of course the past tense is important here since with modern forms of communication, transport and control, this is no longer the case.

There is another more important aspect in the discussion of geography and Iranian nationalism. There has already been mention of an Iran as a geographical concept, but it is important to analyse its connection to Iranian nationalism. The idea of Iran, as the land of Iranians, is an old one. Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet convincingly argues that "Iran" and its corresponding territories therefore were not 19th century innovations… Nor did these ideas originate with the works of Orientalists... The impulse to set apart things Iran — land and language, culture and civilization — had old roots and simply found a new application and context in nationalism[13]."

History is again of relevance when we consider that the limits of Iran as described in Perso-Islamic sources have direct roots in Sassanian Iran. The Sassanians distinguished, even in there own empire, between Iran (Eran) and non-Iran (an-Eran)[14]. The land of Iran "corresponds roughly to the eastern Iranian world, the Iranian plateau, and Mesopotamia[15]." In a world context, Iran held special prominence as the first and central of the seven lands (keshvars). This concept of Iranshahr persisted well into the Islamic era and has influenced modern Iranian nationalism. In medieval Persian geographies, Iran would often be given special consideration as the most beautiful, fertile land, etc. If the notion of Iran, in a cultural or historic sense, was subjective and intangible, a geographic Iran was objective and tangible. As Kashani-Sabet notes, "scholars had reified this abstraction (i.e. Iran) and justified the "truth" of its existence by connecting it to a concrete reality: a territory[13]." Furthermore, "the mapping of "Iran" reinforced the idea that something concrete sustained the idea. Land existed tangibly and with a measure of constancy that culture did not, and its reality was repeatedly supported by visual evidence[13]."

Conclusion

Even today, Iranzamin ["land of Iran"] is given special importance in Iranian nationalism. While, areas that were historically considered part of Iran, are no longer part of the Iranian state, the so called "Iranian heartland" is still in tact. The very land or earth of Iran is held in semi-sacred reverence. One has only to read modern literature for many examples of this. For example, the un-official Iranian national anthem starts right off by extolling Iran as the "treasured land" (marz'e por gawhar) and with "soil that is the wellspring of virtue" (khakat sar cheshme'ye honar).

As already noted, Iran is multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic country. Yet, it does have the basis to constitute a single nation, in the simplest sense formed as a result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result of people living together generation after generation, in a common territory[16]. Iranian nationalism is reflective of Iran's long and diverse history. Thus, it is not unusual to have nationalisms based on the pre-Islamic heritage, Shi'ism, etc. Iranian heritage provides a collage of experiences that Iranians can pick and choose from, focusing on some while paying less attention on others. Ultimately, Iranian nationalism is a romantic notion, perhaps best described by Renan when he writes,

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Only two things, actually, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other is in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances; the other is the actual consent , the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage which all hold in common[17].

References:

[1] Shahrough Akhavi, "State Formation and Consolidation in Twentieth Century Iran" in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (eds), The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, Syracuse University Press, 1997, pp. 198-99.

[2] Ryszard Kapuscinski, "One World, Two Civilizations," New Perspectives Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 3 (Fall 1988), p. 39.

[3] For a critique by a historian of Iran see: Roger Savory, "The emergence of the Modern Persian State Under the Safavids," Studies on the History of Safawid Iran, Variorum, 1987, pp. 1-5.

[4] Anthony Smith, "Memory and modernity: Reflections on Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism," Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 2, no. 3, 1996, pp. 371-88.

[5] Gnoli, Gherardo. "The Idea of Iran," Roma : Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1989.

[6] Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, "Refashioning Iran: Language and Culture During the Constitutional Revolution," Iranian Studies, vol. 23, numbers 4, 1990, pp. 77-101.

[7] Abdul-Baha, The Secret of Divine Civilization, tr. M. Gail, Baha'i Publishing Trust, 1990, pp. 6-9.

[8] Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, 1991; Paschalis Kitromilides and Georgios Varouxakis, "The 'Imagined Communities' Theory of Nationalism," in Athena Leoussi and Anthony D Smith (eds) Encyclopaedia of Nationalism . Oxford: Transaction Books, 2000, pp. 136-139.

[9] Homa Katouzian, State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis, I.B. Taurus, 2000, p. 77; pp. 327-328.

[10] Eskandar Beg Monshi, Tarikh-e 'Alamara-ye 'Abbasi, tr. R. Savory, Westview Press, 1978.

[11] Mehrzad Boroujerdi, "Contesting Nationalist Constructions of Iranian Identity" Critique: Journal for Critical Studies of the Middle East, no. 12 (Spring 1998).

[12] Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979, p. 23.

[13] Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, "Fragile Frontiers: the Diminishing Domains of Qajar Iran," Int’l. Journal of Middle Easter Studies, vol. 29, 1997, pp. 205-34; p. 207.

[14] D.N. Mackenzie, "Eran, Eransharhr," Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. E. Yarshater, vol. VIII, Mazda Pub. 1998, pp. 534-535. See for etymology and connotations.

[15] Touraj Daryaee, Sharestaniha’i Eranshahr, Mazda Pub., 2002, p. 1.

[16] Joseph Stalin, "The nation" in John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (eds.), Nationalism. Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 19.

[17] Ernest Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation? in John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (eds.), Nationalism. Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 18.

Read more ...

Iran Still Pursues Turks Abusing Policy – Human Rights Activist

Azerbaijan, Baku, 23 May / Trend News corr D. Khatinoglu/ Although a half of Iranian population is Iranian citizens of Turkic origin (Azerbaijanis), the authorities still do not recognize their most simple cultural and political rights. “Turks are still abused in Iran. They undergo political pressure and discrimination,” Iranian human rights activist Alireza Javanbakht said to Trend News.

On 22 May, 2006, a range of Iranian cities hosted protests against cartoon depicturing Iranian Turks as cockroaches, which was published in the Iran official newspaper. According to the human rights organizations, Iran’s Azerbaijanis every year make preparations for peace actions devoted to anniversary of that event, but the authorities still do not give permission.

“The authorities do not fulfil its countless promises to restore the cultural rights of Turks, this year the activists of the national movement in Iran again got prepared for mass protest against ‘Persian chauvinistic thinking’,” Javanbakht, speaker of the committee of defence of Azerbaijan political prisoners, said.

According to Javanbakht, an unofficial curfew has been applied in several cities in Southern Azerbaijan (northern part of Iran). “Security bodies called the activists of the national movement and told them not to leave their houses on 22 May. Police in the Southern Azerbaijan cities are ready for action and already scaring the population,” he said via e-mail from Ankara on 22 May.

The human rights activist said that movement’s several activists engaged in cultural and political activities were arrested in recent days. “We have reliable information that Ali Sadigi, Jamshid Zarei, Hujat Iragi, Salman Iragi, Salar Iragi, Akbar Abdullai and Hamid Rustami were arrested. Security bodies have threatened many activist over phones and told them not to participate in the protest actions,” Javanbakht wrote

According to unofficial reports, presently 35mln people in Iran are of Turkic origin. Iran’s Azerbaijanis do not have right to study in their native language, to open independent newspaper or other media organizations. Tens of Azerbaijani activists are imprisoned.

http://news.trendaz.com/index.shtml?show=news&newsid=1206736&lang=EN

Read more ...

ADAPP Calls on Iranian Authorities to Respect the Freedom of Assembly as Azerbaijani Iranians Mark the Anniversary of the May, 2006 Demonstrations

MAY 20, 2008. FOR IMMIDIATE RELEASE.

VANCOUVER, CANADA: At the anniversary of the May, 2006 demonstrations by Azerbaijani Iranians against the publication of a cartoon degrading and threatening them as an ethnic group, the Association for the Defence of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran (ADAPP) calls on Iranian authorities to be respectful of all citizens' constitutional rights, to stop the arrest and torture of Azerbaijani activists and to release Azerbaijani prisoners of conscience. The Association also calls on human rights organizations and democratic countries to join them in pressuring Iran to respect the freedom of assembly.

On May 16, 2006 the official state newspaper, Iran Daily, published a cartoon which portrayed Azerbaijanis as a cockroach and instructed ten ways to exterminate the insect. In northwest Iran, where Azerbaijanis dominate, hundreds of thousands demonstrated to protest the cartoon and decades of discrimination and humiliation by the state. Although the demonstrations were peaceful and theoretically constitutional, (Article 17 of the Iranian constitution states "Unarmed assemblies and marches may be freely organized, provided that no violation of the foundations of Islam is involved."), the demonstrations were violently suppressed. At least 27 people were killed and over one hundred people were injured. A large number of people were arrested. Many detained activists were tortured and made to sign papers promising not to participate or to urge participation by others in demonstrations. Since May, 2006, arrests of Azerbaijani activists have continued.

For more than eighty years, under both the Pahlavi dynasty and the present Islamic government, Azerbaijanis and other non-Persian ethnic groups of Iran have faced a policy of systematic assimilation. Non_Persian Iranians have experienced severe violations of their basic human rights. Although non-Persians constitute more than fifty percent of Iranian population and the Iranian constitution states that they have rights as ethnic groups they can not represent themselves and are deprived of education in their own languages. Detentions of cultural and human rights activists and threats continue to this day.

The Association appeals to the world community to watch and witness as Azerbaijanis mark the anniversary of the May, 2006 demonstrations. The Iranian government is called on to respect freedom of expression and not to use violent repression.

CONTACT: FAKHTEH ZAMANI

Tel : +1-604-677-2524

Read more ...

AZERBAIJANI COMMUNITY IN IRAN

Vaz, Keith

That this House expresses concern at the arrests of thousands of Azerbaijani activists in Iran; notes that this followed large-scale demonstrations in May, when thousands of Azerbaijanis in north-western Iran came onto the streets demanding their cultural rights and an end to the persecution that has been conducted against the country's non-Persian ethnic groups since the arrival of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925; recognises that the Azerbaijani population makes up 25 per cent. of the population (up to 30 million people according to the United Nations Economic and Social Council), yet there are no schools in Iran that teach in the Azerbaijani language; further notes that the demonstrations among the Azerbaijanis in Iran are the biggest in the country since the Islamic revolution of 1979; and calls upon the United Kingdom Government to call upon the Iranian government to give greater cultural rights to Azerbaijanis and other ethnic groups in the country.

http://edmi.parliament.uk/EDMi/EDMDetails.aspx?EDMID=31821&SESSION=885

British Parliament tables Motion about South-Azerbaijanis

Dear countrymen,

I would like to inform you that the former Minister of European Affairs, Mr. Keith Vaz, and his colleague in the British Foreign Affairs Committee Mr. Paul Keetch, together with the Azerbaijani Youth Association in Sweden, has taken the initiative to table an Early Day Motion (EDM) about the Azerbaijanis in Iran.

EDMs exist to allow Members of the Parliament to put on record their opinion on a subject they would like to raise awareness about and canvass support for it from fellow Members.

The EDM about the Azerbaijani community in Iran states that despite that the United Nations Economic and Social Council estimates the amount of Azerbaijanis in the country to around 30 million, there is not a single school teaching in the Azerbaijani language. Further the EDM expresses concerns over the arrests of thousands of Azerbaijani activists in Iran and notes that this followed large-scale demonstrations in May, when thousands of Azerbaijanis in north-western Iran came onto the streets demanding their cultural rights and an end to the persecution that has been conducted against the country's non-Persian ethnic groups since the arrival of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925. The EDM also recognizes that the demonstrations among the Azerbaijanis in Iran are the biggest in the country since the Islamic revolution of 1979.

In the EDM Mr. Vaz and Mr. Keetch and 21 other members of the British Parliament, call on the government of the United Kingdom to call on the Iranian government to give greater cultural rights to the Azerbaijanis in Iran. Altogether 23 Members of the British Parliament are demanding from the government of the United Kingdom to engage in increased rights for the South-Azerbaijanis.

EDMs often attract a great deal of publicity; they are circulated not only among all MPs but also among leading journalists in the country and are considered as a gauge of opinion.

An initiative such as the EDM in Great Britain will send signals to other European governments about the importance and actuality of the question, but fore mostly it will send signals to the Iranian government making known for them that Great Britain is aware and watching.

The EDM will be open for signatures until November 2007 when the queen of the United Kingdom will reopen the parliament, and will much likely gain even wider support during the remaining moths.

We are sure that all sincere Azerbaijanis will receive this news with great joy, but we are likely ensured that the Persian chauvinists all over the world will receive it with even greater bitterness. The Motion about the situation of the Azerbaijanis in Iran that was laid in the Swedish parliament on October 31, created storms of raged protests against it from different chauvinistic Persian groups in the Diaspora, not only in Sweden but as far away as in France and America. They organized and lobbied for the withdrawal of the motion through articles, radio- and TV-discussions and by pressuring Swedish Members of the Parliament; however none of their activities led to any success.

At the same time it is worth noting that the exile-Azerbaijanis within a very short period of time impressively mobilized their forces, putting aside their internal conflicts, and all together confronted the Persian chauvinists and defended the motion. Instead of harming the lobby activities of the Azerbaijanis the Persian chauvinists actually instead revealed their true faces to political circles in Sweden and proved the existence of the Persian chauvinists even among Iranians in the Diaspora.

Therefore I would like to take this opportunity to thank all Azerbaijani organizations and personalities that stood behind us during these tumult months. I would also like to express the feeling of extreme pride when witnessing how strong our community can be when needed, such as when being exposed to organized attacks like these.

We are prepared for attacks this time as well, but we believe we will succeed also this time because our fight is legitimate and conducted with democratic means through democratic channels and for democratic values.

Respectfully
Nergiz Nedaei

22.11.2006

Read more ...

Would Iranians rally 'round the flag?

By Edward N. Luttwak, EDWARD N. LUTTWAK is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. February 10, 2006

THERE MAY BE good reasons to oppose an air attack on Iran's nuclear installations at this time, but one of the arguments that is advanced most often is seriously flawed.The argument is based on a familiar axiom that ruling regimes, even unpopular ones, are strengthened by such attacks because the bombarded nation rallies around its rulers. But this does not apply to Iran. It's true that when Germans, Japanese and Serbs, among others, were bombed, they did indeed support their leaders all the more because the attacks increased their sense of national solidarity.

ADVERTISEMENT

Iran, however, is not a nation-state but rather a multinational empire dominated by Persians, much as the Soviet Union was once dominated by Russians. Except that in this case, the Persians only account for just over half the population of Iran (making them a smaller proportion than the Russians were even in the final days of the Soviet Union).

No scholar who studies Iran would dispute that there is a very strong Persian identity and pride of ownership in ruling Iran among the Persians, but only a very weak sense of Iranian participation among non-Persians. Iran is not like Lebanon, where the different communities often fight each other. Instead, Iran's minorities each resist the Persian-dominated central government. Just in the last month, guerrillas of Baluch nationality kidnapped soldiers in southeast Iran. Arabs of Khuzistan province next to Iraq detonated bombs in Ahwaz, and Kurds clashed with the rural police.

To the extent that the different nationalities each have their own identities and oppose the essentially Persian regime, they are likely to applaud external attacks on the nuclear installations rather than rally to the defense of their rulers.

So how does factional solidarity in Iran break down?

The Kurds, who account for about 9% of the population, have been encouraged by the example of virtual Kurdish independence in Iraq next door. Their demands for autonomy are becoming more forceful, and something of an insurgency seems to have started. Very few Kurds are likely to rally around their Persian overlords.

Smaller nationalities that are known to be disaffected because of recent examples of violent resistance include the Arabs at 3% of Iran's population and the Baluch at 2%. Little is known of the intensity of the national sentiments of the Turkmen and Lurs (2% each), and still less of the Gilaki and Mazandarani (8% in all), who may be politically more assimilated simply because they speak Persian dialects.

Along with the Kurds, all the smaller nationalities amount to only a quarter of Iran's population; but Turkic-speaking Azeris add another 24% all by themselves. Many Azeri families in Tehran especially are believed to be thoroughly assimilated, but the more numerous Azeris farther north are not, and national revival and separatist groups have become increasingly active among them. Since Azerbaijan just across the border gained its independence from the Soviet Union, the Azeris have a national home of their own, and it is not Iran.

The religious extremism of Iran's regime has further fractured the nation's solidarity by discriminating not only against the non-Muslim Bahais, Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians who amount to only 2% of the total population, and are of yet smaller political significance, but also against the 9% or more who are Sunnis (who are not even allowed to have their own mosque in Tehran, where 1 million of them live).

So, all in all, at least half the population is unlikely to be motivated by feelings of solidarity with their rulers. Only among the Persians are many likely to react to an attack as the axiom prescribes; others might welcome the humiliation of their oppressors. The bombing of Iran's nuclear installations may still be a bad idea for other reasons, but not because it would strengthen the hold of its rulers. One may hope that Iran's rulers are not misled by their own propaganda and will therefore accept a diplomatic solution rather than gamble all on an irrelevant axiom.

Los Angeles Times
April 9, 2006

www.iranisnotpersia.com

Read more ...

The Tomorrow of Iran will Be Bloodshed

Ensafali Hedayat;Iranian- Azeri Independent Journalist

Hedayat222@yahoo.com

I received a scroll today from the Iranian Azeris. It was signed by more than 17,536 Azeris from all over the world. The Azeris are one of the many Iranian ethnic groups. There are other ethnicities in Iran, including the Persians, Arabs, Kurds, Turkmans, Baluchs, Sistanies, and so on. Most Iranians believe that the Azeris and Persians are the most dominant communities among all of the ethnicities and they think that the political and economic power in Iran belong to both of these two major ethnic groups.However, each group believes itself to be the most popular in Iran. The population of Iran is around 72 million. The Azeri political and social activists claim that the Azeri population comprises the actual majority, since they number 35 million. Even so, the ruling Persians somehow manage to relegate them to minority status.

Meanwhile, the Azeris were in power for more than one thousand years, and throughout all those centuries, they did not impose their Turkish culture and language on other Iranian ethnics. However, when the political power turned to Persian hands in the 1920s, the government imposed the Persian culture and language, designating Persian as the only official language and suppressing almost 120 languages in Iran in this relatively short period of time.

Unfortunately, there are no reliable statistics on the populations of Iranian ethnic groups. Like many other matters, it is kept under a cloak of secrecy. The Persian political system calls the Azeris in derogatory names in public and the media. In fact, the Iranian media feel free to make Azeris the main subject of a lot of jokes. The official print media and radio and television stations present them in despicable, distorted situations. For example, in May, 2006, an insulting and inflammatory cartoon was published in Iran, the daily newspaper of the official Iranian news agency (IRNA). The cartoon depicts a cockroach which talks in Azeri, instead of in Farsi, the official or newspaper’s language.

The government eventually shut down its own official newspaper, but only after a huge public protest. In 2006, outraged by the controversial cartoon and the government’s institutionalized discrimination against Azeris, the Iranian Azeris held large demonstrations in districts, cities and regions where the Azeris constitute the majority. Their main slogan was: “We are Turks!” and “The Turkish language should be official!”. They called upon the politicians of the Islamic regime to honour the Iranian Islamic Constitution’s fifteenth and nineteenth articles that allow all the ethnic groups to use their local languages in schools and universities, besides Farsi as an official language.

That national protest was as close as Iran has come to a revolution in almost thirty years. Hundreds of thousands of Azeris filled the streets. It reminded the authorities of the role played by the Azeris in the Islamic Revolution in 1978. They thought it may happen again, as it was begun by and continued by Azeris.

Therefore, the Islamic regime called thousands of its troops to quell these demonstrations. In total, the police, secret intelligence forces, Revolutionary Guards and civil militants (Basiije) killed at least eleven and arrested more than 1300 people. At least these are the two figures recorded by Iranian official news agencies.It was the biggest demonstration in Azeri history since 1978—although there were also a lot of peaceful demonstrations from 2000 every year in the Azeri-dominated provinces. I was a journalist there and I was monitoring both sides of the action. Despite my Azeri ethnicity, my thinking is not the same as that of most Azeris. In other words, many of them support the goal of full separation in theory and practice. I am an Azeri-Iranian journalist who does not have any interest in the separation of an Azerbaijan of Iran.

Nevertheless, I am an advocate of the recognition of the cultural, economic, historical and ethnic distinction of Azeris and other ethnic groups in Iran. And I am the witness of deep discriminations in these fields.There is such deep discrimination towards non-Persian Iranian Muslim ethnics in Iran that you cannot imagine it at all, because it is not possible for you to imagine yourself as the victim of such blatant discrimination and persecution. Most Canadian-born people have not felt the effects of this degree of racism and its long-term psychological and political effects. Only the people who have grown up in such a situation can fully comprehend what it feels like to be treated as second class citizens. Only they can imagine what I am going to say.

You should thank God that you were not raised in a society like that of Iran—to feel what we endured on a daily basis. The government’s attitude towards Azeris and other ethnicities in Iran is more like the deprivation of food and goods. I have been a witness to that discrimination myself because I was not permitted to read and write the language of my ancestors, that is, Turkish. I do not know anything about my background, history and culture. But I do know the Farsi and Persian culture and history perfectly, as I was forced to learn it officially in schools and university and by every bit of education and high professional training in journalism.

Although I know very little about my background, I have studied my language on my own outside of school. I know there are a few other Iranian religious ethnic groups that have their linguistic and religious rights there. However, they are relatively small groups compared to other Iranian ethnic minorities. For instance, the Armenians of Iran have special permission to have their own schools in their languages there. It is good and I am glad that they are allowed a little bit of their human rights, but what about us and other ethnics? We Iranian Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchs, Turkmans, and Sistanis constitute huge populations. However, we do not have our human rights to read, write and study in our languages in official schools and universities.

I have written many articles on this subject, not only when I was reporting from Iran and when I was in prison as a dissident, but also since I have been living in exile in Canada. Given the growing ethnic tensions, I predict that the Iranian future will be worse than politicians estimate. The future of Iran will be full of war, blood and dead bodies—and the division of the country into small parts.

Clearly, the future will bring regional and ethnic violence in Iran and throughout the Middle East. The onus is on the world human rights organizations and individual activists to do something now to prevent a tomorrow of disaster and devastation in that region.As an Iranian journalist living in Canada, it is my duty to make you aware and ask you to do your best for all the Iranian people who have been living for tens of centuries there together. Please be realistic about Iran’s future before it changes to a new Darfur.

+1-416-497-8070
Toronto- Canada

http://moriab.blogspot.com/2008/04/tomorrow-of-iran-will-be-bloodshed.html

Read more ...

Human Rights in Iranian Azerbaijan: A Year in Review

Ensafali Hedayat - April 14th, 2008

After Norouz, one can look back and review the past year’s events. This brief survey focuses on human rights and societal and cultural issues of the Azeri people in Iran. It examines daily predicaments that have plagued the lives of Azeri people and the intentional and unintentional circumstances that undermine their culture and identity. This report also summarizes the pressures and attempts by the Islamic Republic to suppress freedom of expression and the press, and the extent to which Azeri activists and supporters of human and ethnic rights are persecuted. Of course, this report is not a thorough survey of Azerbaijan; nonetheless, I hope it can help us to better understand the crucial significance of this population’s struggles, sufferings, needs, and hopes.

In December, three earthquakes on the outskirts of Tabriz alarmed people and forced them to spend a few days out in parks and streets. The earthquake did not inflict heavy damages, but if it had been a little more powerful, thousands of people would have lost their lives. According to official statistics, more than 600,000 people live on the outskirts of Tabriz in shabbily built houses that are vulnerable to natural disasters. The people of Tabriz have bitter memories of past earthquakes. And yet, Tabriz isn’t alone. In many other parts of Iran, and even the capital, officials do not seem to pay any attention to the dangers that threaten people’s lives and properties. The catastrophic consequences of Bam’s earthquake and the slow process of reconstruction over many years have increased the public’s fear in this regard.

Other important news from the past year, to which the Iranian media paid little attention, was the lack of a yearly gathering at Babak Khorramdin’s fortress. No journalist, in Iran or outside the country, inquired as to why this yearly gathering did not take place. Even Amnesty International’s statement about this event and the suppression of the Azeri people was treated in a rather cursory fashion.

It has been some years since Azeris have turned to their own ethnic symbols and Iran’s historical symbols as a powerful resource to bolster their struggle against the injustices of the current government. Babak Khorramdin is a son of this land, celebrated for his legacy and heroic deeds at a gathering at his fortress (Ouz Ghal-e Si) on his birthday every year. This day also provides people with an opportunity to assert their identity and voice their social and political demands. These celebrations of Azerbaijan’s heroes began at the end of the 1990s. In 2002 and 2003, more than 100,000 people gathered in Babak Khorramdin’s fortress and they continued to linger in the surrounding mountains for a week. They exchanged their thoughts with one another and sought solutions to their problems. This horrified the government, which feared that such gatherings could spread to the cities. That is why the government began to crack down on such gatherings the following year. To discourage them, the government turned the area around Babak Khorramdin’s fortress into a field for military maneuvers by the Revolutionary Guards and the basij on the same day. This strategy became an excuse to arrest and imprison hundreds of supporters of human rights who advocated for the Azeri people. These pressures reached their climax in 2007. People who were intimidated by the government’s unpredictable violence were forced into retreat and the celebration of Babak Khorramdin’s birth was held silently in homes.

Another important development last year was the prohibition of the use of Turkish language in the cities of this region. The government prohibited the people of this region from publicly writing in Turkish. Iranian officials in various social, political, and economic capacities have issued and carried out many directives in recent years to weaken the identity of ethnic groups, especially Azeris. One of these directives, which had been issued by the director of a trade office in Eastern Azerbaijan, exposed the Islamic Republic’s agenda completely. This directive ordered economic associations and unions to avoid using Turkish words in their advertisements and in naming their place of work and trade. Those who violated this directive faced heavy punishments. This affair became so scandalous that Akbar Alami, a Member of Parliament for Tabriz, protested against this directive and demanded its annulment.

Last year, the government also demolished the house of Sataar Khan, the National Commander and the most prominent leader of the Constitutional Revolution who fought against despotism and led the revolts against the Qajar dynasty. The decision to destroy this historical site was part of a systematic plan to downplay and discredit Azerbaijan’s history and culture. This attack against the history and achievements of Azerbaijan intends to erase memories that can unite people and spur collective action. The whispering protests became more resonant when the government felt the danger of a public revolt to a caricature in Iran Newspaper. The government was forced to retreat and promised to reconstruct Sataar Khan’s house and turn it into a museum.

At the same time, the government, just as in former years, interrupted a gathering of Azeri youths in Tehran over the tomb of Sattar Khan in the holy site of Shah Abdol-Azim, with arrests and imprisonment. Nevertheless, Sataar Khan is quite fortunate that he was killed and buried in Tehran because his tomb is becoming more prominent in the worldand the government is more reluctant to pressure his commemorators. In contrast, Baqer Khan (the national leader who has been buried in Tabriz) is deprived of visitors because this year too, the police attacked, beat up, and arrested the people who gathered at his tomb.

Along with Sataar Khan’s house, which was partly saved from demolition, the historical site of Arge Alishah (Alishah’s Castle) is still in danger. The government also plans to demolish some surviving parts of Robe Rshidi, the oldest university in Iran, in order to build a new university in its place. But if the government’s intentions are in fact sincere, it is possible to repair and reconstruct what has remained of the old site and build the new university alongside it under the same name. The government has also engaged in the destruction of parts of Tabriz’s “Samovar-Makers’ Bazaar” and Maraghe’s “Twin Towers,” an action which is either motivated by political and cultural objectives or stems from the officials’ regrettable ignorance and naïveté.

In the same fashion, the permit of the political monthly Dilmaj, which was published in Turkish, Farsi, and English, was revoked by the order of the Press Supervisory Board on October 9, 2007. Dilmaj was the only important publication in Iran which had taken Turkish language seriously. Around 100 newspapers and magazines are printed in the Iranian Azerbaijan, and two pages of each of their editions are normally published in Turkish. But most of these publications use Turkish in a way which is at times insulting to their readers, mainly because the writers of these publications are amateurs without any academic training in Turkish. Dilmaj, however, uses a group of highly professional writers who have strong knowledge of Turkish to publish a magazine which was unique.

Along with the crackdown on Dilmaj, some Turkish-language student publications at universities were also shut down. Supporters of Azerbaijan’s culture and language, however, continued their resistance and dozens of internet sites and weblogs—both engaging in transmitting news and producing analytical pieces—were born in both Turkish and Farsi languages in the Iranian Azerbaijan.

It is not only Azerbaijan’s language and culture that is imprisoned in the dungeons of the Islamic Republic. A number of Azeri political, religious, labor, and civil society activists are held in Iran’s prisons. These prisoners are held in almost 40 different prisons throughout Iran. At a certain point last year, the Evin Prison held the most Azerbaijani prisoners. There are ten prisons in Eastern Azerbaijan, 13 prisons in Western Azerbaijan, five prisons in Ardabil, and four prisons in Zanjan, and these are only the known prisons that are managed by the Organization for Iran’s Prisons and Security and Educational Affairs. Besides, there are many other secret prisons, which are run and supervised by the municipal office of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Revolutionary Guards, the basij, or others.

In 2007, a number of Azeri female human rights activists were arrested. Contrary to normal procedure, they were transferred not to the prisons’ general wards, but rather, were held in solitary confinement. Since August 28, 2007, Leyla Heydari was held in the detention of the Ministry of Information. She was later released on a heavy bail of 85,000 dollars along with her husband who had been in prison since June 17, 2007. During this time, Heydari was permitted to contact her family only once. She is a writer and women’s rights activist who showcased and sold her work alongside other women authors in her bookstore.

Shahnaz Gholami is another Azeri woman who was arrested for her activities to advance women’s rights. She also spent the entire duration of her imprisonment in solitary confinement. Gholami was arrested by plainclothes police in her house last summer for launching an internet site about the problems of women, with the help of other female activists. Gholami’s family had no inkling of her condition or whereabouts for many weeks. Shahnaz Gholami, who is also a member of the Association of Iran’s Women Journalists (RZA), had been previously imprisoned for six years during the 1980s.

In the same year, Saleh Kamrani, a Turkish lawyer who was defending political and civil society activists in courts, was arrested and detained. He is now in prison and his wife has stated in interviews that her husband’s license to practice law has been revoked by the judiciary. Saleh Kamrani is a well-known Azerbaijani lawyer who has defended some key figures of Azerbaijan’s National Movement, including engineers Amani and Abbass Lesani. Kamrani was arrested on June 14, 2006, after leaving his law office in Tehran. After a few days search by his family, it became clear that he was being detained by the Ministry of Information. For a long time, his family and close friends had no news of his whereabouts, and even his lawyer was not permitted to meet with him. Charged with “propaganda against the system,” he was conditionally released on September 18, after three months of confinement in Evin Prison.

During this year, radical Shi’a conservatives, who have overtaken the government completely, increased their attacks on other religious minorities and non-Shi’a Muslims in various parts of Iran. The atmosphere became so stifling that some Jewish families migrated to Israel.

The temples of the Sufis in Qom and Boroujerd became the objects of perpetual attacks by government agents; these temples were eventually razed to the ground and destroyed completely. The Iranian media condemned these assaults and defended the Sufis by publishing the news about these attacks widely. But when the turn of Azerbaijan’s Ali-Alahis (a branch of Sufism) came, most of these media remained silent, and offered only inadequate explanations. Like the followers of any other religion or belief, the Ali-Alahis of Azerbaijan have a right to their faith and to practice it freely. The population of Azerbaijan consists of the only people in Iran who are entirely Shi’as; indeed, the Safavids, who relentlessly spread Shiism in Iran and turned it into the official religion, were of Azeri origin. That is why the beliefs of religious minorities in Azerbaijan have the color and flavor of Shiism and the Ali-Alahis of this region, in their adoration of Ali (the first Shi’a imam), have elevated him to the status of God. But even these mystics did not remain immune to the government’s onslaughts. Unfortunately, almost all Iranians chose to ignore this encroachment on the rights of Ali-Alahis. It has been many months since four members of this sect (which has close affinities with Shi’a beliefs) were held in a remote prison in Western Azerbaijan. Almost forgotten and wiped from memory, it seems no one even bothers to inquire about these prisoners, let alone demand their freedom.

Shand-Ali Mohammadi, Bakhsh-Ali Mohammadi, and Abdolah Ghasemzadeh, all from the village of Ouch Tapeh (in Qoshachay-Miandoab, Iran) are the members of the Atash-Beygi Sect. After an armed confrontation with military forces in Miandoab in October 2004, some members of this sect were arrested and, after a summary trial, were condemned to death. Alireza Javanbakht, the spokesman of Asmak, an association which actively defends the rights of Azerbaijani people, has issued a statement about the unfortunate condition of these prisoners:

“According to the reports that we have received from Oroumieh’s Central Prison, these four individuals are not the only Ali-Alahis who have become the target of harassments by prison officials. The members of other religious minorities, who have been held in prison for non-ideological crimes, are also subject to these pressures. These prisoners are also ceaselessly harassed by thuggish and criminal inmates who are encouraged and instigated by prison guards. Sahand-Ali Mohammadi, Bakhsh-Ali Mohammadi, Abdolah Ghasemzadeh, and Mehdi Ghasemzadeh have written a letter protesting against the torture of Mola-Gholi Mohamamdi, another Ali-Alahi prisoner, by the guards of Ward 3 of the Central Prison. These individuals also protested against the violation of Ali-Alahis’ rights and some of the murders in Azerbaijan in a six-page letter dated on October 20, 2007.”

Suppression, harassment, and turmoil still abound, but, in the lead up to the elections, the Islamic Republic’s politicians suddenly remembered the people of Azerbaijan. Mohammad Khatami, the former Iranian president, made a trip to Azerbaijan to campaign for his reformist colleagues for the upcoming elections. Throughout this trip, Khatami and his entourage exhibited a special concern for Azerbaijan and its problems. To attract the votes of this region’s population, Khatami’s political rivals also utilized similar methods. During this time, a few articles about Iran’s Turkish personalities also appeared in the press, commemorating prominent figures such as Ayatollah Khoei and Ayatollah Shariatmadari. Ayatollah Shariatmadari was the only religious authority in Iran who in the early turbulent years of the Revolution firmly criticized the ratification of Article 110 of the Constitution, which provided the Velayat-e Faqih with unrestrained powers. For that very reason, other religious authorities denounced Ayatollah Shariatmadari and then forced him into silence through persecution, pressure, and house arrest.

The truth is that most Iranian politicians and reformists do not concern themselves with the pressures and injustices that the Azeri activists experience; they do not care about the damages that are inflicted on Azerbaijan’s language, history, culture, music, art, and heritage. Nonetheless, when election time approaches, these politicians travel to Azerbaijan and utter a few Turkish words and speak of some Azeri historical figures to bring people to their side and secure their votes. However, their promises are as empty as their words and their sole intention is to perpetuate the already existing pressures on people.

In 2007, a number of political activists in Azerbaijan were charged with “espionage” for Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan. One of these individuals is Hussein Foruhideh, who has since been condemned to death. As a form of psychological torture, the prison officials have given the news of his execution to his family several times. Fortunately, he is still alive and his execution has not yet been carried out. The Iranian government and the enemies of the rights of Azeri people, inside and outside the country, accuse the Azeri activists of espionage and separatism in order to curtail support from human rights and freedoms defenders in hopes that they abandon them in their struggle for the acquisition of their rights.

The Iranian government calls the Azerbaijani activists “spies,” and yet their policies are perfectly in line with those of Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan in suppressing the Azeri intellectuals. Although one naturally expects Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan to advocate for the ethnic and cultural rights of people in Iranian Azerbaijan, these governments have remained silent and even supported the position of the Islamic Republic to safeguard their own economic interests.

On November 20, 2007, the Canadian government presented a proposal to the United Nations Human Rights Council regarding the repression of freedoms and human rights in Iran. Many countries, which had not even been aware of the issues inside the region of Azerbaijan in Iran, voted for the condemnation of Iran. Not only did the Republics of Turkey and Azerbaijan refuse to condemn Iran, but the latter—without taking into account the situation of ethnic minorities in Iran, especially the Azeris and their trampled rights—went as far as to claim that Iran is a country that does not violate the rights of minorities.

This account has been so far bleak and disappointing; nonetheless, not all the news was disheartening. In the final days of 2007, five Azerbaijani political prisoners, who have been mentioned previously in this article, were released from prison and their freedom bolsters the hopes of defenders of freedom and human rights in Iran and Azerbaijan. Although abandoned, the people of Azerbaijan have begun a new year full of hope and struggle for the freedom of all prisoners and the elimination of all pressures.

http://www.gozaar.org/template1.php?id=1015&language=english

Read more ...

Government Coercion Holds Iranian Society Together: An Interview with Ensafali Hedayat

Sasan Ghahreman - February 1st, 2008

Ensafali Hedayat is a distinguished independent journalist and human rights defender. He has long fought for the rights of the people of Iranian Azerbaijan and has contributed regularly to various reformist newspapers and publications. Mr. Hedayat has written on a number of key events these past years, including the 18th of Tir incident at the University of Tehran and a gathering at the tomb of Bagher Khan, leader of the Constitutional Revolution and Azeri hero to the Iranian people. In 2004, in the process of reporting on student protests at Tabriz University, Mr. Hedayat was attacked, severely beaten by the police, and placed in detention. He was accused of spreading propaganda against the regime and spent 18 months in jail in Tabriz. Later, on his way back from the First Gathering of Iranian Republicans (Jomhoorikhahan) in Berlin, Germany, he was arrested and sent to jail again where he went on a hunger strike.

Mr. Hedayat is a two-time winner of the annual Iranian Press Festival award for the best journalism report and a winner of the prestigious Hellman-Hammett prize. He is a founding member of the Cultural Society of Azerbaijan and Yashil, an organization in support of needy and orphaned children. In this interview, Ensafali Hedayat describes the state of human rights for the people of Iranian Azerbaijan and other minorities in Iran as well as Iran’s current political and social environments.

Mr. Hedayat: You are a journalist, a human rights activist, and an advocate of human rights in Iranian Azerbaijan. As an Azeri journalist, how do you assess the obstacles you are facing?

I am a journalist, and I will always be. Naturally, journalists are part of the society they live in. In every society, people are treated unjustly by governments, institutions, organizations, companies, factories, and even individuals. Sometimes a journalist confronts an injustice and, by bringing it to light, takes a stance. This is how a journalist connects with his or her society and its people. I have always been just a journalist who lives in his society and honors his professional duties. Therefore, I was not simply a human rights activist, or an advocate of human rights in Iranian Azerbaijan. I was living among people and wrote about their problems. I care about the short- and long-term welfare of my society. Gradually, I noticed that I had become infected by the virus of self-censorship and became the passive witness to human rights abuses which should have gone public.

On the other hand, a journalist is confined to his or her time and place. I lived for a long time in Tehran, and I wrote about its residents. I wrote well and I received an award at the annual Press Festival. I was absorbed by Tehran’s issues and became detached from the problems of other regions. When I was forced to leave Tehran under government pressure and returned to Tabriz, my perspective on Iran widened to include all of Iran. Based on the news I covered about people’s problems, activists in different movements considered me as a compatriot. I earned the role of human rights activist, political activist, and advocate of Azerbaijan. But I always considered myself a journalist. On the other hand, my adversaries in the regime also accused me of “Pan-Turkism,” secessionism, spying, and so forth. But I was only a journalist who witnessed people’s agony and chose not to censor myself. The problem of a journalist like me is that people expect too much and the government expects him to keep quiet. If I become silent, my mind will adjust to the self-censorship virus, and the people who expect me to revolt and reveal government corruption will consider me a government agent and a traitor.

One of the demands of political forces during the 1979 Revolution was “self-rule for ethnic minorities in Iran,” in other words, ensuring the cultural, economic, and social development of ethnic minorities. What has remained of that slogan?

Today, you cannot even whisper these demands. Both regime officials and political activists condemn them. Those who made these demands either were executed or forced into exile. “Pragmatic” reformists and exiled opposition leaders believe that these issues are secondary and the fate of the “Islamic Republic” must first be determined, and then the government must be handed to them in order to engage in these discussions. But a large part of the minority population does not trust this segment of the opposition. The “reformists” were defeated inside Iran because they did not pay attention to the wishes of all Iranians. They still do not admit that this was a fundamentally flawed policy. Most non-Persian Iranians do not believe that these “politicians” consider them equals and therefore they do not support them. After the early days of the Revolution, participation of non-Persians in elections diminished gradually, and instead they backed their own regional movements. The influence of reformists and the exiled opposition on non-Persians is fading day by day.

Azeris are Iran’s largest ethnic minority. Almost thirty years after the 1979 Revolution, can we observe any improvement in their cultural and language situation?
No, their situation has gotten worse. In the old days, there were a few media outlets with limited coverage of cities and rural areas. More than half of the population was illiterate. But today, in each province, we have only one or two radio and television stations and Persian language enters every house through religious and entertainment programs. The local radios and newspapers are run by people who have no education in the local language. Though the Islamic Republic’s Constitution recognizes other languages and allows for them to be taught in schools and universities, not a penny has been spent on this effort. Such unjust policies and negligence have resulted in people’s distrust towards both authorities and opposition activists. Persians are the only ethnic group in Iran which enjoys the right to speak and write in its own language. Other ethnic groups must speak and write in Persian, and if they protest and seek equal rights, they will be accused of being secessionists or traitors. How can these people trust politicians who ignore them? How can they support these politicians who do not acknowledge their rights? When they do not care about ethnic rights – even when it jeopardizes their own hold on power – how can they be trusted to do the right thing in the future and not repress people?

During the Shah’s regime, Iran’s government accused the Soviet Union of agitating the ethnic minorities, and now they accuse the US of agitating these groups for independence. What is your view?

Just like before, the regime tries to paint minorities as collaborating with outside forces. The regime prefers to alienate minorities and to treat them as inferior, rather than grant them their legitimate rights. When Azeris ask for recognition of their Turkish language, they accuse them of being influenced by the Republic of Azerbaijan or Turkey and of secessionism and “Pan-Turkism” tendencies.

It is natural that people of each region consider their language, culture, history, music, trades, etc. as important and wanting to elevate them. There is nothing wrong with that. But some consider this a crime. For those who believe Aryans, Fars, and Tehranis are better than other people (which are views articulated by the Pan-Iranist Party), all other ethnic groups should forget their rights otherwise they are traitors. Do not think that you are against dictatorship, because if you support these views you are in fact supporting dictatorship.

Is it possible that people’s demands are politically manipulated by foreign powers?
We have seen that it is possible for governments to manipulate others to fulfill their interests. But this cannot be used an excuse to strip people of their human rights, including their minority rights. If a government ignores the natural demands of its citizens, they may seek other advocates and partners to reach their goals. If world powers offer support – even in just their rhetoric – to the downtrodden populations around the world, they will steal the support of these downtrodden away from those who have rejected them. As a result, it is possible for those powers to manipulate these relations. If political forces fail to recognize people or the legitimacy of their rights, people will turn to othe